Glöckner, Andreas

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","641"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","666"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","133"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Hilbig, Benjamin E."],["dc.contributor.author","Jekel, Marc"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:32:11Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:32:11Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","There is broad consensus that human cognition is adaptive. However, the vital question of how exactly this adaptivity is achieved has remained largely open. Herein, we contrast two frameworks which account for adaptive decision making, namely broad and general single-mechanism accounts vs. multi-strategy accounts. We propose and fully specify a single-mechanism model for decision making based on parallel constraint satisfaction processes (PCS-DM) and contrast it theoretically and empirically against a multi-strategy account. To achieve sufficiently sensitive tests, we rely on a multiple-measure methodology including choice, reaction time, and confidence data as well as eye-tracking. Results show that manipulating the environmental structure produces clear adaptive shifts in choice patterns - as both frameworks would predict. However, results on the process level (reaction time, confidence), in information acquisition (eye-tracking), and from cross-predicting choice consistently corroborate single-mechanisms accounts in general, and the proposed parallel constraint satisfaction model for decision making in particular. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.017"],["dc.identifier.isi","000345481300010"],["dc.identifier.pmid","25243773"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/31693"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","1873-7838"],["dc.relation.issn","0010-0277"],["dc.title","What is adaptive about adaptive decision making? A parallel constraint satisfaction account"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Frontiers in Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","6"],["dc.contributor.author","Dorrough, Angela Rachael"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Hellmann, Dshamilja M."],["dc.contributor.author","Ebert, Irena"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:58:16Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:58:16Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","In two comprehensive and fully incentivized studies, we investigate the development of ingroup favoritism as one of two aspects of parochial altruism in repeated social dilemmas. Specifically, we test whether ingroup favoritism is a fixed phenomenon that can be observed from the very beginning and remains stable over time, or whether it develops (increases vs. decreases) during repeated contact. lngroup favoritism is assessed through cooperation behavior in a repeated continuous prisoner's dilemma where participants sequentially interact with 10 members of the ingroup (own city and university) and subsequently with 10 members of the outgroup (other city and university), or vice versa. In none of the experiments do we observe initial differences in cooperation behavior for interaction partners from the ingroup, as compared to outgroup, and we only observe small differences in expectations regarding the interaction partners' cooperation behavior. After repeated interaction, however, including a change of groups, clear ingroup favoritism can be observed. Instead of being due to gradual and potentially biased updating of expectations, we found that these emerging differences were mainly driven by the change of interaction partners' group membership that occurred after round 10. This indicates that in social dilemma settings ingroup favoritism is to some degree dynamic in that it is enhanced and sometimes only observable if group membership is activated by thinking about both the interaction with the ingroup and the outgroup."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00476"],["dc.identifier.isi","000354536600002"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/37336"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DeepGreen Import"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Frontiers Media S.A."],["dc.relation.eissn","1664-1078"],["dc.relation.issn","1664-1078"],["dc.rights","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"],["dc.title","The development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmas"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","964"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Behavioral Decision Making"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","975"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","30"],["dc.contributor.author","Bassarak, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Leib, Margarita"],["dc.contributor.author","Mischkowski, Dorothee"],["dc.contributor.author","Strang, Sabrina"],["dc.contributor.author","Glöckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Shalvi, Shaul"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T14:05:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T14:05:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1002/bdm.v30.4"],["dc.identifier.issn","0894-3257"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/69624"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","What Provides Justification for Cheating-Producing or Observing Counterfactuals?"],["dc.title.alternative","Justification for Cheating"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","16"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Global Policy"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","24"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","7"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:14:37Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:14:37Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","To be able to decide and act quickly and efficiently in a complex world, individuals rely on mechanisms that reduce information in a meaningful way. Instead of holding a set of partially contradicting cognitions, individuals construct coherent interpretations or stories to make sense of the available information using interactive activation. Interactive activation describes cognitive processing as bidirectional propagation of activation among simple processing units, which allows individuals to integrate large amounts of information quickly and with little cognitive effort. However, interactive activation also has important downsides that can prevent individuals from detecting looming disasters and can even contribute to their emergence. I describe the functioning of interactive activation and how it can be modeled using connectionist networks. Later I explain how interactive activation causes a set of biases (e.g. coherence effects, overconfidence, hindsight bias and status-quo bias) that make it hard to detect looming disasters and how these biases lead to discontinuities in understanding of problems and rapid behavioral switches that can contribute to the emergence of disasters."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/1758-5899.12289"],["dc.identifier.isi","000378560200003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/40648"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley-blackwell"],["dc.relation.issn","1758-5899"],["dc.relation.issn","1758-5880"],["dc.title","Psychology and Disaster: Why We Do Not See Looming Disasters and How Our Way of Thinking Causes Them"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","230"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Empirical Legal Studies"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","252"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","10"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Engel, Christoph"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:24:30Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:24:30Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.description.abstract","Jury members are confronted with highly complex, ill-defined problems. Coherence-based reasoning (Pennington & Hastie 1992; Simon 2004), which partially relies on intuitive-automatic processing, empowers them to nonetheless make meaningful decisions. These processes, however, have a downside. We tested possible negative effects in a set of studies. Specifically, we investigated whether stricter standards of proof are suppressed by stronger coherence shifts and whether the probative value of the evidence is properly taken into account. We found that U.S. model jury instructions for preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt influence conviction rates in the intended direction and are not undermined by coherence shifts, although probabilistic estimations of these standards are inappropriate. However, even massive changes in explicitly stated probabilities, while holding the overall constellation of facts constant, did not influence conviction rates or the estimated probability of conviction. We argue that reforms in legal procedure should focus on measures to reduce the negative side effects of coherence-based reasoning in general but, more specifically, to make probabilistic information better evaluable for decisionmakers in law."