Waldmann, Michael R.

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","242"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Topics in Cognitive Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","257"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","10"],["dc.contributor.author","Stephan, Simon"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T18:36:30Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T18:36:30Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/tops.12309"],["dc.identifier.issn","1756-8757"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/76647"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Preemption in Singular Causation Judgments: A Computational Model"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5-6"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Journal of Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","39"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.contributor.author","Hagmayer, Y."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:45:13Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:45:13Z"],["dc.date.issued","2004"],["dc.format.extent","150"],["dc.identifier.isi","000226118001358"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/47453"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Psychology Press"],["dc.publisher.place","Hove"],["dc.relation.issn","0020-7594"],["dc.title","Seeing versus doing: Two modes of accessing causal knowledge"],["dc.type","conference_abstract"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","842"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognitive Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","873"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","35"],["dc.contributor.author","Hagmayer, York"],["dc.contributor.author","Meder, Bjoern"],["dc.contributor.author","von Sydow, Momme"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:54:41Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:54:41Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","The goal of the present set of studies is to explore the boundary conditions of category transfer in causal learning. Previous research has shown that people are capable of inducing categories based on causal learning input, and they often transfer these categories to new causal learning tasks. However, occasionally learners abandon the learned categories and induce new ones. Whereas previously it has been argued that transfer is only observed with essentialist categories in which the hidden properties are causally relevant for the target effect in the transfer relation, we here propose an alternative explanation, the unbroken mechanism hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that categories are transferred from a previously learned causal relation to a new causal relation when learners assume a causal mechanism linking the two relations that is continuous and unbroken. The findings of two causal learning experiments support the unbroken mechanism hypothesis."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01179.x"],["dc.identifier.isi","000292511600004"],["dc.identifier.pmid","21609354"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/22727"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley-blackwell"],["dc.relation.issn","0364-0213"],["dc.title","Category Transfer in Sequential Causal Learning: The Unbroken Mechanism Hypothesis"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3-4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Journal of Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","43"],["dc.contributor.author","von Sydow, Momme"],["dc.contributor.author","Meder, Bjoern"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T11:14:32Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T11:14:32Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.format.extent","42"],["dc.identifier.isi","000259264300464"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/54144"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Psychology Press"],["dc.publisher.place","Hove"],["dc.relation.issn","0020-7594"],["dc.title","Transitivity heuristics in causal reasoning"],["dc.type","conference_abstract"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","249"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Memory & Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","264"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","37"],["dc.contributor.author","Meder, Bjoern"],["dc.contributor.author","Hagmayer, York"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:31:14Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:31:14Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","Recent studies have shown that people have the capacity to derive interventional predictions for previously unseen actions from observational knowledge, a finding that challenges associative theories of causal learning and reasoning (e.g., Meder, Hagmayer, & Waldmann, 2008). Although some researchers have claimed that such inferences are based mainly on qualitative reasoning about the structure of a causal system (e.g., Sloman, 2005), we propose that people use both the causal structure and its parameters for their inferences. We here employ an observational trial-by-trial learning paradigm to test this prediction. In Experiment 1, the causal strength of the links within a given causal model was varied, whereas in Experiment 2, base rate information was manipulated while keeping the structure of the model constant. The results show that learners' causal judgments were strongly affected by the observed learning data despite being presented with identical hypotheses about causal structure. The findings show furthermore that participants correctly distinguished between observations and hypothetical interventions. However, they did not adequately differentiate between hypothetical and counterfactual interventions."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.3758/MC.37.3.249"],["dc.identifier.isi","000263942300001"],["dc.identifier.pmid","19246341"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/17076"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Psychonomic Soc Inc"],["dc.publisher.place","Austin"],["dc.relation.conference","49th Annual Meeting of Experimental Psychologists"],["dc.relation.eventlocation","Trier, GERMANY"],["dc.relation.issn","0090-502X"],["dc.title","The role of learning data in causal reasoning about observations and interventions"],["dc.type","conference_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1233"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Journal of Neuroscience"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1238"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","22"],["dc.contributor.author","Satpute, A. B."],["dc.contributor.author","Fenker, D. B."],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.contributor.author","Tabibnia, G."],["dc.contributor.author","Holyoak, K. J."],["dc.contributor.author","Lieberman, M. D."