Glöckner, Andreas

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","431"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Competition Law & Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","461"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","11"],["dc.contributor.author","Morell, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Towfigh, Emanuel V."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:56:26Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:56:26Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","Competition policy often relies on the assumption of a rational consumer, although other models may better account for people's decision-making behavior. In three experiments, we investigate the influence of loyalty rebates on consumers based on the alternative Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). CPT predicts that loyalty rebates could harm consumers by impeding rational switching from an incumbent to an outside option (for example, a market entrant). In a repeated trading task, participants decided whether or not to enter a loyalty rebate scheme and to continue buying within that scheme. Meeting the condition triggering the rebate was uncertain. Loyalty rebates considerably reduced the likelihood that participants switched to a higher-payoff outside option later. We conclude that loyalty rebates may inflict substantial harm on consumers and may have an underestimated potential to foreclose consumer markets. Our findings therefore provide additional arguments why a dominant firm using target rebates may monopolize a market or abuse its market power. They also provide arguments why target rebates may raise consumer protection concerns."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1093/joclec/nhv009"],["dc.identifier.isi","000356238300008"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/36952"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Oxford Univ Press"],["dc.relation.issn","1744-6422"],["dc.relation.issn","1744-6414"],["dc.title","STICKY REBATES: LOYALTY REBATES IMPEDE RATIONAL SWITCHING OF CONSUMERS"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","126"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Review of Law and Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","136"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","37"],["dc.contributor.author","Engel, Christoph"],["dc.contributor.author","Beckenkamp, Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Irlenbusch, Bernd"],["dc.contributor.author","Hennig-Schmidt, Heike"],["dc.contributor.author","Kube, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Kurschilgen, Michael"],["dc.contributor.author","Morell, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Nicklisch, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Normann, Hans-Theo"],["dc.contributor.author","Towfigh, Emanuel V."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:42:54Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:42:54Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","Broken windows: the metaphor has changed New York and Los Angeles. Yet it is far from undisputed whether the broken windows policy was causal for reducing crime. The scope of the theory is not confined to crime. The theory claims that crime is inextricably linked to social order more generally. In a series of lab experiments we put two components of this more general theory to the test. We show that first impressions and early punishment of antisocial behaviour are independently and jointly causal for cooperativeness. The effect of good first impressions and of early vigilance cannot be explained with, but adds to, participants' initial level of benevolence. Mere impression management is not strong enough to maintain cooperation. Cooperation stabilizes if good first impressions are combined with some risk of sanctions. Yet if we control for first impressions, early vigilance only has a small effect. The effect vanishes over time. (c) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.irle.2013.07.005"],["dc.identifier.isi","000334090600013"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/34070"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Inc"],["dc.relation.issn","1873-6394"],["dc.relation.issn","0144-8188"],["dc.title","First impressions are more important than early intervention: Qualifying broken windows theory in the lab"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]