Glöckner, Andreas

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","431"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Competition Law & Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","461"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","11"],["dc.contributor.author","Morell, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Towfigh, Emanuel V."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:56:26Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:56:26Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","Competition policy often relies on the assumption of a rational consumer, although other models may better account for people's decision-making behavior. In three experiments, we investigate the influence of loyalty rebates on consumers based on the alternative Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). CPT predicts that loyalty rebates could harm consumers by impeding rational switching from an incumbent to an outside option (for example, a market entrant). In a repeated trading task, participants decided whether or not to enter a loyalty rebate scheme and to continue buying within that scheme. Meeting the condition triggering the rebate was uncertain. Loyalty rebates considerably reduced the likelihood that participants switched to a higher-payoff outside option later. We conclude that loyalty rebates may inflict substantial harm on consumers and may have an underestimated potential to foreclose consumer markets. Our findings therefore provide additional arguments why a dominant firm using target rebates may monopolize a market or abuse its market power. They also provide arguments why target rebates may raise consumer protection concerns."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1093/joclec/nhv009"],["dc.identifier.isi","000356238300008"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/36952"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Oxford Univ Press"],["dc.relation.issn","1744-6422"],["dc.relation.issn","1744-6414"],["dc.title","STICKY REBATES: LOYALTY REBATES IMPEDE RATIONAL SWITCHING OF CONSUMERS"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","989"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","6"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Instructional Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1007"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","41"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Towfigh, Emanuel V."],["dc.contributor.author","Traxler, Christian"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:18:08Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:18:08Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.description.abstract","In a comprehensive empirical investigation (N = 71,405) we analyzed the development of legal expertise in a critical 1-year period of academic legal training in which advanced law students start practicing to solve complex cases. We were particularly interested in the functional form of the learning curve and inter-individual differences in learning. Performance increases monotonically with the number of practice exams following a slightly concave learning curve without any considerable kinks. Considering the performance development over time, however, the curve is not monotonic and shows intermediate drops in performance. We provide evidence which suggests that these drops are due to cyclic drops in motivation. There are about equally sized marginal effects of practicing law exams in general and practicing exams in the specific area of law. However, students with high (vs. low) initial performance profit more from practicing exams within a specific area of law whereas students with low initial performance profit more from practicing exams in general. The concave increase in performance with the number of practicing exams is mainly driven by individuals with low initial performance. Those with high initial performance mainly display a linear learning trend. We discuss the practical implications of these findings for academic legal training."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s11251-013-9266-5"],["dc.identifier.isi","000326247200001"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/10381"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/28337"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.relation.issn","1573-1952"],["dc.relation.issn","0020-4277"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Development of legal expertise"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","126"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Review of Law and Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","136"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","37"],["dc.contributor.author","Engel, Christoph"],["dc.contributor.author","Beckenkamp, Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Irlenbusch, Bernd"],["dc.contributor.author","Hennig-Schmidt, Heike"],["dc.contributor.author","Kube, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Kurschilgen, Michael"],["dc.contributor.author","Morell, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Nicklisch, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Normann, Hans-Theo"],["dc.contributor.author","Towfigh, Emanuel V."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:42:54Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:42:54Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","Broken windows: the metaphor has changed New York and Los Angeles. Yet it is far from undisputed whether the broken windows policy was causal for reducing crime. The scope of the theory is not confined to crime. The theory claims that crime is inextricably linked to social order more generally. In a series of lab experiments we put two components of this more general theory to the test. We show that first impressions and early punishment of antisocial behaviour are independently and jointly causal for cooperativeness. The effect of good first impressions and of early vigilance cannot be explained with, but adds to, participants' initial level of benevolence. Mere impression management is not strong enough to maintain cooperation. Cooperation stabilizes if good first impressions are combined with some risk of sanctions. Yet if we control for first impressions, early vigilance only has a small effect. The effect vanishes over time. (c) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.irle.2013.07.005"],["dc.identifier.isi","000334090600013"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/34070"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Inc"],["dc.relation.issn","1873-6394"],["dc.relation.issn","0144-8188"],["dc.title","First impressions are more important than early intervention: Qualifying broken windows theory in the lab"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]