Gräfenhain, Maria

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","201"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Experimental Child Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","209"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","128"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Gräfenhain, Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Clüver, Annette"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulze Dalhoff, Ann Christin"],["dc.contributor.author","Sternkopf, Anika"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:52:49Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:52:49Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","Recent developmental research has shown that young children coordinate complementary action roles with others. But what do they understand about the logical structure of such roles? Do they have an agent-neutral conception of complementary action roles, grasping that such roles can be variably filled by any two agents or even by one agent over time? Accordingly, can they make use of such representations for planning both their own and others’ actions? To address these questions, 3- and 4-year-olds were introduced to an activity comprising two action roles, A and B, by seeing either two agents performing A and B collaboratively or one agent performing A and B individually. Children’s flexible inferences from these demonstrations were then tested by asking them later on to plan ahead for the fulfillment of one of the roles either by themselves or by someone else. The 4-year-olds competently drew inferences in all directions, from past individual and collaborative demonstrations, when planning how they or someone else would need to fulfill the roles in the future. The 3-year-olds, in contrast, showed more restricted competence; they were capable of such inferences only when planning in the immediate present. Taken together, these results suggest that children form and use agent-neutral representations of action roles by 3 years of age and flexibly use such representations for episodic memory and future deliberation in planning their own and others’ actions by 4 years of age. The findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of understanding self–other equivalence and agent-neutral frames of references."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jecp.2014.06.004"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151305"],["dc.identifier.pmid","25074622"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8094"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0022-0965"],["dc.title","Young children’s agent-neutral representations of action roles"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","54"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Developmental Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","61"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","15"],["dc.contributor.author","Warneken, Felix"],["dc.contributor.author","Graefenhain, Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomasello, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:15:56Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:15:56Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.description.abstract","Some childrens social activities are structured by joint goals. In previous research, the criterion used to determine this was relatively weak: if the partner stopped interacting, did the child attempt to re-engage her? But re-engagement attempts could easily result from the child simply realizing that she needs the partner to reach her own goal in the activity (social tool explanation). In two experiments, 21- and 27-month-old children interacted with an adult in games in which they either did or did not physically need the partner to reach a concrete goal. Moreover, when the partner stopped interacting, she did so because she was either unwilling to continue (breaking off from the joint goal) or unable to continue (presumably still maintaining the joint goal). Children of both age groups encouraged the recalcitrant partner equally often whether she was or was not physically needed for goal attainment. In addition, they did so more often when the partner was unable to continue than when she was unwilling to continue. These findings suggest that young children do not just view their collaborative partners as mindless social tools, but rather as intentional, cooperative agents with whom they must coordinate intentional states."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01107.x"],["dc.identifier.isi","000299158000007"],["dc.identifier.pmid","22251292"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/27821"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley-blackwell"],["dc.relation.issn","1363-755X"],["dc.title","Collaborative partner or social tool? New evidence for young children's understanding of joint intentions in collaborative activities"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","65"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","102"],["dc.contributor.author","Behne, Tanya"],["dc.contributor.author","Carpenter, Malinda"],["dc.contributor.author","Gräfenhain, Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Liebal, Kristin"],["dc.contributor.author","Liszkowski, Ulf"],["dc.contributor.author","Moll, Henrike"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.editor","Müller, U."],["dc.contributor.editor","Carpendale, J."],["dc.contributor.editor","Budwig, N."],["dc.contributor.editor","Sokol, B."],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:49:56Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:49:56Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.description.abstract","Human children become cultural beings by learning to participate in the cultural activities and practices going on around them. Household pets grow up in the midst of these same cultural activities and practices, but they do not learn to participate in them in anything like the same way as human children. Even chimpanzees and bonobos raised in human homes and treated like human children still retain, for the most part, their species-typical social and cognitive skills without turning into cultural beings of the human kind. This difference suggests that humans