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:56:07Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:56:07Z"],["dc.date.issued","2005"],["dc.description.abstract","The capacity to evaluate causal relations is fundamental to human cognition, and yet little is known of its neurocognitive underpinnings. A functional magnetic resonance imaging study was performed to investigate an hypothesized dissociation between the use of semantic knowledge to evaluate specifically causal relations in contrast to general associative relations. Identical pairs of words were judged for causal or associative relations in different blocks of trials. Causal judgments, beyond associative judgments, generated distinct activation in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and right precuneus. These findings indicate that the evaluation of causal relations in semantic memory involves additional neural mechanisms relative to those required to evaluate associative relations."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/j.1460-9568.2005.04292.x"],["dc.identifier.isi","000231903000025"],["dc.identifier.pmid","16176366"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/49940"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Blackwell Publishing"],["dc.publisher.place","Oxford"],["dc.relation.conference","28th International Congress of Psychology"],["dc.relation.eventlocation","Beijing, PEOPLES R CHINA"],["dc.relation.issn","0953-816X"],["dc.title","An fMRI study of causal judgments"],["dc.type","conference_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","9"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie)"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","22"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","55"],["dc.contributor.author","Reips, Ulf-Dietrich"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T11:19:53Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T11:19:53Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.description.abstract","In three experiments we investigated whether two procedures of acquiring knowledge about the same causal structure, predictive learning ( from causes to effects) versus diagnostic learning ( from effects to causes), would lead to different base-rate use in diagnostic judgments. Results showed that learners are capable of incorporating base-rate information in their judgments regardless of the direction in which the causal structure is learned. However, this only holds true for relatively simple scenarios. When complexity was increased, base rates were only used after diagnostic learning, but were largely neglected after predictive learning. It could be shown that this asymmetry is not due to a failure of encoding base rates in predictive learning because participants in all conditions were fairly good at reporting them. The findings present challenges for all theories of causal learning."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1027/1618-3169.55.1.9"],["dc.identifier.isi","000250507100002"],["dc.identifier.pmid","18271349"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/55396"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Hogrefe & Huber Publishers"],["dc.relation.issn","1618-3169"],["dc.title","When learning order affects sensitivity to base rates - Challenges for theories of causal learning"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","S0010027721003474"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","104924"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","218"],["dc.contributor.author","Stephan, Simon"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-12-01T09:24:03Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-12-01T09:24:03Z"],["dc.date.issued","2022"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104924"],["dc.identifier.pii","S0010027721003474"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/94833"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-478"],["dc.relation.issn","0010-0277"],["dc.title","The role of mechanism knowledge in singular causation judgments"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","27"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","58"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","82"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R"],["dc.contributor.author","Hagmayer, York"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-06-01T10:50:05Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-06-01T10:50:05Z"],["dc.date.issued","2001"],["dc.description.abstract","The strength of causal relations typically must be inferred on the basis of statistical relations between observable events. This article focuses on the problem that there are multiple ways of extracting statistical information from a set of events. In causal structures involving a potential cause. an effect and a third related event, the assumed causal role of this third event crucially deter-mines whether it is appropriate to control for this event when making causal assessments between the potential cause and the effect. Three experiments show that prior assumptions about the causal roles of the learning events affect the way contingencies are assessed with otherwise identical learning input. However, prior assumptions about causal roles is only one factor influencing contingency estimation. The experiments also demonstrate that processing effort affects the way statistical information is processed. These findings provide further evidence for the interaction between bottom-up and top-down influences in the acquisition of causal knowledge. They show that, apart from covariation information or knowledge about mechanisms, abstract assumptions about causal structures also may affect the learning process. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/S0010-0277(01)00141-X"],["dc.identifier.isi","000171988700002"],["dc.identifier.pmid","11672704"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/86521"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-425"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","0010-0277"],["dc.title","Estimating causal strength: the role of structural knowledge and processing effort"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","57"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5796"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","58"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","314"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:07:09Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:07:09Z"],["dc.date.issued","2006"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1126/science.1132880"],["dc.identifier.isi","000241031200024"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/25724"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Amer Assoc Advancement Science"],["dc.publisher.place","Washington"],["dc.relation.issn","0036-8075"],["dc.title","Moral minds - How nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong"],["dc.type","review"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]