Schwager, Robert

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","997"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Canadian Journal of Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1015"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","49"],["dc.contributor.author","Aytimur, R. Emre"],["dc.contributor.author","Boukouras, Aristotelis"],["dc.contributor.author","Schwager, Robert"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:10:32Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:10:32Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates' policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/caje.12222"],["dc.identifier.isi","000388363900006"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/39876"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley-blackwell"],["dc.relation.issn","1540-5982"],["dc.relation.issn","0008-4085"],["dc.title","The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control: Strategic delegation and polarization"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","997"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Canadian Journal of Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1015"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","43"],["dc.contributor.author","Schwager, Robert"],["dc.contributor.author","Emre Aytimur, R."],["dc.contributor.author","Boukouras, Aristotelis"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-06-24T12:20:49Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-06-24T12:20:49Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87291"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Professur für Finanzwissenschaft"],["dc.title","The citizen candidate model with imperfect policy control"],["dc.title.subtitle","Strategic delegation and polarization"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","753"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Economic Theory"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","777"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","55"],["dc.contributor.author","Schwager, Robert"],["dc.contributor.author","Emre Aytimur, R."],["dc.contributor.author","Boukouras, Aristotelis"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-06-24T12:21:03Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-06-24T12:21:03Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively related to the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon effects and small changes in the electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of turnout to voting incentives in communities with low opportunity cost of social interaction, while the opposite is true for communities with high cost of social interaction. Therefore, the model predicts less volatile turnout for the latter type of communities."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s00199-013-0764-0"],["dc.identifier.isi","000333158100010"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87293"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.relation.issn","1432-0479"],["dc.relation.issn","0938-2259"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Professur für Finanzwissenschaft"],["dc.title","Voting as a signaling device"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]