Meub, Lukas

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","80"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","109"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","66"],["dc.contributor.author","Meub, Lukas"],["dc.contributor.author","Proeger, Till"],["dc.contributor.author","Bizer, Kilian"],["dc.contributor.author","Henger, Ralph"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-10-16T14:42:19Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-10-16T14:42:19Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.description.abstract","Die Einführung handelbarer Flächenzertifikate wird als Regulierungsinstrument zur Reduktion des Flächenverbrauchs in Deutschland diskutiert. Bislang fehlen jedoch empirische Studien zur Untersuchung der Wohlfahrts- und Umverteilungswirkung eines solchen cap & trade Systems. Insbesondere die Frage nach der Effizienz verschiedener Mechanismen der Primärallokation von Zertifikaten ist politisch relevant, aber bisher nicht untersucht. Die vorliegende Studie analysiert daher anhand eines ökonomischen Laborexperiments, das ein Zertifikatsystem zur Flächenverbrauchsreduktion simuliert, die Auswirkungen von drei Primärallokationsmechanismen: einer vollständigen Gratiszuteilung, einer ausschließlichen Versteigerung und einer hälftigen Aufteilung von Gratiszuteilung und Versteigerung. Es zeigt sich, dass ein Auktionsmechanismus die Effizienz und Stabilität des Zertifikatsystems senkt. Zertifikatpreise weisen eine höhere Volatilität auf und es bestehen stärker als durch die Theorie zu erwartende Umverteilungseffekte zu Gunsten des Auktionators. Persistente Preisunterschiede zwischen Auktion und innerkommunalem Handel verhindern eine effiziente Allokation der Zertifikate. Während das Zertifikatsystem insgesamt bei einer Gratiszuteilung einen hohen Effizienzgrad erreicht, führt ein Auktionsmechanismus zu Ineffizienzen, Unsicherheit und starken Umverteilungswirkungen. Aus wirtschaftspolitischer Sicht unterstützen diese Ergebnisse eine Gratis-Zuteilung innerhalb eines Systems handelbarer Flächenzertifikate."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1515/zfwp-2017-0001"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/16018"],["dc.identifier.url","http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~cege/Diskussionspapiere/DP235.pdf"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Die Effizienz von Zuteilungsmechanismen bei Flächenzertifikaten zwischen Versteigerung und Grandfathering – experimentelle Evidenz"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1162"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","16"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Applied Economics Letters"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1167"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","23"],["dc.contributor.author","Meub, Lukas"],["dc.contributor.author","Proeger, Till"],["dc.contributor.author","Schneider, Tim"],["dc.contributor.author","Bizer, Kilian"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-10-15T14:53:27Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-10-15T14:53:27Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","In an experiment on moral cleansing with an endogenously manipulated moral self-image, we examine the role of the addressee of an immoral action. We find that cheating is highest and moral cleansing lowest when subjects cheat at the expense of the experimenter, while cheating is lowest and moral cleansing highest once cheating harms another participant. A subsequent measurement of subjects\\’ moral self-image supports our interpretation that the occurrence of moral cleansing crucially depends on the moral costs resulting from immoral actions directed at individuals in different roles. Our results can help to explain the different propensity to cheat and conduct moral cleansing when immoral actions harm either another person or representatives of organizations."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1080/13504851.2016.1139674"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/16019"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","The victim matters – experimental evidence on lying, moral costs and moral cleansing"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","229"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","238"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","135"],["dc.contributor.author","Meub, Lukas"],["dc.contributor.author","Proeger, Till E."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:26:28Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:26:28Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.description.abstract","The performance of groups has been thoroughly investigated in experimental economics, showing that groups are overall more rational deciders than individuals. However, while superior group performance in economic experiments has primarily been shown for face-to-face decision making, this has ceased to be the prevalent form of communication in many IT-based organizations. We conduct a social learning experiment to compare group rationality under conditions of virtual and face-to-face communication. Group matching is conducted based on cognitive abilities to determine its impact on group rationality. Despite the more challenging transmission of information, we find that virtual communication does not reduce overall group rationality. There is no evidence that group performance is driven by a cognitively superior group member, which hints at the relevance of the process of group discussions. Our results have methodological implications for the further study of group performance in experimental economics, as well as practical consequences for the choice of communication structures and team composition within decentralized organizations. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jebo.2017.02.010"],["dc.identifier.isi","000398643100014"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/43050"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","PUB_WoS_Import"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","1879-1751"],["dc.relation.issn","0167-2681"],["dc.title","The impact of communication regimes and cognitive abilities on group rationality: Experimental evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","117"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Theory and Decision"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","150"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","85"],["dc.contributor.author","Meub, Lukas"],["dc.contributor.author","Proeger, Till"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-26T09:49:44Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-26T09:49:44Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.description.abstract","Economic small group research points to groups as more rational decision-makers in numerous economic situations. However, no attempts have been made to investigate whether groups are affected similarly by behavioral biases that are pervasive for individuals. If groups were also able to more effectively avoid these biases, the relevance of biases in actual economic contexts dominated by group decision-making might be questioned. We consider the case of anchoring as a prime example of a well-established, robust bias. Individual and group biasedness in three economically relevant domains are compared: factual knowledge, probability estimates and price valuations. In contrast to previous anchoring studies, we find groups to successfully reduce, albeit not eliminate, anchoring in the factual knowledge domain. For the other two domains, groups and individuals are equally biased by external anchors. Group cooperation thus reduces biases for predominantly intellective tasks only, while no such reduction is achieved when judgmental aspects are involved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s11238-017-9608-x"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/62082"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation.issn","0040-5833"],["dc.relation.issn","1573-7187"],["dc.title","Are groups ‘less behavioral’? The case of anchoring"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","303"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","323"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","7"],["dc.contributor.author","Proeger, Till"],["dc.contributor.author","Meub, Lukas"],["dc.contributor.author","Bizer, Kilian"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T18:15:33Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T18:15:33Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1080/21606544.2018.1429322"],["dc.identifier.eissn","2160-6552"],["dc.identifier.issn","2160-6544"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/74880"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Tradable