Wolff, Michael A.

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1050"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","7"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Management Studies"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1078"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","54"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Braun, Daniel"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.contributor.author","Yoshikawa, Toru"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-12-08T12:27:58Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-12-08T12:27:58Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/joms.12275"],["dc.identifier.eissn","1467-6486"],["dc.identifier.issn","0022-2380"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/95513"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-476"],["dc.relation.eissn","1467-6486"],["dc.relation.issn","0022-2380"],["dc.rights.uri","http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor"],["dc.title","When Elites Forget Their Duties: The Double‐Edged Sword of Prestigious Directors on Boards"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","451"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Accounting Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","482"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","28"],["dc.contributor.author","Firk, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Maybuechen, Franz"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T18:14:56Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T18:14:56Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1080/09638180.2018.1492947"],["dc.identifier.eissn","1468-4497"],["dc.identifier.issn","0963-8180"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/74676"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Value-based Management and Merger & Acquisition Returns: A Multi-level Contingency Model"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","26"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Management Accounting Research"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","43"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","44"],["dc.contributor.author","Firk, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmidt, Torben"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T15:20:19Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T15:20:19Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.mar.2018.11.001"],["dc.identifier.issn","1044-5005"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/72620"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","CFO emphasis on value-based management: Performance implications and the challenge of CFO succession"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","95"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","125"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","82"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Rapp, Marc Steffen"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael A."],["dc.contributor.editor","Beham, Barbara"],["dc.contributor.editor","Straub, Caroline"],["dc.contributor.editor","Schwalbach, Joachim"],["dc.date.accessioned","2014-08-20T09:54:16Z"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-10-27T13:19:52Z"],["dc.date.available","2014-08-20T09:54:16Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-10-27T13:19:52Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.description.abstract","In this paper we want to investigate the impact of company owners on the low percentage of women on management boards and whether they are attempting to increase this percentage. After analysing whether ownership concentration influences the number ofwomen on management boards we distinguish between different types of owners.We find that ownership concentration has no effect on the presence of women on German management boards, we show however that institutional and individual owners have a significantly positive effect. Classifying institutional owners into national and foreign owners illustrates that foreign investors are the primary driver of the positive effect within the class of institutional owners; the presence of national investors that are strongly influenced by the national banking system does not show any effect. Our analyses are based on 15,976 management board member positions from 2000 to 2007 in approximately 600 German-listed companies."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/978-3-8349-3869-5_6"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s11573-011-0541-0"],["dc.identifier.fs","594628"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/10630"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/91918"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Migrated from goescholar"],["dc.publisher","Gabler Verlag"],["dc.publisher.place","Wiesbaden"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Managing Diversity in Organizations"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät"],["dc.rights.access","openAccess"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.subject","Management board · Gender ·Women · Corporate governance"],["dc.title","Women on German management boards"],["dc.title.subtitle","How ownership structure affects management board diversity"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","452"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of World Business"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","462"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","53"],["dc.contributor.author","Ahrens, Carolin"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T15:20:10Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T15:20:10Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jwb.2018.01.002"],["dc.identifier.issn","1090-9516"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/72578"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Expatriates as influencers in global work arrangements: Their impact on foreign-subsidiary employees’ ESOP participation"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Accounting, Economics and Law"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","16"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","4"],["dc.contributor.author","Lazar, Christian"],["dc.contributor.author","Metzner, Yves"],["dc.contributor.author","Rapp, Marc Steffen"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-09T11:40:14Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-09T11:40:14Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","We analyze director compensation in German listed firms for the 2005–2009 period. Our sample covers all listed companies in the German Prime Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, specifically firms with shares listed in the indices of DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX. In the last years, non-executive directors are facing increasing duties and (legal) responsibilities. From that perspective, it is quite surprising that the remuneration of non-executive directors has received rather little attention so far. In this study, we examine the German experience. We present the status quo of non-executive director remuneration and discuss its challenges. Specifically, we will look at the level of director remuneration and the (possible) problem of limited incentives."