Schultze-Gerlach, Thomas

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","204"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","219"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","11454"],["dc.contributor.author","Unakafov, Anton M."],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze-Gerlach, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Kagan, Igor"],["dc.contributor.author","Moeller, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Gail, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Treue, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Eule, Stephan"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolf, Fred"],["dc.contributor.editor","Kaufmann, P."],["dc.contributor.editor","Castillo, P."],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-30T07:45:17Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-30T07:45:17Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019"],["dc.description.abstract","A Transparent game is a game-theoretic setting that takes action visibility into account. In each round, depending on the relative timing of their actions, players have a certain probability to see their partner’s choice before making their own decision. This probability is determined by the level of transparency. At the two extremes, a game with zero transparency is equivalent to the classical simultaneous game, and a game with maximal transparency corresponds to a sequential game. Despite the prevalence of intermediate transparency in many everyday interactions such scenarios have not been sufficiently studied. Here we consider a transparent iterated Prisoner’s dilemma (iPD) and use evolutionary simulations to investigate how and why the success of various strategies changes with the level of transparency. We demonstrate that non-zero transparency greatly reduces the set of successful memory-one strategies compared to the simultaneous iPD. For low and moderate transparency the classical “Win - Stay, Lose - Shift” (WSLS) strategy is the only evolutionary successful strategy. For high transparency all strategies are evolutionary unstable in the sense that they can be easily counteracted, and, finally, for maximal transparency a novel “Leader-Follower” strategy outperforms WSLS. Our results provide a partial explanation for the fact that the strategies proposed for the simultaneous iPD are rarely observed in nature, where high levels of transparency are common."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/978-3-030-16692-2_14"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/62176"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.publisher.place","hm"],["dc.relation.crisseries","Lecture Notes in Computer Science"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-3-030-16691-5"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-3-030-16692-2"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Applications of Evolutionary Computation. Applications of Evolutionary Computation."],["dc.relation.ispartofseries","Lecture Notes in Computer Science;"],["dc.relation.issn","0302-9743"],["dc.relation.issn","1611-3349"],["dc.title","Evolutionary Successful Strategies in a Transparent iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]