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Cisneros, Elías
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Preferred name
Cisneros, Elías
Official Name
Cisneros, Elías
Alternative Name
Cisneros Tersitsch, Marco E.
Cisneros Tersitsch, M. E.
Cisneros Tersitsch, Elías
Cisneros Tersitsch, E.
Cisneros, Marco Elías
Cisneros, Marco E.
Cisneros, M. E.
Cisneros, Elías
Cisneros, E.
Cisneros Tersitsch, Marco Elias
Cisneros Tersitsch, Elias
Cisneros, Marco Elias
Cisneros, Elias
Main Affiliation
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elias.cisneros@uni-goettingen.de
ORCID
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
2022Journal Article Research Paper [["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","102572"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Environmental Economics and Management"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","111"],["dc.contributor.author","Cisneros, Elías"],["dc.contributor.author","Börner, Jan"],["dc.contributor.author","Pagiola, Stefano"],["dc.contributor.author","Wunder, Sven"],["dc.date.accessioned","2022-09-01T09:49:41Z"],["dc.date.available","2022-09-01T09:49:41Z"],["dc.date.issued","2022"],["dc.description.abstract","Conditional incentives are a promising complementary approach to conserve tropical forests, for example, in multiple-use protected areas. In this paper we analyze the environmental impacts of Bolsa Floresta, a forest conservation program that combines direct conditional payments with livelihood-focused investments in 15 multiple-use reserves in the Brazilian state of Amazonas. We use grid-based data, nearest-neighbor matching, and panel data econometrics to compare three forest-related program outcomes – deforestation, degradation, and fires – of participating and non-participating reserve areas. Forest threats were low before and after treatment, because the program prioritized low-pressure sites. Thus, we find significant but small additional conservation effects from the implementation of the program. Notwithstanding, treatment effects are relatively larger in areas with higher deforestation pressure and higher potential agricultural income. Our findings add to the growing body of evidence showing that adverse spatial targeting of conservation incentives, i.e. disproportionally enrolling low–pressure sites, is a prime cause for the low additionality found in rigorous impact evaluations of many existing initiatives."],["dc.description.sponsorship"," http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100007843 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation"],["dc.description.sponsorship"," http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001659 German Research Foundation"],["dc.description.sponsorship"," http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002347 Federal Ministry of Education and Research Bonn Office"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102572"],["dc.identifier.pii","S0095069621001200"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/113497"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-597"],["dc.relation","SFB 990: Ökologische und sozioökonomische Funktionen tropischer Tieflandregenwald-Transformationssysteme (Sumatra, Indonesien)"],["dc.relation","SFB 990 | C | C10: Lokalisierte Umwelt- und Landnutzungspolitiken, Umwandlung zu Palmöl und Abholzung"],["dc.relation.issn","0095-0696"],["dc.rights","CC BY-NC-ND 4.0"],["dc.rights.uri","https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/"],["dc.subject.gro","sfb990_journalarticles"],["dc.title","Impacts of conservation incentives in protected areas: The case of Bolsa Floresta, Brazil"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2021Journal Article Research Paper [["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","102453"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Environmental Economics and Management"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","108"],["dc.contributor.author","Cisneros, Elías"],["dc.contributor.author","Kis-Katos, Krisztina"],["dc.contributor.author","Nuryartono, Nunung"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-06-16T05:59:31Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-06-16T05:59:31Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.description.abstract","This paper studies the interactions between political and economic incentives to foster forest conversion in Indonesian districts. Using a district–level panel data set from 2001 to 2016, we analyze variation in remotely sensed forest losses as well as measures of land-use licensing. We link these outcomes to political incentives arising before idiosyncratically–timed local mayoral elections as well as to price exposure measures based on oil palm soil suitability combined with global price variations for palm oil. Empirical results document increases of about 4% in deforestation in the year prior to local mayoral elections on average. Additionally, palm oil plays a crucial role in driving deforestation dynamics. Deforestation rates increase by 7% in places that experience a one standard deviation increase in local price exposure, but no upcoming elections. These effects are amplified to almost 19% larger forest losses in places that experience pre-election years and a standard deviation higher palm oil price exposure at the same time. We thus find clear evidence for economic and political incentives reinforcing each other as drivers of forest loss and land conversion for oil palm cultivation."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102453"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87225"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation","SFB 990: Ökologische und sozioökonomische Funktionen tropischer Tieflandregenwald-Transformationssysteme (Sumatra, Indonesien)"],["dc.relation","SFB 990 | C | C10: Lokalisierte Umwelt- und Landnutzungspolitiken, Umwandlung zu Palmöl und Abholzung"],["dc.relation.issn","0095-0696"],["dc.rights","CC BY-NC-ND 4.0"],["dc.subject.gro","sfb990_journalarticles"],["dc.title","Palm oil and the politics of deforestation in Indonesia"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI