Schultze-Gerlach, Thomas

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","705"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Organizational Behavior"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","721"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","35"],["dc.contributor.author","Haeusser, Jan Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomaschek, Anne"],["dc.contributor.author","Mojzisch, Andreas"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:38:34Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:38:34Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","People frequently have to work in high repetitive jobs. Previous research has focused exclusively on the effects of task repetitiveness on well-being, while neglecting effects on work performance. In the present study, we aimed to fill this void by conducting two workplace simulations with experimental manipulations of task repetitiveness. Participants worked for about 5hours at either a computer workstation, compiling computer hardware packages according to customer requests (Experiment 1, N=160), or at an assembly line, piecing together equipment sets for furniture (Experiment 2, N=213). Both experiments provide consistent evidence that high repetitiveness has a detrimental effect on well-being, whereas work performance increases under conditions of high repetitiveness. On a practical level, our study hence shows that high task repetitiveness is a double-edged sword for both employees and organizations. On a conceptual level, our findings emphasize the necessity to account for both mental strain and work performance when examining the effects of task repetitiveness. Copyright (c) 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1002/job.1920"],["dc.identifier.isi","000337636000007"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/33089"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley-blackwell"],["dc.relation.issn","1099-1379"],["dc.relation.issn","0894-3796"],["dc.title","Experimental evidence for the effects of task repetitiveness on mental strain and objective work performance"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","170"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie)"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","183"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","64"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Mojzisch, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:24:00Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:24:00Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.description.abstract","Research in the judge-advisor-paradigm suggests that advice is generally utilized less than it should be according to its quality. In a series of four experiments, we challenge this widely held assumption. We hypothesize that when advice quality is low, the opposite phenomenon, namely overutilization of advice, occurs. We further assume that this overutilization effect is the result of anchoring: advice serves as an anchor, thus causing an adjustment toward even useless advice. The data of our four experiments support these hypotheses. Judges systematically adjusted their estimates toward advice that we introduced to them as being useless, and this effect was stable after controlling for intentional utilization of this advice. Furthermore, we demonstrate that anchoring-based adjustment toward advice is independent of advice quality. Our findings enhance our understanding of the processes involved in advice taking and identify a potential threat to judgment accuracy arising from an inability to discount useless advice."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1027/1618-3169/a000361"],["dc.identifier.isi","000404038800003"],["dc.identifier.pmid","28633625"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/42575"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","PUB_WoS_Import"],["dc.publisher","Hogrefe & Huber Publishers"],["dc.relation.issn","2190-5142"],["dc.relation.issn","1618-3169"],["dc.title","On the Inability to Ignore Useless Advice A Case for Anchoring in the Judge-Advisor-System"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","144"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Judgment and Decision Making"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","171"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","10"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakotoarisoa, Anne-Fernandine"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:00:11Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:00:11Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","Six experiments investigated how the distance between one's initial opinion and advice relates to advice utilization. Going beyond previous research, we relate advice distance to both relative adjustments and absolute adjustments towards the advice, and we also investigate a second mode of advice utilization, namely confidence shifts due to social validation. Whereas previous research suggests that advice is weighted less the more it differs from one's initial opinion, we consistently find evidence of a curvilinear pattern. Advice is weighted less when advice distance is low and when it is high. This is in particular because individuals are much more likely to retain their initial opinions in the light of near advice. Also, absolute opinion adjustments towards the advice increases in a monotone fashion as advice distance increases. This finding is in contrast to the predictions of the theoretical framework previous studies on advice distance are based on, social judgment theory. Instead, they data are more in line with a simple stimulus-response model suggesting that absolute adjustments towards the advice increase with advice distance but-potentially-with diminished sensitivity. Finally, our data show that advice can be utilized even when it receives zero weight during belief revision. The closer advice was to the initial opinions, the more it served as a means for social validation, increasing decision-makers' confidence in the accuracy of their final opinions. Thus, our findings suggest that advice utilization is a more complex function of advice distance than previously assumed."],["dc.identifier.isi","000351862400003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/37747"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Soc Judgment & Decision Making"],["dc.relation.issn","1930-2975"],["dc.title","Effects of distance between initial estimates and advice on advice utilization"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1371"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","7"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Psychological Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1372"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","24"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Mojzisch, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:53Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:53Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1177/0956797612472206"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151527"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/10809"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8333"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.publisher","SAGE Publications"],["dc.relation.issn","0956-7976"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Groups Weight Outside Information Less Than Individuals Do Because They Should"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","e159"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Behavioral and Brain Sciences"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","39"],["dc.contributor.author","Mojzisch, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Hüffmeier, Joachim"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T15:22:17Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T15:22:17Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","Notwithstanding the appeal of the \"one size fits all\" approach that Baumeister et al. propose, we argue that there is no panacea for improving group performance. The concept of \"differentiation of selves\" constitutes an umbrella term for similar seeming but actually different constructs. Even the same type of \"differentiation of selves\" can be beneficial for some and harmful for other tasks."