Dreher, Axel

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1950"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","11"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","World Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1968"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","39"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Thiele, Rainer"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:50:04Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:50:04Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","Major DAC donors are widely criticized for weak targeting of aid, selfish aid motives, and insufficient coordination. The emergence of an increasing number of new donors may further complicate the coordination of international aid efforts. At the same time, it is open to question whether new donors (many of which were aid recipients until recently) are more altruistic and provide better targeted aid according to need and merit. Project-level data on aid by new donors, as collected by the AidData initiative, allow for empirical analyses comparing the allocation behavior of new versus old donors. We employ Probit and Tobit models and test for significant differences in the distribution of aid by new and old donors across recipient countries. We find that, on average, new donors care less for recipient need than old donors. New and old donors behave similarly in several respects, however. They disregard merit by not taking the level of corruption in recipient countries into account. Concerns that commercial self-interest distorts the allocation of aid seem to be overblown for both groups. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.024"],["dc.identifier.isi","000297525700005"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/21606"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Pergamon-elsevier Science Ltd"],["dc.relation.issn","0305-750X"],["dc.title","Are 'New' Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between nonDAC and DAC Donor Countries"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","902"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","World Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","918"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","37"],["dc.contributor.author","Koch, Dirk-Jan"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Thiele, Rainer"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:30:37Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:30:37Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","We analyze the targeting of non-governmental organization (NGO) aid across countries in a multivariate regression framework, based on a dataset for 61 important international NGOs. While our results show that NGOs are more active in the neediest countries, we reject the hypothesis that NGOs complement official aid through engaging in difficult institutional environments. Rather, they replicate location choices of official \"backdonors.\" Moreover, NGOs follow other NGOs so that aid gets clustered. Finally, NGOs select recipient countries with common traits related to religion or colonial history. Our findings suggest that NGOs keep a low profile rather than distinguishing themselves from other donors. It remains open to debate, however, whether these findings also apply to the wide variety of smaller NGOs (not covered by our sample). (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.09.004"],["dc.identifier.isi","000265562300002"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/16933"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Pergamon-elsevier Science Ltd"],["dc.relation.issn","0305-750X"],["dc.title","Keeping a Low Profile: What Determines the Allocation of Aid by Non-Governmental Organizations?"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","138"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Economic Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","153"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","56"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehler, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:15:45Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:15:45Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.description.abstract","Performance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was successful in promoting better control of corruption. We employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach, considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized. We find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the MCC, while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of MCC aid appears to have weakened the incentive to fight corruption over time. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.05.003"],["dc.identifier.isi","000299983900009"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/27774"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","0014-2921"],["dc.title","Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","160"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Economics and Politics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","184"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","27"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmaljohann, Maya"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:00:40Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:00:40Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","We investigate the importance of geo-strategic and commercial motives for the allocation of German aid to 138 countries over the 1973-2010 period. We find that geo-strategic and commercial motives matter. When we relate them to the political color of the German government in general, and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Federal Foreign Office in particular, we find their importance to be at least as strong under the socialist leadership. Socialist leadership decreases the amount of aid commitments, controlled for other factors."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/ecpo.12053"],["dc.identifier.isi","000349688400006"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/37860"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley Periodicals, Inc"],["dc.relation.issn","1468-0343"],["dc.relation.issn","0954-1985"],["dc.title","THE ALLOCATION OF GERMAN AID: SELF-INTEREST AND GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","172"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","World Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","199"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","56"],["dc.contributor.author","Fuchs, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:42:20Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:42:20Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","This article provides a survey of the aid budget literature and examines the determinants of the development aid efforts of 22 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members over the 1976-2011 period. In fixed effects regressions, we identify aid inertia, per-capita GDP, the creation of an independent aid agency, colonial history, Russian military capacity, peer effects, terror incidents, aid to CEEC/NIS countries, and imports from developing countries as determinants of the Official Development Assistance (ODA)-to-GNI ratio. Excluding donor fixed effects, several variables, including colonial history and the aid agency dummy, are no longer significant; the impact of per-capita GDP gets weaker, while donors' budget deficits decrease aid effort. