Gräfenhain, Maria

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","e86958"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","PLOS ONE"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","9"],["dc.contributor.author","Lohse, Karoline"],["dc.contributor.author","Gräfenhain, Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Behne, Tanya"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:52:50Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:52:50Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","Much recent research has shown that the capacity for mental time travel and temporal reasoning emerges during the preschool years. Nothing is known so far, however, about young children's grasp of the normative dimension of future-directed thought and speech. The present study is the first to show that children from age 4 understand the normative outreach of such future-directed speech acts: subjects at time 1 witnessed a speaker make future-directed speech acts about/towards an actor A, either in imperative mode (“A, do X!”) or as a prediction (“the actor A will do X”). When at time 2 the actor A performed an action that did not match the content of the speech act at time 1, children identified the speaker as the source of a mistake in the prediction case, and the actor as the source of the mistake in the imperative case and leveled criticism accordingly. These findings add to our knowledge about the emergence and development of temporal cognition in revealing an early sensitivity to the normative aspects of future-orientation."],["dc.description.sponsorship","Open-Acces-Publikationsfonds 2014"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1371/journal.pone.0086958"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151301"],["dc.identifier.pmid","24489815"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/9754"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8090"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","1932-6203"],["dc.rights","CC BY 4.0"],["dc.rights.uri","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0"],["dc.title","Young Children Understand the Normative Implications of Future-Directed Speech Acts"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","65"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","102"],["dc.contributor.author","Behne, Tanya"],["dc.contributor.author","Carpenter, Malinda"],["dc.contributor.author","Gräfenhain, Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Liebal, Kristin"],["dc.contributor.author","Liszkowski, Ulf"],["dc.contributor.author","Moll, Henrike"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.editor","Müller, U."],["dc.contributor.editor","Carpendale, J."],["dc.contributor.editor","Budwig, N."],["dc.contributor.editor","Sokol, B."],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:49:56Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:49:56Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.description.abstract","Human children become cultural beings by learning to participate in the cultural activities and practices going on around them. Household pets grow up in the midst of these same cultural activities and practices, but they do not learn to participate in them in anything like the same way as human children. Even chimpanzees and bonobos raised in human homes and treated like human children still retain, for the most part, their species-typical social and cognitive skills without turning into cultural beings of the human kind. This difference suggests that humans are biologically adapted, in ways that other animal species are not, for becoming cultural beings by tuning in to what others around them are doing, and thereby learning from them. Moreover, on occasion, young children even create with others small- scale cultural activities and routines involving one or another form of collaboration, or even collaborative pretense. Such cultural creation would also seem to be unique to human beings, and of course cultural creation leads to ever new cultural environments in which human cognitive ontogeny takes place. We may therefore identify two sets of human cultural skills responsible, as they work over historical and ontogenetic time, for humans' unique form of social organization: cultural learning and cultural creation. These enable humans, and only humans, to have cultures which accumulate complexities in both social practices and cognitive artifacts - creating ever new cultural niches within which developing children become mature cultural beings. Tomasello (1999) proposed that underlying these cultural abilities was a uniquely human social-cognitive skill for understanding others as intentional agents who, like the self, attend to things and pursue goals in the environment. The collective aspect of cultural evolution in this theory was, in an important sense, taken for granted. Uniquely human types of social engagements such as joint attention, collaborative co-operation, and symbolic communication were seen as simply emanating naturally from the understanding of others as intentional agents like the self. However, recent"],["dc.identifier.gro","3149789"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/6486"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.publisher","Lawrence Erlbaum"],["dc.publisher.place","New York"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Social Life and Social Knowledge: Toward a Process Account of Development"],["dc.title","Cultural learning and creation"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","e0160881"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","8"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","PLOS ONE"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","11"],["dc.contributor.author","Hermes, Jonas"],["dc.contributor.author","Behne, Tanya"],["dc.contributor.author","Studte, Kristin"],["dc.contributor.author","Zeyen, Anna-Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Gräfenhain, Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:52:48Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:52:48Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","Cooperation is essential for human society, and children engage in cooperation from early on. It is unclear, however, how children select their partners for cooperation. We know that children choose selectively whom to learn from (e.g. preferring reliable over unreliable models) on a rational basis. The present study investigated whether children (and adults) also choose their cooperative partners selectively and what model characteristics they regard as important for cooperative partners and for informants about novel words. Three- and four-year-old children (N = 64) and adults (N = 14) saw contrasting pairs of models differing either in physical strength or in accuracy (in labeling known objects). Participants then performed different tasks (cooperative problem solving and word learning) requiring the choice of a partner or informant. Both children and adults chose their cooperative partners selectively. Moreover they showed the same pattern of selective model choice, regarding a wide range of model characteristics as important for cooperation (preferring both the strong and the accurate model for a strength-requiring cooperation tasks), but only prior knowledge as important for word learning (preferring the knowledgeable but not the strong model for word learning tasks). Young children’s selective model choice thus reveals an early rational competence: They infer characteristics from past behavior and flexibly consider what characteristics are relevant for certain tasks."],["dc.description.sponsorship","Open-Access-Publikationsfonds 2016"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1371/journal.pone.0160881"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151283"],["dc.identifier.pmid","27505043"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/13704"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8070"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","1932-6203"],["dc.rights","CC BY 4.0"],["dc.rights.uri","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0"],["dc.title","Selective Cooperation in Early Childhood – How to Choose Models and Partners"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1430"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Developmental Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1443"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","45"],["dc.contributor.author","Graefenhain, Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Behne, Tanya"],["dc.contributor.author","Carpenter, Malinda"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomasello, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T11:24:40Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T11:24:40Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","When adults make a joint commitment to act together, they feel an obligation to their partner. In 2 studies, the authors investigated whether young children also understand joint commitments to act together. In the first study, when an adult orchestrated with the child a joint commitment to play a game together and the broke off from their joint activity, 3-year-olds (n = 24) reacted to the break significantly more often (e.g., by trying to re-engage her or waiting for her to restart playing) than when she simply joined the child's individual activity unbidden. Two-year-olds (n = 24) did not differentiate between these 2 situations. In the second study, 3- and 4-year-old children (n = 30 at each age) were enticed away from their activity with an adult. Children acknowledged their leaving (e.g., by looking to the adult or handing her the object they had been playing with) significantly more often when they had made a joint commitment to act together than when they had not. By 3 years of age, children thus recognize both when an adult is committed and when they themselves are committed to a joint activity."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1037/a0016122"],["dc.identifier.isi","269366900019"],["dc.identifier.pmid","19702403"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/56455"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Amer Psychological Assoc"],["dc.relation.issn","0012-1649"],["dc.title","Young Children's Understanding of Joint Commitments"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]