Schwager, Robert

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","779"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Public Economic Theory"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","805"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","8"],["dc.contributor.author","Schwager, Robert"],["dc.contributor.author","Kotsogiannis, Christos"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-06-25T07:40:13Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-06-25T07:40:13Z"],["dc.date.issued","2006"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87303"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Professur für Finanzwissenschaft"],["dc.title","Political uncertainty and policy innovation"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","484"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Urban Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","497"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","60"],["dc.contributor.author","Schwager, Robert"],["dc.contributor.author","Kotsogiannis, Christos"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-06-25T07:40:07Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-06-25T07:40:07Z"],["dc.date.issued","2006"],["dc.description.abstract","Conventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a federal rather than in a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theoretical evidence to the contrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized-due to the existence of a horizontal information externality-by under-provision of policy innovation. This paper presents a simple model that introduces political competition for federal office and emphasizes that such competition plays an important role in shaping the incentives for experimentation. For, in this case, political actors use the innovative policies to signal ability to the electorate. This effect may offset the effect that arises from the incentive to free ride, and so a federal system may generate more innovation than a unitary one. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jue.2006.04.008"],["dc.identifier.isi","000241753700007"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87302"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science"],["dc.relation.issn","0094-1190"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Professur für Finanzwissenschaft"],["dc.title","On the incentives to experiment in federations"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","2336"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","12"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Public Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","2349"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","92"],["dc.contributor.author","Schwager, Robert"],["dc.contributor.author","Kotsogiannis, Christos"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-06-25T07:39:40Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-06-25T07:39:40Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.description.abstract","A common feature of multi-jurisdictional systems is equalization programs. The implementation of such programs, that is based on some measurement of sub-national fiscal capacity and effort, is particularly complex. Within a political economy model, this paper analyzes the impact of such systems on accountability, identifying a positive and a negative effect. The positive effect arises because with equalized fiscal resources, a consequence of equalization, citizens attach more importance to any remaining variation in public good supplies and so punish rent-taking more severely This induces politicians to restrain themselves and so accountability improves. The negative effect arises because the complexity of such programs reduces the informational content of observed public good supplies. This introduces a perverse fiscal incentive that reduces accountability. Thus, the overall impact of equalization programs on accountability depends on the balance of these effects. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.013"],["dc.identifier.isi","000261592300005"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87298"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Sa"],["dc.publisher.place","Lausanne"],["dc.relation.conference","Conference on New Directions in Fiscal Freedom"],["dc.relation.eventlocation","Lexington, KY"],["dc.relation.issn","0047-2727"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Professur für Finanzwissenschaft"],["dc.title","Accountability and fiscal equalization"],["dc.type","conference_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1480"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1506"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","55"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Kotsogiannis, Christos; 1\r\nTax Administration Research Center (TARC), Department of Economics\r\nUniversity of Exeter Business School; CESifo"],["dc.contributor.author","Kotsogiannis, Christos"],["dc.contributor.author","Schwager, Robert"],["dc.date.accessioned","2022-04-01T10:00:24Z"],["dc.date.available","2022-04-01T10:00:24Z"],["dc.date.issued","2022"],["dc.date.updated","2022-11-11T13:14:17Z"],["dc.description.abstract","Abstract\r\nQuasi‐hyperbolic discounted preferences imply that consumers overemphasize immediate current rewards and overlook future ones (they have a “bias for the present”). Within this context the literature has emphasized that the misalignment between immediate and future rewards can be rectified by government policy. Importantly, it has also been shown that intervention by a government that shares the same biased intertemporal preferences with consumers does not deliver welfare improvements. Focusing on the latter, this paper identifies conditions under which, in the presence of quasi‐hyperbolic preferences and a market imperfection (which takes the form of a negative externality), intervention by a present‐biased government is welfare enhancing. This is the case if the market imperfection is sufficiently strong or the consumers' bias for the present is weak."],["dc.description.sponsorship","Economic and Social Research Council http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000269"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/caje.12572"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/105421"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-530"],["dc.relation.eissn","1540-5982"],["dc.relation.issn","0008-4085"],["dc.rights","This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited."],["dc.rights.uri","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"],["dc.title","Present bias and externalities: Can government intervention raise welfare?"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]