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1515/ael-2013-0014"],["dc.identifier.fs","597242"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/10783"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/58121"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.relation.issn","2152-2820"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Remuneration of Non-Executive Directors in German Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis from a Practitioners’ Perspective"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1179"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","6"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Business Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1192"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","23"],["dc.contributor.author","Huettenbrink, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Rapp, Marc Steffen"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:32:23Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:32:23Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","Are there country-level differences in the use of pay-for-performance in executive compensation contracts? We investigate how formal country-level institutions affect pay-for-performance directly and if institutions have a moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and pay-for-performance contracts. Based on agency theory arguments, we show that substitutionary and complementary relations are conceivable, for the direct and the moderating effect. We conduct an empirical analysis based on 2766 firm-year observations for the years 2005-2008. Our empirical results show that whereas strong shareholder protection substitutes pay-for-performance, disclosure requirements complement pay-for-performance. Additionally, strong shareholder protection complements the effect of concentrated ownership on pay-for-performance while disclosure requirements substitute effects of ownership concentration. Overall, our results provide evidence for the relevance of formal institutions as determinants of executive compensation contracts. Additionally, our results indicate the general complexity of integrating institutions and internal governance mechanisms. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.ibusrev.2014.04.002"],["dc.identifier.isi","000343391300013"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/31748"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","1873-6149"],["dc.relation.issn","0969-5931"],["dc.title","Pay-for-performance - Does one size fit all? A multi-country study of Europe and the United States"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1023"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Human Resource Management"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1037"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","57"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.contributor.author","Zschoche, Ulrike"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-12-08T12:30:34Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-12-08T12:30:34Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1002/hrm.21885"],["dc.identifier.issn","0090-4848"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/96482"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-476"],["dc.relation.issn","0090-4848"],["dc.rights.uri","http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1"],["dc.title","Employee participation in employee stock ownership plans: Cross-level interaction effects of institutions and workgroup behavior"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","S104450052100010X"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","100736"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Management Accounting Research"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","51"],["dc.contributor.author","Firk, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Richter, Sven"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-07-05T15:00:21Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-07-05T15:00:21Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.mar.2021.100736"],["dc.identifier.pii","S104450052100010X"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87802"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import DOI-Import GROB-441"],["dc.relation.issn","1044-5005"],["dc.title","Does value-based management facilitate managerial decision-making? An analysis of divestiture decisions"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Accounting Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","24"],["dc.contributor.author","Sauset, Johannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Waller, Phillip"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:50:23Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:50:23Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","Since 2009, the European Commission (EC) requires firms to incorporate an array of new elements into CEO compensation contracts, such as bonus caps, claw back provisions, bonus deferral, performance-vesting, and minimum shareholding guidelines. This paper examines whether CEO contract design in line with the EC principles reduces risk-taking and its economic consequences. Using hand-collected contract design data of 763 firm-years from European listed non-financial firms, we construct an index that reflects a firm's contract fit with the EC principles. Complemented by hand-collected data of national regulatory changes consistent to the EC principles, we employ the regime shift as quasi-experiment. We find that CEOs rewarded under contracts more in line with the principles choose lower risk profiles with respect to their country peers by divergent reductions of idiosyncratic and systematic risk-taking. Moreover, intensity of change of the regulatory environment negatively affects systematic risk-taking. Furthermore, we find CEOs compensated under contracts more adhering to the principles lead to increased subsequent risk-adjusted performance."],["dc.description.sponsorship","Dr. Werner Jackstadt-Foundation; Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1080/09638180.2015.1071275"],["dc.identifier.isi","000362505500003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/35699"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd"],["dc.relation.issn","1468-4497"],["dc.relation.issn","0963-8180"],["dc.title","CEO Contract Design Regulation and Risk-Taking"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]