Juniorprofessur für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","175"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Economic Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","192"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","100"],["dc.contributor.author","Feicht, Robert"],["dc.contributor.author","Grimm, Veronika"],["dc.contributor.author","Rau, Holger A."],["dc.contributor.author","Stephan, Gesine"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T14:23:51Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T14:23:51Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.08.004"],["dc.identifier.issn","0014-2921"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/72063"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","33"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Economics Letters"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","36"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","123"],["dc.contributor.author","Rau, Holger A."],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-07-02T06:53:28Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-07-02T06:53:28Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.020"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87463"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.title","The Disposition Effect and Loss Aversion"],["dc.title.subtitle","Do Gender Differences Matter?"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","272"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Banking & Finance"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","282"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","61"],["dc.contributor.author","Rau, Holger A."],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-07-02T06:53:43Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-07-02T06:53:43Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","This paper experimentally studies the disposition effects of teams and individuals. The disposition effect describes the phenomenon that investors are reluctant to realize losses, whereas winners are sold too early. Our experiments compare the investments of two-person teams to a setting, where investors trade alone. We find that subjects investing jointly exhibit more pronounced disposition effects than individuals. A closer look reveals that investor teams hardly realize losses and predominately sell winners. The data suggest that decision-dependent emotions may explain the differences. That is, teams reporting high levels of regret exhibit significantly higher disposition effects than individuals. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.09.015"],["dc.identifier.isi","000370462600020"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87464"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","1872-6372"],["dc.relation.issn","0378-4266"],["dc.title","The Disposition Effect in Team Investment Decisions"],["dc.title.subtitle","Experimental Evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Theory and Decision"],["dc.contributor.author","Clemens, Georg"],["dc.contributor.author","Rau, Holger A."],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-10-01T09:58:56Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-10-01T09:58:56Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.description.abstract","Abstract This paper analyzes the coordination challenge a partial cartel faces when payoff asymmetries between potential cartel insiders and potential cartel outsiders are large. We introduce two experimental treatments: a standard treatment where a complete cartel can be supported in a Nash equilibrium and a modified treatment where a complete cartel and a partial cartel can both be supported in a Nash equilibrium. To assess the role of communication both treatments are additionally run with a “chat option,” yielding four treatments in total. Our results show that subjects frequently reject the formation of partial cartels in the modified treatments. In all treatments with communication subjects are more likely to form complete cartels than partial cartels. The implications of these results are important for antitrust: payoff asymmetries between cartel members and outsiders may jeopardize the formation of partial cartels. Yet complete cartels may be formed instead, if institutional mechanisms with frequent communication are used to form cartels."],["dc.description.abstract","Abstract This paper analyzes the coordination challenge a partial cartel faces when payoff asymmetries between potential cartel insiders and potential cartel outsiders are large. We introduce two experimental treatments: a standard treatment where a complete cartel can be supported in a Nash equilibrium and a modified treatment where a complete cartel and a partial cartel can both be supported in a Nash equilibrium. To assess the role of communication both treatments are additionally run with a “chat option,” yielding four treatments in total. Our results show that subjects frequently reject the formation of partial cartels in the modified treatments. In all treatments with communication subjects are more likely to form complete cartels than partial cartels. The implications of these results are important for antitrust: payoff asymmetries between cartel members and outsiders may jeopardize the formation of partial cartels. Yet complete cartels may be formed instead, if institutional mechanisms with frequent communication are used to form cartels."