Waldmann, Michael R.

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Journal of Comparative Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","18"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","22"],["dc.contributor.author","Blaisdell, Aaron P."],["dc.contributor.author","Leising, Kenneth J."],["dc.contributor.author","Stahlman, W. David"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-10T08:13:21Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-10T08:13:21Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/5870"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/61215"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Migrated from goescholar"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.access","openAccess"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.subject","Sensory Preconditioning"],["dc.subject.ddc","570"],["dc.title","Rats Distinguish Between Absence of Events and Lack of Information in Sensory Preconditioning"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1020"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5763"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1022"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","311"],["dc.contributor.author","Blaisdell, Aaron P."],["dc.contributor.author","Sawa, K."],["dc.contributor.author","Leising, Kenneth J."],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:18:05Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:18:05Z"],["dc.date.issued","2006"],["dc.description.abstract","Empirical research with nonhuman primates appears to support the view that causal reasoning is a key cognitive faculty that divides humans from animals. The claim is that animals approximate causal learning using associative processes. The present results cast doubt on that conclusion. Rats made causal inferences in a basic task that taps into core features of causal reasoning without requiring complex physical knowledge. They derived predictions of the outcomes of interventions after passive observational learning of different kinds of causal models. These competencies cannot be explained by current associative theories but are consistent with causal Bayes net theories."],["dc.description.sponsorship","NIMH NIH HHS [MH12531]"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1126/science.1121872"],["dc.identifier.isi","000235456900051"],["dc.identifier.pmid","16484500"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/41357"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Amer Assoc Advancement Science"],["dc.relation.issn","0036-8075"],["dc.title","Causal reasoning in rats"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","514"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Experimental Psychology General"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","527"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","137"],["dc.contributor.author","Leising, Kenneth J."],["dc.contributor.author","Wong, Jared"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.contributor.author","Blaisdell, Aaron P."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T11:12:32Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T11:12:32Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.description.abstract","A. P. Blaisdell, K. Sawa, K. J. Leising, and M. R. Waldmann (2006) reported evidence for causal reasoning in rats. After learning through Pavlovian observation that Event A (a light) was a common cause of Events X (an auditory stimulus) and F (food), rats predicted F in the test phase when they observed Event X as a cue but not when they generated X by a lever press. Whereas associative accounts predict associations between X and F regardless of whether X is observed or generated by an action, causal-model theory predicts that the intervention at test should lead to discounting of A, the regular cause of X. The authors report further tests of causal-model theory. One key prediction is that full discounting should be observed only when the alternative cause is viewed as deterministic and independent of other events, 2 hallmark features of actions but not necessarily of arbitrary events. Consequently, the authors observed discounting with only interventions but not other observable events (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, rats were capable of flexibly switching between observational and interventional predictions (Experiment 3). Finally, discounting occurred on the very first test trial (Meta-Analysis). These results confirm causal-model theory but refute associative accounts."],["dc.description.sponsorship","NIMH NIH HHS [MH12531]"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1037/0096-3445.137.3.514"],["dc.identifier.isi","000258352500007"],["dc.identifier.pmid","18729713"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/53690"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Amer Psychological Assoc"],["dc.relation.issn","1939-2222"],["dc.relation.issn","0096-3445"],["dc.title","The special status of actions in causal reasoning in rats"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]