are biologically adapted, in ways that other animal species are not, for becoming cultural beings by tuning in to what others around them are doing, and thereby learning from them. Moreover, on occasion, young children even create with others small- scale cultural activities and routines involving one or another form of collaboration, or even collaborative pretense. Such cultural creation would also seem to be unique to human beings, and of course cultural creation leads to ever new cultural environments in which human cognitive ontogeny takes place. We may therefore identify two sets of human cultural skills responsible, as they work over historical and ontogenetic time, for humans' unique form of social organization: cultural learning and cultural creation. These enable humans, and only humans, to have cultures which accumulate complexities in both social practices and cognitive artifacts - creating ever new cultural niches within which developing children become mature cultural beings. Tomasello (1999) proposed that underlying these cultural abilities was a uniquely human social-cognitive skill for understanding others as intentional agents who, like the self, attend to things and pursue goals in the environment. The collective aspect of cultural evolution in this theory was, in an important sense, taken for granted. Uniquely human types of social engagements such as joint attention, collaborative co-operation, and symbolic communication were seen as simply emanating naturally from the understanding of others as intentional agents like the self. However, recent"],["dc.identifier.gro","3149789"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/6486"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.publisher","Lawrence Erlbaum"],["dc.publisher.place","New York"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Social Life and Social Knowledge: Toward a Process Account of Development"],["dc.title","Cultural learning and creation"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","247"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Experimental Child Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","255"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","141"],["dc.contributor.author","Proft, Marina"],["dc.contributor.author","Kushnir, Tamar"],["dc.contributor.author","Gräfenhain, Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:52:48Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:52:48Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","Young children spontaneously engage in normative evaluations of others’ actions and actively enforce social norms. It is unclear, however, how flexible and integrated this early norm psychology is. The current study explored this question by testing whether children in their “real-life” normative evaluation of actions consider the actor’s freedom of choice. Children witnessed different appropriate acts or mistakes (conventional or moral) by an agent under free or constrained circumstances. Across the two types of norms, participants protested less if a mistake occurred under constrained conditions than if it occurred under free conditions. Furthermore, they laid different weight on the actor’s free choice in the two conditions. While refraining from blaming the agent for inappropriate constrained acts in the moral scenario, children still criticized a social conventional mistake under constrained conditions (although less than under free conditions), indicating that free choice is a more prominent factor in moral evaluations than in conventional evaluations. Thus, two domains of social cognition, normativity and theory of mind, are functionally integrated already early in development."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jecp.2015.08.002"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151284"],["dc.identifier.pmid","26341742"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8071"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.relation.issn","0022-0965"],["dc.title","Children protest moral and conventional violations more when they believe actions are freely chosen"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1430"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Developmental Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1443"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","45"],["dc.contributor.author","Graefenhain, Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Behne, Tanya"],["dc.contributor.author","Carpenter, Malinda"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomasello, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T11:24:40Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T11:24:40Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","When adults make a joint commitment to act together, they feel an obligation to their partner. In 2 studies, the authors investigated whether young children also understand joint commitments to act together. In the first study, when an adult orchestrated with the child a joint commitment to play a game together and the broke off from their joint activity, 3-year-olds (n = 24) reacted to the break significantly more often (e.g., by trying to re-engage her or waiting for her to restart playing) than when she simply joined the child's individual activity unbidden. Two-year-olds (n = 24) did not differentiate between these 2 situations. In the second study, 3- and 4-year-old children (n = 30 at each age) were enticed away from their activity with an adult. Children acknowledged their leaving (e.g., by looking to the adult or handing her the object they had been playing with) significantly more often when they had made a joint commitment to act together than when they had not. By 3 years of age, children thus recognize both when an adult is committed and when they themselves are committed to a joint activity."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1037/a0016122"],["dc.identifier.isi","269366900019"],["dc.identifier.pmid","19702403"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/56455"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Amer Psychological Assoc"],["dc.relation.issn","0012-1649"],["dc.title","Young Children's Understanding of Joint Commitments"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]