development rights under uncertainty: an experimental approach"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","95"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Land Use Policy"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","108"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","51"],["dc.contributor.author","Meub, Lukas"],["dc.contributor.author","Henger, Ralph"],["dc.contributor.author","Proeger, Till"],["dc.contributor.author","Bizer, Kilian"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-10-16T13:27:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-10-16T13:27:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","The German government has committed to substantially limiting future land consumption. Among the most prominently discussed policy instruments is the implementation of a cap & trade system for land consumption, in which a limited amount of certificates is allocated to and traded by municipalities. Since these certificates would be a prerequisite for conducting building projects, this system is expected to reduce urban sprawl and foster the efficient allocation of land consumption projects. While previous empirical studies have supported these projections, the potential fragility of a cap & trade system in the case of macroeconomic shocks has not been considered. In three laboratory experiments, we simulate the impact of economic and budgetary crises within a cap & trade scheme for land consumption. We find that a market-based system succeeds in compensating macroeconomic disturbances with only minor welfare losses. Certificate prices in auctions and trading are somewhat more volatile before shocks, yet normalize afterwards. Trading volumes and the specifics of project realizations remain largely unaffected. Unrelated to the macroeconomic shocks, auction and market prices persistently diverge, leading to income redistributions to the state. Overall, our evidence supports the introduction of a market-based certificate scheme to reduce land consumption in Germany due to its resilience against potential shocks."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.10.018"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/16040"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Experimental evidence on the resilience of a cap & trade system for land use in Germany"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","2054"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","10"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Research Policy"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","2068"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","45"],["dc.contributor.author","Brüggemann, Julia"],["dc.contributor.author","Crosetto, Paolo"],["dc.contributor.author","Meub, Lukas"],["dc.contributor.author","Bizer, Kilian"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-10-16T14:51:34Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-10-16T14:51:34Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","In this paper we contribute to the discussion on whether intellectual property rights foster or hinder innovation by means of a laboratory experiment. We introduce a novel Scrabble-like word-creation task that captures most essentialities of a sequential innovation process. We use this task to investigate the effects of intellectual property allowing subjects to impose license fees on their innovations. We find intellectual property to have an adverse effect on welfare as innovations become less frequent and less sophisticated. Introducing communication among innovators does not reduce this detrimental effect. Introducing intellectual property results in more basic innovations, with subjects failing to exploit the most valuable sequential innovation paths. Subjects act more self-reliant and non-optimally in order to avoid paying license fees. Our results suggest that granting intellectual property rights hinders innovation, especially for sectors characterized by a strong sequentiality in innovation processes."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.respol.2016.07.008"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/16052"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Intellectual Property Rights Hinder Sequential Innovation"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","39"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.seriesnr","285"],["dc.contributor.author","Schneider, Tim"],["dc.contributor.author","Meub, Lukas"],["dc.contributor.author","Bizer, Kilian"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-10-18T08:38:35Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-10-18T08:38:35Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the effects of consumer information, where consumers suffer from either a minor or serious problem and only experts can infer the appropriate treatment. Consumer information is a noisy signal that is informative about a consumer’s problem severity. In a laboratory experiment, we show that consumers are generally reluctant to accept expensive treatment recommendations, which is endorsed by good signals and fundamentally changed by bad signals. Experts condition their cheating on a consumer’s risk of suffering from a serious problem if they can observe consumer information. Accordingly, experts and low-risk consumers benefit at the expense of more frequently cheated high-risk consumers. Consumer information leads to more appropriate treatments being carried out and thus superior overall welfare. In contrast to our theoretical predictions, this effect does not depend on hiding consumer information for experts."],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/16087"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.relation.crisseries","CeGE Discussion Papers"],["dc.relation.ispartofseries","cege discussion paper; 285"],["dc.title","Consumer Information In A Market For Expert Services"],["dc.title.subtitle","Experimental Evidence"],["dc.type","working_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","712"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","6"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of environmental policy and planning"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","732"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","19"],["dc.contributor.author","Meub, Lukas"],["dc.contributor.author","Proeger, Till"],["dc.contributor.author","Bizer, Kilian"],["dc.contributor.author","Henger, Ralph"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T18:15:12Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T18:15:12Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1080/1523908X.2016.1266932"],["dc.identifier.eissn","1522-7200"],["dc.identifier.issn","1523-908X"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/74782"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","The political economy of certificates for land use in Germany – experimental evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","203"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Economics Letters"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","207"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","122"],["dc.contributor.author","Proeger, Till E."],["dc.contributor.author","Meub, Lukas"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:44:18Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:44:18Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","The overconfidence bias is discussed extensively in economic studies, yet fails to hold experimentally once monetary incentives and feedback are implemented. We consider overconfidence as a social bias. For a simple real effort task, we show that, individually, economic conditions effectively prevent overconfidence. By contrast, the introduction of a very basic, purely observational social setting fosters overconfident self-assessments. Additionally, observing others' actions effectively eliminates underconfidence compared to the individual setting. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.027"],["dc.identifier.isi","000331687400023"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/34361"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Sa"],["dc.relation.issn","1873-7374"],["dc.relation.issn","0165-1765"],["dc.title","Overconfidence as a social bias: Experimental evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]