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/jels.12009"],["dc.identifier.isi","000318079300003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/29840"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley-blackwell"],["dc.relation.issn","1740-1453"],["dc.title","Can We Trust Intuitive Jurors? Standards of Proof and the Probative Value of Evidence in Coherence-Based Reasoning"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","59"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","72"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","149"],["dc.contributor.author","Mischkowski, Dorothee"],["dc.contributor.author","Glöckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Lewisch, Peter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T15:20:36Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T15:20:36Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.07.001"],["dc.identifier.issn","0749-5978"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/72734"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","From spontaneous cooperation to spontaneous punishment – Distinguishing the underlying motives driving spontaneous behavior in first and second order public good games"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","431"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Competition Law & Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","461"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","11"],["dc.contributor.author","Morell, Alexander"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Towfigh, Emanuel V."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:56:26Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:56:26Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","Competition policy often relies on the assumption of a rational consumer, although other models may better account for people's decision-making behavior. In three experiments, we investigate the influence of loyalty rebates on consumers based on the alternative Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). CPT predicts that loyalty rebates could harm consumers by impeding rational switching from an incumbent to an outside option (for example, a market entrant). In a repeated trading task, participants decided whether or not to enter a loyalty rebate scheme and to continue buying within that scheme. Meeting the condition triggering the rebate was uncertain. Loyalty rebates considerably reduced the likelihood that participants switched to a higher-payoff outside option later. We conclude that loyalty rebates may inflict substantial harm on consumers and may have an underestimated potential to foreclose consumer markets. Our findings therefore provide additional arguments why a dominant firm using target rebates may monopolize a market or abuse its market power. They also provide arguments why target rebates may raise consumer protection concerns."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1093/joclec/nhv009"],["dc.identifier.isi","000356238300008"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/36952"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Oxford Univ Press"],["dc.relation.issn","1744-6422"],["dc.relation.issn","1744-6414"],["dc.title","STICKY REBATES: LOYALTY REBATES IMPEDE RATIONAL SWITCHING OF CONSUMERS"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","172"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","184"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","10"],["dc.contributor.author","Ashby, Nathaniel J. S."],["dc.contributor.author","Walasek, Lukasz"],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:00:12Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:00:12Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","Online marketplaces allow consumers to leave reviews about the products they purchase, which are visible to potential customers and competitors. While the impact of reviews on valuations of worth and purchasing decisions has been intensively studied, little is known about how the reviews themselves are attended to, and the relation between attention and valuations. In three studies we use eye-tracking methodologies to investigate attention in subjective monetary valuations of consumer goods. We find that, when evaluating consumer goods, individuals' attention to ratings are related to their frequencies, attention to positive or negative information is related to subjective valuations, and that perspective (owner vs. non-owner) influences the type of information attended to. These findings extend previous research regarding the valuations of risky prospects as implemented in abstract monetary gambles and suggest that similar cognitive processes might underlie both types of tasks."],["dc.description.sponsorship","Leverhulme grant [RP2012-V-022]"],["dc.identifier.isi","000351862400004"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/37748"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Soc Judgment & Decision Making"],["dc.relation.issn","1930-2975"],["dc.title","The effect of consumer ratings and attentional allocation on product valuations"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","85"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Experimental Social Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","97"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","74"],["dc.contributor.author","Mischkowski, Dorothee"],["dc.contributor.author","Thielmann, Isabel"],["dc.contributor.author","Glöckner, Andreas"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T14:25:08Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T14:25:08Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jesp.2017.09.001"],["dc.identifier.issn","0022-1031"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/72449"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Think it through before making a choice? Processing mode does not influence social mindfulness"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","529"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Personality and Social Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","539"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","107"],["dc.contributor.author","Hilbig, Benjamin E."],["dc.contributor.author","Gloeckner, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Zettler, Ingo"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:35:30Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:35:30Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","Concerning the dispositional determinants of prosocial behavior and cooperation, work based on the classic 5 personality factors, and especially Agreeableness, has turned out somewhat inconsistent. A clearer picture has emerged from consideration of the HEXACO model of personality though supported entirely by hypothetical behavior as criterion, so far. Thus, in 2 studies and a reanalysis, we investigated \"actual behavior\" in the form of individually and socially consequential distribution decisions. As expected, HEXACO Honesty-Humility consistently predicted prosocial behavior, including a theory-consistent pattern on the facet level. Importantly, this pattern might explain why five-factor Agreeableness has only sometimes been found to account for prosocial behavior. Indeed, further results indicate that five-factor Agreeableness comprises some aspects that are predictive of prosocial behavior aspects well covered by BEXACO Honesty-Humility but also others that play no role for this criterion. As such, the links between five-factor Agreeableness and prosocial behavior are well-covered by HEXACO Honesty-Humility, but not vice versa. Taken together, these findings hint that especially HEXACO Honesty-Humility (and certain aspects of five-factor Agreeableness) account for prosocial behavior thus explaining previous inconsistencies and providing a more nuanced understanding of the links between basic personality and prosocial or cooperative behavior."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1037/a0036074"],["dc.identifier.isi","000348334600009"],["dc.identifier.pmid","25019254"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/32398"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Amer Psychological Assoc"],["dc.relation.issn","1939-1315"],["dc.relation.issn","0022-3514"],["dc.title","Personality and Prosocial Behavior: Linking Basic Traits and Social Value Orientations"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]