Waldmann, Michael R.

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","143"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognitive Processing"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","158"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","11"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.contributor.author","Meder, Bjoern"],["dc.contributor.author","von Sydow, Momme"],["dc.contributor.author","Hagmayer, York"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:43:27Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:43:27Z"],["dc.date.issued","2010"],["dc.description.abstract","The main goal of the present research was to demonstrate the interaction between category and causal induction in causal model learning. We used a two-phase learning procedure in which learners were presented with learning input referring to two interconnected causal relations forming a causal chain (Experiment 1) or a common-cause model (Experiments 2a, b). One of the three events (i.e., the intermediate event of the chain, or the common cause) was presented as a set of uncategorized exemplars. Although participants were not provided with any feedback about category labels, they tended to induce categories in the first phase that maximized the predictability of their causes or effects. In the second causal learning phase, participants had the choice between transferring the newly learned categories from the first phase at the cost of suboptimal predictions, or they could induce a new set of optimally predictive categories for the second causal relation, but at the cost of proliferating different category schemes for the same set of events. It turned out that in all three experiments learners tended to transfer the categories entailed by the first causal relation to the second causal relation."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s10339-009-0267-x"],["dc.identifier.isi","000277096800005"],["dc.identifier.pmid","19562395"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/4249"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/19968"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.publisher.place","Heidelberg"],["dc.relation.issn","1612-4782"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","The tight coupling between category and causal learning"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Journal of Comparative Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","18"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","22"],["dc.contributor.author","Blaisdell, Aaron P."],["dc.contributor.author","Leising, Kenneth J."],["dc.contributor.author","Stahlman, W. David"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-10T08:13:21Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-10T08:13:21Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/5870"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/61215"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Migrated from goescholar"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.access","openAccess"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.subject","Sensory Preconditioning"],["dc.subject.ddc","570"],["dc.title","Rats Distinguish Between Absence of Events and Lack of Information in Sensory Preconditioning"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","273"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Behavioral and Brain Sciences"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","+"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","34"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:51:01Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:51:01Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","I defend the claim that in psychological theories concerned with theoretical or practical rationality there is a constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories: Normative theories provide idealized descriptive accounts of rational agents. However, we need to resist the temptation to collapse descriptive theories with any specific normative theory. I show how a partial separation is possible."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1017/S0140525X11000586"],["dc.identifier.isi","000296615600029"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/8631"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/21833"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Cambridge Univ Press"],["dc.relation.issn","1469-1825"],["dc.relation.issn","0140-525X"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Neurath's ship: The constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories of rationality"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.subtype","letter_note"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","789"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Psychonomic Bulletin & Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","796"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","23"],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:13:01Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:13:01Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","In the Michotte task, a ball (X) moves toward a resting ball (Y). In the moment of contact, X stops und Y starts moving. Previous studies have shown that subjects tend to view X as the causal agent (\"X launches Y\") rather than Y (\"Y stops X\"). Moreover, X tends to be attributed more force than Y (force asymmetry), which contradicts the laws of Newtonian mechanics. Recent theories of force asymmetry try to explain these findings as the result of an asymmetrical identification with either the (stronger) agent or the (weaker) patient of the causal interaction. We directly tested this assumption by manipulating attributions of causal agency while holding the properties of the causal interaction constant across conditions. In contrast to previous accounts, we found that force judgments stayed invariant across conditions in which assignments of causal agency shifted from X to Y and that even those subjects who chose Y as the causal agent gave invariantly higher force ratings to X. These results suggest that causal agency and the perception of force are conceptually independent of each other. Different possible explanations are discussed."],["dc.description.sponsorship","Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Wa 621/22-1, Ma 6545/1-2, SPP 1516]"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.3758/s13423-015-0960-y"],["dc.identifier.isi","000381177400011"],["dc.identifier.pmid","26452375"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/12591"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/40352"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.relation.issn","1531-5320"],["dc.relation.issn","1069-9384"],["dc.rights","CC BY 4.0"],["dc.rights.uri","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0"],["dc.title","Causal agency and the perception of force"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","119"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","The Open Psychology Journal"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","135"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","3"],["dc.contributor.author","Meder, Björn"],["dc.contributor.author","Gerstenberg, Tobias"],["dc.contributor.author","Hagmayer, York"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-09T11:53:10Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-09T11:53:10Z"],["dc.date.issued","2010"],["dc.description.abstract","Recently, a number of rational theories have