Schultze-Gerlach, Thomas

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Developmental Science"],["dc.contributor.author","Mani, Nivedita"],["dc.contributor.author","Schreiner, Melanie S."],["dc.contributor.author","Brase, Julia"],["dc.contributor.author","Köhler, Katrin"],["dc.contributor.author","Strassen, Katrin"],["dc.contributor.author","Postin, Danilo"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-04-14T08:28:19Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-04-14T08:28:19Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.description.abstract","Abstract Developmental research, like many fields, is plagued by low sample sizes and inconclusive findings. The problem is amplified by the difficulties associated with recruiting infant participants for research as well as the increased variability in infant responses. With sequential testing designs providing a viable alternative to paradigms facing such issues, the current study implemented a Sequential Bayes Factor (SBF) design on three findings in the developmental literature. In particular, using the framework described by Schönbrödt and colleagues (2017), we examined infants’ sensitivity to mispronunciations of familiar words, their learning of novel word‐object associations from cross‐situational learning paradigms, and their assumption of mutual exclusivity in assigning novel labels to novel objects. We tested an initial sample of 20 participants in each study, incrementally increasing sample size by one and computing a Bayes Factor with each additional participant. In one study, we were able to obtain moderate evidence for the alternate hypotheses despite testing less than half the number of participants as in the original study. We did not replicate the findings of the cross‐situational learning study. Indeed, the data were five times more likely under the null hypothesis, allowing us to conclude that infants did not recognize the trained word‐object associations presented in the task. We discuss these findings in light of the advantages and disadvantages of using a SBF design in developmental research while also providing researchers with an account of how we implemented this design across multiple studies."],["dc.description.abstract","Results of the sequential Bayesian analysis of the mispronunciation effect. image"],["dc.description.sponsorship","Leibniz ScienceCampus Primate Cognition"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/desc.13097"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/82567"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-399"],["dc.relation.eissn","1467-7687"],["dc.relation.issn","1363-755X"],["dc.rights","This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited."],["dc.title","Sequential Bayes Factor designs in developmental research: Studies on early word learning"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1371"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","7"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Psychological Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1372"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","24"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Mojzisch, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:53Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:53Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1177/0956797612472206"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151527"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/10809"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8333"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.publisher","SAGE Publications"],["dc.relation.issn","0956-7976"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Groups Weight Outside Information Less Than Individuals Do Because They Should"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","e1007588"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","PLoS Computational Biology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","16"],["dc.contributor.author","Unakafov, Anton M."],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Gail, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Moeller, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Kagan, Igor"],["dc.contributor.author","Eule, Stephan"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolf, Fred"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-11-10T12:45:11Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-11-10T12:45:11Z"],["dc.date.issued","2020"],["dc.description.abstract","Real-world agents, humans as well as animals, observe each other during interactions and choose their own actions taking the partners' ongoing behaviour into account. Yet, classical game theory assumes that players act either strictly sequentially or strictly simultaneously without knowing each other's current choices. To account for action visibility and provide a more realistic model of interactions under time constraints, we introduce a new game-theoretic setting called transparent games, where each player has a certain probability of observing the partner's choice before deciding on its own action. By means of evolutionary simulations, we demonstrate that even a small probability of seeing the partner's choice before one's own decision substantially changes the evolutionary successful strategies. Action visibility enhances cooperation in an iterated coordination game, but reduces cooperation in a more competitive iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In both games, \"Win-stay, lose-shift\" and \"Tit-for-tat\" strategies are predominant for moderate transparency, while a \"Leader-Follower\" strategy emerges for high transparency. Our results have implications for studies of human and animal social behaviour, especially for the analysis of dyadic and group interactions."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007588"],["dc.identifier.pmid","31917809"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/17163"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/68671"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.relation.issn","1553-7358"],["dc.rights","CC BY 4.0"],["dc.rights.uri","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0"],["dc.title","Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","sode.12533"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","147"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Social Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","164"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","31"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Miosga, Nadja; 1\r\nDepartment of Developmental Psychology\r\nUniversity of Göttingen\r\nGöttingen Germany"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Schultze, Thomas; 1\r\nDepartment of Developmental Psychology\r\nUniversity of Göttingen\r\nGöttingen