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Wolff, Michael A.
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Wolff, Michael A.
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Wolff, Michael A.
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Wolff, M. A.
Wolff, Michael
Wolff, M.
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2017Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1050"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","7"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Management Studies"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1078"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","54"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Braun, Daniel"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.contributor.author","Yoshikawa, Toru"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-12-08T12:27:58Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-12-08T12:27:58Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/joms.12275"],["dc.identifier.eissn","1467-6486"],["dc.identifier.issn","0022-2380"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/95513"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-476"],["dc.relation.eissn","1467-6486"],["dc.relation.issn","0022-2380"],["dc.rights.uri","http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor"],["dc.title","When Elites Forget Their Duties: The Double‐Edged Sword of Prestigious Directors on Boards"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2018Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","451"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Accounting Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","482"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","28"],["dc.contributor.author","Firk, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Maybuechen, Franz"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T18:14:56Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T18:14:56Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1080/09638180.2018.1492947"],["dc.identifier.eissn","1468-4497"],["dc.identifier.issn","0963-8180"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/74676"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Value-based Management and Merger & Acquisition Returns: A Multi-level Contingency Model"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2019Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","26"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Management Accounting Research"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","43"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","44"],["dc.contributor.author","Firk, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmidt, Torben"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T15:20:19Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T15:20:19Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.mar.2018.11.001"],["dc.identifier.issn","1044-5005"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/72620"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","CFO emphasis on value-based management: Performance implications and the challenge of CFO succession"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2018Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","452"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of World Business"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","462"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","53"],["dc.contributor.author","Ahrens, Carolin"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T15:20:10Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T15:20:10Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jwb.2018.01.002"],["dc.identifier.issn","1090-9516"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/72578"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Expatriates as influencers in global work arrangements: Their impact on foreign-subsidiary employees’ ESOP participation"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2014Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1179"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","6"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Business Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1192"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","23"],["dc.contributor.author","Huettenbrink, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Rapp, Marc Steffen"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:32:23Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:32:23Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","Are there country-level differences in the use of pay-for-performance in executive compensation contracts? We investigate how formal country-level institutions affect pay-for-performance directly and if institutions have a moderating effect on the relation between ownership structure and pay-for-performance contracts. Based on agency theory arguments, we show that substitutionary and complementary relations are conceivable, for the direct and the moderating effect. We conduct an empirical analysis based on 2766 firm-year observations for the years 2005-2008. Our empirical results show that whereas strong shareholder protection substitutes pay-for-performance, disclosure requirements complement pay-for-performance. Additionally, strong shareholder protection complements the effect of concentrated ownership on pay-for-performance while disclosure requirements substitute effects of ownership concentration. Overall, our results provide evidence for the relevance of formal institutions as determinants of executive compensation contracts. Additionally, our results indicate the general complexity of integrating institutions and internal governance mechanisms. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.ibusrev.2014.04.002"],["dc.identifier.isi","000343391300013"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/31748"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","1873-6149"],["dc.relation.issn","0969-5931"],["dc.title","Pay-for-performance - Does one size fit all? A multi-country study of Europe and the United States"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI WOS2017Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1023"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Human Resource Management"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1037"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","57"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.contributor.author","Zschoche, Ulrike"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-12-08T12:30:34Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-12-08T12:30:34Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1002/hrm.21885"],["dc.identifier.issn","0090-4848"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/96482"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-476"],["dc.relation.issn","0090-4848"],["dc.rights.uri","http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1"],["dc.title","Employee