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1017/S0140525X15001478"],["dc.identifier.eissn","1469-1825"],["dc.identifier.isi","000389602500068"],["dc.identifier.issn","0140-525X"],["dc.identifier.pmid","28355798"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/73342"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Cambridge Univ Press"],["dc.relation.issn","1469-1825"],["dc.relation.issn","0140-525X"],["dc.title","Differentiation of selves: Differentiating a fuzzy concept"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.subtype","letter_note"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","24"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","36"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","118"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Mojzisch, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:52Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:52Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.description.abstract","One prominent finding in research on group judgment is that groups often outperform the average of their members’ individual judgments. Previous research attributed this finding to groups weighting their more competent members more strongly (differential weighting explanation). We postulate an alternative explanation, namely that groups outperform individuals due to group-to-individual (G–I) transfer, which denotes group members becoming more accurate individually during group interaction. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that individual accuracy in an estimation task strongly increases due to interaction, leading to high accuracy at the group level. Experiment 2 replicates this finding and shows that G–I transfer can be enhanced by expertise feedback. In both experiments, when controlling for G–I transfer during group interaction, group judgments were not better than the average model. The findings imply that previously observed superior performance by groups compared to individuals may have been due to G–I transfer and not necessarily due to differential weighting."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.12.006"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151524"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8330"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0749-5978"],["dc.title","Why groups perform better than individuals at quantitative judgment tasks: Group-to-individual transfer as an alternative to differential weighting"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","108"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Economic Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","119"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","49"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:54:11Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:54:11Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","Research on escalation of commitment suggests that decision-makers make use of additional information when confronted with a potentially losing course of action. Veridical information is a helpful tool when deciding whether to continue or de-escalate commitment. However, field data suggests that one primary source of information, namely information provided by experts, is often biased toward the continuation of projects. This bias is partly the result of attempts to influence decision-makers to escalate their commitment. Previous research has, so far, not addressed the question of how decision-makers in an escalation context utilize meta-information that makes them aware of such biases. In three experiments, we show that decision-makers act in accordance with expert advice: they further escalate their commitment when the experts suggest continuation of a failing project, and they de-escalate their commitment when the experts argue in favor of withdrawal (Experiment 1). When participants are made aware of the possibility that the expert advice is biased, the impact of this advice is reduced (Experiment 2). Most importantly, when decision-makers were made aware beyond doubt that the experts aimed to manipulate them, they also relied on the information less, but they failed to fully ignore it (Experiment 3). In sum, our data suggest that decision-makers in an escalation context are prone to attempts at manipulation as they cannot fully ignore biased advice even when the deceptive motive of their advisors is disclosed to them. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.description.sponsorship","German Research Foundation [SCHU 1279/4-2]"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.joep.2015.05.005"],["dc.identifier.isi","000357762900009"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/36481"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","1872-7719"],["dc.relation.issn","0167-4870"],["dc.title","The impact of biased information and corresponding meta-information on escalating commitment"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","890"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Experimental Psychology. General"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","914"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","150"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Drewes, Sylvana"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-08-12T07:44:54Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-08-12T07:44:54Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1037/xge0000975"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/88324"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-448"],["dc.relation.eissn","1939-2222"],["dc.relation.issn","0096-3445"],["dc.title","A test of synergy in dynamic system control tasks."],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Experimental Psychology: General"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Wanzel, Stella K."],["dc.contributor.author","Rollwage, Johannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Treffenstädt, Christian"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.date.accessioned","2022-01-11T14:05:40Z"],["dc.date.available","2022-01-11T14:05:40Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1037/xge0001153"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/97721"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-507"],["dc.relation.eissn","1939-2222"],["dc.relation.issn","0096-3445"],["dc.title","Do judges prefer advisors with dependent or independent errors? Investigating judges’ advice selection and advice weighting."],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","16"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Applied Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","32"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","97"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Pfeiffer, Felix"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:43:27Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:43:27Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","Escalation of commitment denotes decision makers' increased reinvestment of resources in a losing course of action. Despite the relevance of this topic, little is known about how information is processed in escalation situations, that is, whether decision makers who receive negative outcome feedback on their initial decision search for and/or process information biasedly and whether these biases contribute to escalating commitment. Contrary to a widely cited study by E. J. Conlon and J. M. Parks (1987), in 3 experiments, the authors found that biases do not occur on the level of information search. Neither in a direct replication and extension of the original study with largely increased test power (Experiment 1) nor under methodologically improved conditions (Experiments 2 and 3) did decision makers responsible for failure differ from nonresponsible decision makers with regards to information search, and no selective search for information supporting the initial decision or voting for further reinvestment was observed. However, Experiments 3 and 4 show that the evaluation of the previously sought information is biased among participants who were responsible for initiating the course of action. Mediation analyses show that this evaluation bias in favor of reinvestment partially mediated the responsibility effect on escalation of commitment."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1037/a0024739"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151535"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8343"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","1939-1854"],["dc.title","Biased information processing in the escalation paradigm: Information search and information evaluation as potential mediators of escalating commitment."],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]