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.09.004"],["dc.identifier.isi","000330496000012"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/33932"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.relation.issn","0305-750X"],["dc.title","Determinants of Donor Generosity: A Survey of the Aid Budget Literature"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","88"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","World Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","109"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","44"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:26:29Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:26:29Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.description.abstract","The decisions of foreign investors on technical cooperation versus equity engagements and on the degree of ownership in FDI projects are likely to depend on their relative bargaining position vis-a-vis the host country. We perform negative binominal regressions by making use of a unique dataset on about 24,500 technical cooperation and FDI projects in India by investors from 45 countries of origin over the 1991-2004 period. We find that relative market size, relative financial market development, relative risk, relative endowment of human capital, and previous international experience significantly affect the type of engagement by foreign investors in post-reform India. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.09.011"],["dc.identifier.isi","000317149000007"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/30314"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Pergamon-elsevier Science Ltd"],["dc.relation.issn","0305-750X"],["dc.title","The Role of Country-of-Origin Characteristics for Foreign Direct Investment and Technical Cooperation in Post-Reform India"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","402"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Interactions"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","415"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","39"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Fuchs, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-11-05T14:46:51Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-11-05T14:46:51Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1080/03050629.2013.784076"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/68209"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-352.2"],["dc.relation.eissn","1547-7444"],["dc.relation.issn","0305-0629"],["dc.title","New Donors"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1448"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","11"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","World Economy"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1472"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","35"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Thiel, Susann"],["dc.contributor.author","Thiele, Rainer"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:03:56Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:03:56Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.description.abstract","Using a new data set for 41 German non-governmental organisations (NGOs), we analyse the allocation of NGO aid across recipient countries in a Tobit regression framework. By identifying for each NGO the degree of official financing, we address the largely unresolved issue of whether financial dependence on the government impairs the targeting of NGO aid. It turns out that German NGOs are more active in poorer countries, while they do not complement official aid by working under difficult local conditions. Beyond a certain threshold, rising financial dependence weakens their poverty orientation and provides an incentive to engage in easier environments. In addition, we find that the NGOs follow the state as well as NGO peers when allocating aid. This herding behaviour is, however, hardly affected by the degree of official financing."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/j.1467-9701.2012.01455.x"],["dc.identifier.isi","000311385400003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/25003"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley-blackwell"],["dc.relation.issn","0378-5920"],["dc.title","Aid Allocation by German NGOs: Does the Degree of Official Financing Matter?"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","147"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","World Economy"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","176"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","33"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Moelders, Florian"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:46:41Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:46:41Z"],["dc.date.issued","2010"],["dc.description.abstract","This paper analyses whether aid channelled through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is less affected by selfish donor motivations and better targeted to needy recipient countries than aid distributed by state agencies. We employ Tobit (and Probit) models and make use of an exceptionally detailed database that allows an assessment of the allocation of Swedish aid channelled through NGOs in comparison to the allocation of Swedish official aid. Our analysis provides mixed results. On the one hand, NGOs appear to be altruistic as far as available indicators on political and commercial motivations of aid can tell. On the other hand, needs-based targeting of aid by NGOs turns out to be surprisingly weak. GDP per capita of recipient countries shapes the allocation of official aid, but not that of aid channelled through NGOs. The headcount of absolute poverty has a significantly positive effect on aid allocation, but its impact is not particularly strong when NGOs are involved. Overall, the Swedish case supports the sceptical view that NGOs are not necessarily superior donors compared to state aid agencies."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/j.1467-9701.2009.01233.x"],["dc.identifier.isi","000274242700001"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/20754"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley-blackwell Publishing, Inc"],["dc.relation.issn","0378-5920"],["dc.title","Aid Delivery through Non-governmental Organisations: Does the Aid Channel Matter for the Targeting of Swedish Aid?"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","373"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Economics Letters"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","375"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","115"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehler, Hannes"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:09:51Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:09:51Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.description.abstract","We empirically analyze how other aid agencies, within and outside the United States, reacted to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). We find that positive signaling effects dominate possible substitution effects. Striving for MCC eligibility thus pays. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.058"],["dc.identifier.isi","304637100013"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/26363"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Sa"],["dc.relation.issn","0165-1765"],["dc.title","Why it pays for aid recipients to take note of the Millennium Challenge Corporation: Other donors do!"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]