participation in employee stock ownership plans: Cross-level interaction effects of institutions and workgroup behavior"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2021Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","S104450052100010X"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","100736"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Management Accounting Research"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","51"],["dc.contributor.author","Firk, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Richter, Sven"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-07-05T15:00:21Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-07-05T15:00:21Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.mar.2021.100736"],["dc.identifier.pii","S104450052100010X"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87802"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import DOI-Import GROB-441"],["dc.relation.issn","1044-5005"],["dc.title","Does value-based management facilitate managerial decision-making? An analysis of divestiture decisions"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2015Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Accounting Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","24"],["dc.contributor.author","Sauset, Johannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Waller, Phillip"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:50:23Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:50:23Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","Since 2009, the European Commission (EC) requires firms to incorporate an array of new elements into CEO compensation contracts, such as bonus caps, claw back provisions, bonus deferral, performance-vesting, and minimum shareholding guidelines. This paper examines whether CEO contract design in line with the EC principles reduces risk-taking and its economic consequences. Using hand-collected contract design data of 763 firm-years from European listed non-financial firms, we construct an index that reflects a firm's contract fit with the EC principles. Complemented by hand-collected data of national regulatory changes consistent to the EC principles, we employ the regime shift as quasi-experiment. We find that CEOs rewarded under contracts more in line with the principles choose lower risk profiles with respect to their country peers by divergent reductions of idiosyncratic and systematic risk-taking. Moreover, intensity of change of the regulatory environment negatively affects systematic risk-taking. Furthermore, we find CEOs compensated under contracts more adhering to the principles lead to increased subsequent risk-adjusted performance."],["dc.description.sponsorship","Dr. Werner Jackstadt-Foundation; Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1080/09638180.2015.1071275"],["dc.identifier.isi","000362505500003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/35699"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd"],["dc.relation.issn","1468-4497"],["dc.relation.issn","0963-8180"],["dc.title","CEO Contract Design Regulation and Risk-Taking"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI WOS2021Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1800"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","7"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Management Studies"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1831"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","58"],["dc.contributor.author","Firk, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Hanelt, André"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-12-08T12:27:58Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-12-08T12:27:58Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/joms.12718"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/95514"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-476"],["dc.relation.eissn","1467-6486"],["dc.relation.issn","0022-2380"],["dc.rights.uri","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"],["dc.title","Chief Digital Officers: An Analysis of the Presence of a Centralized Digital Transformation Role"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2017Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","645"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Strategic Management Journal"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","656"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","38"],["dc.contributor.author","Oehmichen, Jana"],["dc.contributor.author","Schrapp, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Wolff, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:26:37Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:26:37Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.description.abstract","Research summary: We analyze the effects of board industry expertise on corporate strategic change and the moderating role of institutional quality. We suggest that country-level contingency factors mitigate the effect of experienced boards on strategy formation by providing alternative sources of information and control in strategic matters. We develop institutional quality as institutional information provision and institutional control provision to test our hypotheses on a sample of firms from MSCI Europe and the S&P 500. Our findings confirm that industry expertise is a salient driver of strategic change across countries. The strength of the effect, however, depends on the institutional quality. We submit that weak institutions require greater board industry expertise as an alternative channel of information and control. Managerial summary: This study provides new empirical evidence that experience in the firms' industries enables directors to increase strategic change. Our findings show that this effect is even stronger in countries with weak regulatory environments. We hereby provide guidance for multiple stakeholders. First, shareholders seeking a more active adjustment of their firms' strategies may want to compose boards that leverage such experienced directors. Second, directors can use their industry experience to control and to challenge managers better to move beyond the status quo. Third, managers lacking access to information on potential strategic change can use such experienced directors for strategic advice and as a source of information. Overall, we add to the understanding of the corporate board's role in shaping strategy and the influence of weak regulations. Copyright (C) 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1002/smj.2513"],["dc.identifier.isi","000397155100009"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/43079"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","PUB_WoS_Import"],["dc.publisher","Wiley"],["dc.relation.issn","1097-0266"],["dc.relation.issn","0143-2095"],["dc.title","WHO NEEDS EXPERTS MOST? BOARD INDUSTRY EXPERTISE AND STRATEGIC CHANGE-A CONTINGENCY PERSPECTIVE"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI WOS