Rakoczy, Hannes

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","13"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Infant Behavior and Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","21"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","54"],["dc.contributor.author","Dörrenberg, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Wenzel, Lisa"],["dc.contributor.author","Proft, Marina"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Liszkowski, Ulf"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T14:24:41Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T14:24:41Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.infbeh.2018.11.005"],["dc.identifier.issn","0163-6383"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/72322"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Reliability and generalizability of an acted-out false belief task in 3-year-olds"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","142"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","76"],["dc.contributor.author","Callaghan, Tara"],["dc.contributor.author","Moll, Henrike"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Warneken, Felix"],["dc.contributor.author","Liszkowski, Ulf"],["dc.contributor.author","Behne, Tanya"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomasello, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-03-26T14:27:50Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-03-26T14:27:50Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","The influence of culture on cognitive development is well established for school age and older children. But almost nothing is known about how different parenting and socialization practices in different cultures affect infants' and young children's earliest emerging cognitive and social-cognitive skills. In the current monograph, we report a series of eight studies in which we systematically assessed the social-cognitive skills of 1- to 3-year-old children in three diverse cultural settings. One group of children was from a Western, middle-class cultural setting in rural Canada and the other two groups were from traditional, small-scale cultural settings in rural Peru and India.In a first group of studies, we assessed 1-year-old children's most basic social-cognitive skills for understanding the intentions and attention of others: imitation, helping, gaze following, and communicative pointing.Children's performance in these tasks was mostly similar across cultural settings. In a second group of studies, we assessed 1-year-old children's skills in participating in interactive episodes of collaboration and joint attention.Again in these studies the general finding was one of cross-cultural similarity. In a final pair of studies, we assessed 2- to 3-year-old children's skills within two symbolic systems (pretense and pictorial). Here we found that the Canadian children who had much more experience with such symbols showed skills at an earlier age.Our overall conclusion is that young children in all cultural settings get sufficient amounts of the right kinds of social experience to develop their most basic social-cognitive skills for interacting with others and participating in culture at around the same age. In contrast, children's acquisition of more culturally specific skills for use in practices involving artifacts and symbols is more dependent on specific learning experiences."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/j.1540-5834.2011.00603.x"],["dc.identifier.pmid","21767264"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/13151"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.relation.eissn","1540-5834"],["dc.title","Early social cognition in three cultural contexts"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","65"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","102"],["dc.contributor.author","Behne, Tanya"],["dc.contributor.author","Carpenter, Malinda"],["dc.contributor.author","Gräfenhain, Maria"],["dc.contributor.author","Liebal, Kristin"],["dc.contributor.author","Liszkowski, Ulf"],["dc.contributor.author","Moll, Henrike"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.editor","Müller, U."],["dc.contributor.editor","Carpendale, J."],["dc.contributor.editor","Budwig, N."],["dc.contributor.editor","Sokol, B."],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:49:56Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:49:56Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.description.abstract","Human children become cultural beings by learning to participate in the cultural activities and practices going on around them. Household pets grow up in the midst of these same cultural activities and practices, but they do not learn to participate in them in anything like the same way as human children. Even chimpanzees and bonobos raised in human homes and treated like human children still retain, for the most part, their species-typical social and cognitive skills without turning into cultural beings of the human kind. This difference suggests that humans are biologically adapted, in ways that other animal species are not, for becoming cultural beings by tuning in to what others around them are doing, and thereby learning from them. Moreover, on occasion, young children even create with others small- scale cultural activities and routines involving one or another form of collaboration, or even collaborative pretense. Such cultural creation would also seem to be unique to human beings, and of course cultural creation leads to ever new cultural environments in which human cognitive ontogeny takes place. We may therefore identify two sets of human cultural skills responsible, as they work over historical and ontogenetic time, for humans' unique form of social organization: cultural learning and cultural creation. These enable humans, and only humans, to have cultures which accumulate complexities in both social practices and cognitive artifacts - creating ever new cultural niches within which developing children become mature cultural beings. Tomasello (1999) proposed that underlying these cultural abilities was a uniquely human social-cognitive skill for understanding others as intentional agents who, like the self, attend to things and pursue goals in the environment. The collective aspect of cultural evolution in this theory was, in an important sense, taken for granted. Uniquely human types of social engagements such as joint attention, collaborative co-operation, and symbolic communication were seen as simply emanating naturally from the understanding of others as intentional agents like the self. However, recent"],["dc.identifier.gro","3149789"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/6486"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.publisher","Lawrence Erlbaum"],["dc.publisher.place","New York"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Social Life and Social Knowledge: Toward a Process Account of Development"],["dc.title","Cultural learning and creation"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","302"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognitive Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","315"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","48"],["dc.contributor.author","Poulin-Dubois, Diane"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Burnside, Kimberly"],["dc.contributor.author","Crivello, Cristina"],["dc.contributor.author","Dörrenberg, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Edwards, Katheryn"],["dc.contributor.author","Krist, Horst"],["dc.contributor.author","Kulke, Louisa"],["dc.contributor.author","Liszkowski, Ulf"],["dc.contributor.author","Low, Jason"],["dc.contributor.author","Perner, Josef"],["dc.contributor.author","Powell, Lindsey"],["dc.contributor.author","Priewasser, Beate"],["dc.contributor.author","Rafetseder, Eva"],["dc.contributor.author","Ruffman, Ted"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-30T07:37:51Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-30T07:37:51Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.description.abstract","The commentary by Baillargeon, Buttelmann and Southgate raises a number of crucial issues concerning the replicability and validity of measures of false belief in infancy. Although we agree with some of their arguments, we believe that they underestimate the replication crisis in this area. In our response to their commentary, we first analyze the current empirical situation. The upshot is that, given the available evidence, it remains very much an open question whether infants possess a rich theory of mind. We then draw out more general conclusions for future collaborative studies that have the potential to address this open question."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.09.005"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/62174"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation.issn","0885-2014"],["dc.title","Do infants understand false beliefs? We don’t know yet – A commentary on Baillargeon, Buttelmann and Southgate’s commentary"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognitive Development"],["dc.contributor.author","Dörrenberg, Sebastian"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Liszkowski, Ulf"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-02-12T11:20:26Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-02-12T11:20:26Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.description.abstract","A growing body of infant studies with various implicit, non-verbal measures has suggested that Theory of Mind (ToM) may emerge much earlier than previously assumed. While explicit verbal ToM findings are highly replicable and show convergent validity, systematic replication studies of infant ToM, as well as convergent validations of these measures, are still missing. Here, we report a systematic study of the replicability and convergent validity of implicit ToM tasks using four different measures with 24-month-olds (N = 66): Anticipatory looking, looking times and pupil dilation in violation-of-expectation paradigms, and spontaneous communicative interaction. Results of anticipatory looking and interaction-based tasks did not replicate previous findings, suggesting that these tasks do not reliably measure ToM. Looking time and new pupil dilation measures revealed sensitivity to belief-incongruent outcomes which interacted with the presentation order of outcomes, indicating limited evidence for implicit ToM processes under certain conditions. There were no systematic correlations of false belief processing between the tasks, thus failing to provide convergent validity. The present results suggest that the robustness and validity of existing implicit ToM tasks needs to be treated with more caution than previously practiced, and that not all non-verbal tasks and measures are equally suited to tap into implicit ToM processing."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cogdev.2018.01.001"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/12162"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.title","How (not) to measure infant Theory of Mind: Testing the replicability and validity of four non-verbal measures"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]