Schultze-Gerlach, Thomas

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","204"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","219"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","11454"],["dc.contributor.author","Unakafov, Anton M."],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze-Gerlach, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Kagan, Igor"],["dc.contributor.author","Moeller, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Gail, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Treue, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Eule, Stephan"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolf, Fred"],["dc.contributor.editor","Kaufmann, P."],["dc.contributor.editor","Castillo, P."],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-30T07:45:17Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-30T07:45:17Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019"],["dc.description.abstract","A Transparent game is a game-theoretic setting that takes action visibility into account. In each round, depending on the relative timing of their actions, players have a certain probability to see their partner’s choice before making their own decision. This probability is determined by the level of transparency. At the two extremes, a game with zero transparency is equivalent to the classical simultaneous game, and a game with maximal transparency corresponds to a sequential game. Despite the prevalence of intermediate transparency in many everyday interactions such scenarios have not been sufficiently studied. Here we consider a transparent iterated Prisoner’s dilemma (iPD) and use evolutionary simulations to investigate how and why the success of various strategies changes with the level of transparency. We demonstrate that non-zero transparency greatly reduces the set of successful memory-one strategies compared to the simultaneous iPD. For low and moderate transparency the classical “Win - Stay, Lose - Shift” (WSLS) strategy is the only evolutionary successful strategy. For high transparency all strategies are evolutionary unstable in the sense that they can be easily counteracted, and, finally, for maximal transparency a novel “Leader-Follower” strategy outperforms WSLS. Our results provide a partial explanation for the fact that the strategies proposed for the simultaneous iPD are rarely observed in nature, where high levels of transparency are common."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/978-3-030-16692-2_14"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/62176"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.publisher.place","hm"],["dc.relation.crisseries","Lecture Notes in Computer Science"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-3-030-16691-5"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-3-030-16692-2"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Applications of Evolutionary Computation. Applications of Evolutionary Computation."],["dc.relation.ispartofseries","Lecture Notes in Computer Science;"],["dc.relation.issn","0302-9743"],["dc.relation.issn","1611-3349"],["dc.title","Evolutionary Successful Strategies in a Transparent iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","e1007588"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","PLoS Computational Biology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","16"],["dc.contributor.author","Unakafov, Anton M."],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Gail, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Moeller, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Kagan, Igor"],["dc.contributor.author","Eule, Stephan"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolf, Fred"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-11-10T12:45:11Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-11-10T12:45:11Z"],["dc.date.issued","2020"],["dc.description.abstract","Real-world agents, humans as well as animals, observe each other during interactions and choose their own actions taking the partners' ongoing behaviour into account. Yet, classical game theory assumes that players act either strictly sequentially or strictly simultaneously without knowing each other's current choices. To account for action visibility and provide a more realistic model of interactions under time constraints, we introduce a new game-theoretic setting called transparent games, where each player has a certain probability of observing the partner's choice before deciding on its own action. By means of evolutionary simulations, we demonstrate that even a small probability of seeing the partner's choice before one's own decision substantially changes the evolutionary successful strategies. Action visibility enhances cooperation in an iterated coordination game, but reduces cooperation in a more competitive iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In both games, \"Win-stay, lose-shift\" and \"Tit-for-tat\" strategies are predominant for moderate transparency, while a \"Leader-Follower\" strategy emerges for high transparency. Our results have implications for studies of human and animal social behaviour, especially for the analysis of dyadic and group interactions."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007588"],["dc.identifier.pmid","31917809"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/17163"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/68671"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.relation.issn","1553-7358"],["dc.rights","CC BY 4.0"],["dc.rights.uri","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0"],["dc.title","Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]