been put forward which provide a coherent formal framework for modeling different types of causal inferences, such as prediction, diagnosis, and action planning. A hallmark of these theories is their capacity to simultaneously express probability distributions under observational and interventional scenarios, thereby rendering it possible to derive precise predictions about interventions (“doing”) from passive observations (“seeing”). In Part 1 of the paper we discuss different modeling approaches for formally representing interventions and review the empirical evidence on how humans draw causal inferences based on observations or interventions. We contrast deterministic interventions with imperfect actions yielding unreliable or unknown outcomes. In Part 2, we discuss alternative strategies for making interventional decisions when the causal structure is unknown to the agent. A Bayesian approach of rational causal inference, which aims to infer the structure and its parameters from the available data, provides the benchmark model. This account is contrasted with a heuristic approach which knows categories of causes and effects but neglects further structural information. The results of computer simulations show that despite its computational parsimony the heuristic approach achieves very good performance compared to the Bayesian model."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.2174/1874350101003010119"],["dc.identifier.fs","578454"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/6972"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/60356"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.relation.issn","1874-3501"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.subject.ddc","570"],["dc.title","Observing and Intervening: Rational and Heuristic Models of Causal Decision Making"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","979"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Animal Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","990"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","15"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.contributor.author","Schmid, Martina"],["dc.contributor.author","Wong, Jared"],["dc.contributor.author","Blaisdell, Aaron P."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:06:43Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:06:43Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.description.abstract","The goal of three experiments was to study whether rats are aware of the difference between absence of events and lack of evidence. We used a Pavlovian extinction paradigm in which lights consistently signaling sucrose were suddenly paired with the absence of sucrose. The crucial manipulation involved the absent outcomes in the extinction phase. Whereas in the Cover conditions, access to the drinking receptacle was blocked by a metal plate, in the No Cover conditions, the drinking receptacle was accessible. The Test phase showed that in the Cover conditions, the measured expectancies of sucrose were clearly at a higher level than in the No Cover conditions. We compare two competing theories potentially explaining the findings. A cognitive theory interprets the observed effect as evidence that the rats were able to understand that the cover blocked informational access to the outcome information, and therefore the changed learning input did not necessarily signify a change of the underlying contingency in the world. An alternative associationist account, renewal theory, might instead explain the relative sparing of extinction in the Cover condition as a consequence of context change. We discuss the merits of both theories as accounts of our data and conclude that the cognitive explanation is in this case preferred."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s10071-012-0524-8"],["dc.identifier.isi","000307766300022"],["dc.identifier.pmid","22744612"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/8831"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/25618"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.publisher.place","Heidelberg"],["dc.relation.issn","1435-9448"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Rats distinguish between absence of events and lack of evidence in contingency learning"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","307"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","6"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Current Directions in Psychological Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","311"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","15"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.contributor.author","Hagmayer, York"],["dc.contributor.author","Blaisdell, Aaron P."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:52:40Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:52:40Z"],["dc.date.issued","2006"],["dc.description.abstract","The philosopher David Hume's conclusion that causal induction is solely based on observed associations still presents a puzzle to psychology. If we only acquired knowledge about statistical covariations between observed events without accessing deeper information about causality, we would be unable to understand the differences between causal and spurious relations, between prediction and diagnosis, and between observational and interventional inferences. All these distinctions require a deep understanding of causality that goes beyond the information given. We report a number of recent studies that demonstrate that people and rats do not stick to the superficial level of event covariations but reason and learn on the basis of deeper causal representations. Causal-model theory provides a unified account of this remarkable competence."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/j.1467-8721.2006.00458.x"],["dc.identifier.isi","000242780000009"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/12248"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/22224"],["dc.notes","This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively."],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.intern","In goescholar not merged with http://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/13041 but duplicate"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Sage Publications Inc"],["dc.relation.issn","0963-7214"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.access","openAccess"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Beyond the information given: Causal models in learning and reasoning"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","2151"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","10"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","2163"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","22"],["dc.contributor.author","Fenker, Daniela B."],["dc.contributor.author","Schoenfeld, Mircea A."],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R."],["dc.contributor.author","Schuetze, Hartmut"],["dc.contributor.author","Heinze, Hans-Jochen"],["dc.contributor.author","Duezel, Emrah"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-10T08:13:50Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-10T08:13:50Z"],["dc.date.issued","2010"],["dc.description.abstract","Knowledge about cause and effect relationships (e.g., virus– epidemic) is essential for predicting changes in the environment and for anticipating the consequences of events and oneʼs own actions. Although there is evidence that predictions and learning from prediction errors are instrumental in acquiring causal