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s11238-021-09842-z"],["dc.identifier.pii","9842"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/90177"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-469"],["dc.relation.eissn","1573-7187"],["dc.relation.issn","0040-5833"],["dc.title","Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1689"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Economic Inquiry"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1706"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","58"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Grosch, Kerstin; 1\r\nInstitute for Advanced Studies (IHS)\r\nVienna Austria"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Rau, Holger A.; 2\r\nUniversity of Goettingen\r\nGöttingen Germany"],["dc.contributor.author","Rau, Holger A."],["dc.contributor.author","Grosch, Kerstin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-07-13T08:11:38Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-07-13T08:11:38Z"],["dc.date.issued","2020"],["dc.date.updated","2022-02-09T13:21:27Z"],["dc.description.abstract","In this paper, we investigate how payment procedures that are deemed unfair can spur unethical behavior towards innocent coworkers in a real‐effort experiment. In our Discrimination treatment, a highly unfair payment procedure with wage differentials, half the workforce is randomly selected and paid by relative performance whereas the remaining receives no payment. A joy‐of‐destruction game measures unethical behavior subsequently. Non‐earners in Discrimination destroy significantly more than in the non‐discriminatory control treatments. In Discrimination, unethical behavior is generally high for all non‐earners, independent of individual inequality aversion and relative performance beliefs. In the control treatments, inequality aversion is the main driver of destructive behavior. (JEL C91, D03, J33, J70, M52)"],["dc.description.sponsorship","University of Göttingen http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003385"],["dc.description.sponsorship","German Research Foundation “DFG”"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/ecin.12906"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/88250"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-399"],["dc.publisher","Wiley Periodicals, Inc."],["dc.relation.eissn","1465-7295"],["dc.relation.issn","0095-2583"],["dc.rights","This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited."],["dc.title","Procedural Unfair Wage Differentials and their Effects on Unethical Behavior"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","104322"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","104322"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Public Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","194"],["dc.contributor.author","Rau, Holger A."],["dc.contributor.author","Müller, Stephan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-07-13T08:11:44Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-07-13T08:11:44Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104322"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/88251"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-399"],["dc.relation.issn","0047-2727"],["dc.title","Economic preferences and compliance in the social stress test of the COVID-19 crisis"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","105"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","110"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","83"],["dc.contributor.author","Rau, Holger A."],["dc.contributor.author","Heinz, Matthias"],["dc.contributor.author","Juranek, Steffen"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-07-02T06:52:05Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-07-02T06:52:05Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.015"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87461"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.title","Do Women Behave More Reciprocally than Men?"],["dc.title.subtitle","Gender Differences in Real-Effort Dictator Games"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","336"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Economic Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","349"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","90"],["dc.contributor.author","Rau, Holger A."],["dc.contributor.author","Heinz, Matthias"],["dc.contributor.author","Normann, Hans-Theo"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-07-02T07:10:58Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-07-02T07:10:58Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","We show that choices in competitive behavior may entail a gender wage gap. In our experiments, employees first choose a remuneration scheme (competitive tournament vs. piece rate) and then conduct a real-effort task. Employers know the pie size the employee has generated, the remuneration scheme chosen, and the employee's gender. Employers then decide how the pie will be split, as in a dictator game. Whereas employers do not discriminate by gender when tournaments are chosen, they take substantially and significantly more from female employees who choose piece-rate remuneration. A discriminatory wage gap occurs which cannot be attributed to employees' performance. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.isi","000390640000021"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87467"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","1873-572X"],["dc.relation.issn","0014-2921"],["dc.title","How Competitiveness May Cause a Gender Wage Gap"],["dc.title.subtitle","Experimental Evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1273"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Conflict Resolution"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1300"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","59"],["dc.contributor.author","Rau, Holger A."],["dc.contributor.author","Normann, Hans-Theo"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-07-02T06:52:18Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-07-02T06:52:18Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1177/0022002714530429"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87462"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.title","Simultaneous and Sequential Contributions to Step-level Public Goods"],["dc.title.subtitle","One versus Two Provision Levels"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.contributor.author","Rau, Holger A."],["dc.contributor.editor","McGeowen, Sarah"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-07-02T06:50:46Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-07-02T06:50:46Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87460"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.publisher","Nova Science Publishers"],["dc.publisher.place","New York"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Psychology of Gender Differences"],["dc.title","Trust and Trustworthiness"],["dc.title.subtitle","A Survey of Gender Differences"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]