Germany"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Miosga, Nadja"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-09-01T06:38:34Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-09-01T06:38:34Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.date.updated","2022-06-15T00:13:54Z"],["dc.description.abstract","Abstract What do young children understand about arguments? Do they evaluate arguments critically when deciding whom to learn from? To address this question, we investigated children at age 4–5, when robust selective social learning is in place. In Studies 1a/b, children made an initial perceptual judgment regarding the location of an object under varying perceptual circumstances; then received advice by another informant who had better/worse perceptual access than them; and then made their final judgment. The advice by the other informant was sometimes accompanied by utterances of the form “I am certain … because I've seen it”. These utterances thus constituted good arguments in some conditions (informant could see clearly), but not in others (informant had poor perceptual access). Results showed that children evaluated argument quality in context‐sensitive ways and used them differentially for belief‐revision. They engaged in more belief‐revision when the informant gave this argument only when her perceptual condition, and thus her argument, was good. In Study 2, children were asked to find out about different properties (color/texture) of an object, and received conflicting testimony from two informants who supported their claims by utterances of the form “because I've seen it” (good argument regarding color/poor regarding texture) or “because I've felt it” (vice versa). Again, children engaged in context‐relative evaluation of argument quality, selectively learning from the agent with the appropriate argument. Taken together, these finding reveal that children from age 4 understand argument quality in sophisticated, context‐relative ways, and use this understanding for selective learning and belief‐revision."],["dc.description.sponsorship","German Science Foundation"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/sode.12533"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/88960"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-455"],["dc.relation.eissn","1467-9507"],["dc.relation.issn","0961-205X"],["dc.rights","CC BY-NC-ND 4.0"],["dc.title","Young children evaluate and follow others’ arguments when forming and revising beliefs"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Behavioral Decision Making"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","8"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Loschelder, David D."],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-11-10T12:44:56Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-11-10T12:44:56Z"],["dc.date.issued","2020"],["dc.description.abstract","Abstract Advice is a powerful means to improve peoples' judgments and decisions. Because advice quality is rarely apparent, decision‐makers must infer it from the characteristics of the advisor or the advice itself. Here, we focus on a largely neglected advice characteristic that should signal quality: advice precision. In a preregistered, high‐powered study (N = 195), we tested the effects of advice precision on advice taking. Drawing from past research and theorizing on anchor precision, we derived and tested two competing hypotheses for the relation of advice precision and advice taking—one predicting a monotone increase in advice taking when advice precision increases and the other predicting a backfiring effect of overly precise advice resulting in an inverted U‐shape. Our results support the notion of a monotone, albeit not a strong monotone, relationship. Higher perceived advice quality correlated with individuals' advice taking. Consistent with the idea that advice precision serves as a cue for advice quality, the effect of advice precision on advice taking was statistically mediated by perceived advice quality. Although the mediation analysis does not allow for causal interpretation because we did not manipulate the mediating variable, it shows that the effect of advice precision on advice taking is not merely a demand effect. Implications of our findings for theory and practice are discussed."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1002/bdm.2211"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/68668"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DeepGreen Import"],["dc.relation.issn","0894-3257"],["dc.relation.issn","1099-0771"],["dc.rights","This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited."],["dc.title","How numeric advice precision affects advice taking"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","16"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Collabra: Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","3"],["dc.contributor.author","Stern, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Schultze, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-09T11:44:35Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-09T11:44:35Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.description.abstract","G-I transfer denotes an increase in individual performance due to group interaction, for example, because of acquiring certain skills or knowledge from the other group members. Whereas such G-I transfer has been successfully shown for problem-solving tasks, evidence for G-I transfer on quantitative estimation tasks is scarce. We address this research gap with a focus on how often a group has to interact in order to fully exploit the benefit of this learning effect. Results from two experiments support the idea that a single group interaction is sufficient to induce a stable G-I transfer, which reduces group members’ metric error. Smaller metric errors indicate that people improved their representation of the correct upper and lower boundaries, or what range of values is plausible. In contrast to nominal groups, both members of continuously interacting groups and members of groups with only one initial interaction exhibited stable G-I transfer, and the size of this transfer did not significantly differ between the latter two conditions. Furthermore, we found evidence for differential weighting of group members’ individual contributions that goes beyond sheer individual capability gains under certain circumstances, namely in tasks with a population bias."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1525/collabra.95"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/14827"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/59042"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation.issn","2474-7394"],["dc.subject.ddc","570"],["dc.title","How Much Group is Necessary? Group-To-Individual Transfer in Estimation Tasks"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]