knowledge, it is unclear whether prediction error circuitry remains involved in the mental representation and evaluation of causal knowledge already stored in semantic memory. In an fMRI study, participants assessed whether pairs of words were causally related (e.g., virus–epidemic) or noncausally associated (e.g., emerald–ring). In a second fMRI study, a task cue prompted the participants to evaluate either the causal or the noncausal associative relationship between pairs of words. Causally related pairs elicited higher activity in OFC, amygdala, striatum, and substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area than noncausally associated pairs. These regions were alsomore activated by the causal than by the associative task cue. This network overlaps with the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopaminergic network known to code prediction errors, suggesting that prediction error processing might participate in assessments of causality even under conditions when it is not explicitly required to make predictions"],["dc.identifier.fs","578453"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/7550"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/61353"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Fakultät für Biologie und Psychologie"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.subject.ddc","570"],["dc.title","“Virus and Epidemic”: Causal Knowledge Activates Prediction Error Circuitry"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","493"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Animal Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","507"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","16"],["dc.contributor.author","Schloegl, Christian"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R."],["dc.contributor.author","Fischer, Julia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:47:16Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:47:16Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.description.abstract","Diagnostic reasoning, defined as the ability to infer unobserved causes based on the observation of their effects, is a central cognitive competency of humans. Yet, little is known about diagnostic reasoning in non-human primates, and what we know is largely restricted to the Great Apes. To track the evolutionary history of these skills within primates, we investigated long-tailed macaques' understanding of the significance of inclinations of covers of hidden food as diagnostic indicators for the presence of an object located underneath. Subjects were confronted with choices between different objects that might cover food items. Based on their physical characteristics, the shape and orientation of the covers did or did not reveal the location of a hidden reward. For instance, hiding the reward under a solid board led to its inclination, whereas a hollow cup remained unaltered. Thus, the type of cover and the occurrence or absence of a change in their appearance could potentially be used to reason diagnostically about the location of the reward. In several experiments, the macaques were confronted with a varying number of covers and their performance was dependent on the level of complexity and on the type of change of the covers' orientation. The macaques could use a board's inclination to detect the reward, but failed to do so if the lack of inclination was indicative of an alternative hiding place. We suggest that the monkeys' performance is based on a rudimentary understanding of causality, but find no good evidence for sophisticated diagnostic reasoning in this particular domain."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s10071-012-0591-x"],["dc.identifier.gro","3150669"],["dc.identifier.pmid","23417558"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/10327"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/7450"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.relation.doi","10.1007/s10071-012-0591-x"],["dc.relation.issn","1435-9448"],["dc.relation.issn","1435-9448"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Understanding of and reasoning about object–object relationships in long-tailed macaques?"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","12067"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","19"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","19"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Demel, Ronja; 1Institute of Psychology, Georg-August University, 37073 Goettingen, Germany"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Grassi, Francesco; 1Institute of Psychology, Georg-August University, 37073 Goettingen, Germany"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Rafiee, Yasaman; 1Institute of Psychology, Georg-August University, 37073 Goettingen, Germany"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Waldmann, Michael R.; 1Institute of Psychology, Georg-August University, 37073 Goettingen, Germany"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Schacht, Annekathrin; 1Institute of Psychology, Georg-August University, 37073 Goettingen, Germany"],["dc.contributor.author","Demel, Ronja"],["dc.contributor.author","Grassi, Francesco"],["dc.contributor.author","Rafiee, Yasaman"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R."],["dc.contributor.author","Schacht, Annekathrin"],["dc.contributor.editor","Lamichhane, Dirga Kumar"],["dc.date.accessioned","2022-11-01T10:17:25Z"],["dc.date.available","2022-11-01T10:17:25Z"],["dc.date.issued","2022"],["dc.date.updated","2022-11-11T13:13:04Z"],["dc.description.abstract","(1) Background: The COVID-19 pandemic provided a unique opportunity to investigate how moral reasoning is influenced by individuals’ exposure to a crisis and by personal, societal and temporal proximity. We examined how Italians and Germans judged different behaviors that arose because of the pandemic, which affected health and societal matters. (2) Methods: Over the course of four months and three assessment periods, we used an observational online survey to assess participants’ judgments regarding seven scenarios that addressed distributive shortages during the pandemic. (3) Results: Overall, there was no clear answering pattern across all scenarios. For a variation of triage and pandemic restrictions, most participants selected a mean value, which can be interpreted as deferring the choice. For the other scenarios, most participants used the extremes of the scale, thereby reflecting a clear opinion of the public regarding the moral issue. In addition, moral reasoning varied across the two countries, assessment periods, fear, and age. (4) Conclusions: By using scenarios that were taken from real-life experiences, the current study addresses criticism that moral research mostly relies on unrealistic scenarios that lack in external validity, plausibility, and proximity to everyday situations. In addition, it shows how lay people regard measures of public health and societal decision-making."],["dc.description.sponsorship","the German Research Foundation (DFG)"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.3390/ijerph191912067"],["dc.identifier.pii","ijerph191912067"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/116805"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-605"],["dc.publisher","MDPI"],["dc.relation.eissn","1660-4601"],["dc.rights","Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)."],["dc.title","How German and Italian Laypeople Reason about Distributive Shortages during COVID-19"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]