Keser, Claudia

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","177"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Games and Economic Behavior"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","205"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","39"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-02T17:41:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-02T17:41:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2002"],["dc.description.abstract","We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine how much local interaction structures affect players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium than interaction in closed neighborhoods. Second, when players are allocated around a circle, the neighborhood size has, in the long run, no effect on the players' strategy choices. Third, with the same neighborhood size, players allocated on a lattice tend less than players allocated around a circle to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. This is true even though the players are given exactly the same instructions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1006/game.2001.0897"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57168"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Conventions and local interaction structures"],["dc.title.subtitle","experimental evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","465"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Labour Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","479"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","10"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.contributor.author","Güth, Werner"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T15:06:12Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T15:06:12Z"],["dc.date.issued","2003"],["dc.description.abstract","In an experiment, two players bargain with a third party, either separately or collectively after forming a joint venture. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one of the players has an interest in forming a joint venture. However, we observe a significant share of collective bargaining. When compared with decentralized bargaining, centralization has no significant effect on the payoffs of the merged partners, but reduces the payoff of the third player due to more frequent conflicts caused by higher ambitions of the merged party."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/S0927-5371(03)00021-6"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57179"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Unity suggests strength"],["dc.title.subtitle","An experimental study of decentralized and collective bargaining"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","269"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Economics Letters"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","275"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","58"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T14:49:26Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T14:49:26Z"],["dc.date.issued","1998"],["dc.description.abstract","Subjects repeatedly played a three-player coordination game with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while those interacting with their neighbors around a circle eventually coordinated on the risk-dominant equilibrium."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00289-9"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57176"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Coordination and local interaction"],["dc.title.subtitle","experimental evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","41"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Experimental Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","57"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","2"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-12-20T17:59:29Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-12-20T17:59:29Z"],["dc.date.issued","1999"],["dc.description.abstract","In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish between a situation in which the subjects are completely informed about the payoff function and a situation in which they are incompletely informed. We observe that subjects spend the greater part of the time at or near the efficient state. If the efficient state is an equilibrium, they spend more time there than otherwise. Furthermore, incomplete information increases the time spent at the efficient state."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1023/A:1009977715310"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57149"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Continuous-time strategy selection in linear population games"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","93"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Homo Oeconomicus"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","106"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","15"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-02T17:24:38Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-02T17:24:38Z"],["dc.date.issued","1998"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57166"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","New directions in experimental coordination games"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","89"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","109"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Vogt, Bodo"],["dc.contributor.editor","Ockenfels, Axel"],["dc.contributor.editor","Sadrieh, Abdolkarim"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-12-20T14:26:47Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-12-20T14:26:47Z"],["dc.date.issued","2010"],["dc.description.abstract","Social networks play an important role in life. We interact with our friends, neighbors and business partners, who in turn also interact with people who are not part of the community we directly interact with. How people form and maintain networks and how networks impact their behaviors raises behavioral questions that have been addressed by sociologists, economists, physicists, computer scientists and anthropologists."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/978-3-642-13983-3_8"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57145"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.publisher.place","Berlin"],["dc.relation.doi","10.1007/978-3-642-13983-3"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-3-642-13982-6"],["dc.relation.ispartof","The Selten School of Behavioral Economics A Collection of Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten"],["dc.title","Strategy Choice and Network Effects"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]