Keser, Claudia

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","177"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Games and Economic Behavior"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","205"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","39"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-02T17:41:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-02T17:41:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2002"],["dc.description.abstract","We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine how much local interaction structures affect players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium than interaction in closed neighborhoods. Second, when players are allocated around a circle, the neighborhood size has, in the long run, no effect on the players' strategy choices. Third, with the same neighborhood size, players allocated on a lattice tend less than players allocated around a circle to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. This is true even though the players are given exactly the same instructions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1006/game.2001.0897"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57168"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Conventions and local interaction structures"],["dc.title.subtitle","experimental evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","15"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.seriesnr","99s-24"],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T14:43:44Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T14:43:44Z"],["dc.date.issued","1999"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57174"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.publisher","CIRANO"],["dc.publisher.place","Montréal"],["dc.relation.crisseries","Série Scientifique (CIRANO)"],["dc.relation.ispartofseries","Série scientifique. Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche et Analyse des Organisations; 99s-24"],["dc.title","Mobility and cooperation"],["dc.title.subtitle","On the run"],["dc.type","working_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","279"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Games and Economic Behavior"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","295"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","59"],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Gardner, Roy S."],["dc.contributor.author","Hagen, Jürgen von"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T14:14:04Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T14:14:04Z"],["dc.date.issued","2007"],["dc.description.abstract","This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. Ferejohn and Krehbiel [Ferejohn, J., Krehbiel, K., 1987. The budget process and the size of the budget, Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 31, 296–320] showed theoretically that this need not be the case. We test experimentally the theoretical predictions of their work. The evidence from these experiments lends strong support to their theory, both at the aggregate and the individual subject level."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.004"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57172"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Budget processes"],["dc.title.subtitle","theory and experimental evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","269"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Economics Letters"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","275"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","58"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T14:49:26Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T14:49:26Z"],["dc.date.issued","1998"],["dc.description.abstract","Subjects repeatedly played a three-player coordination game with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while those interacting with their neighbors around a circle eventually coordinated on the risk-dominant equilibrium."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00289-9"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57176"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Coordination and local interaction"],["dc.title.subtitle","experimental evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","41"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Experimental Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","57"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","2"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-12-20T17:59:29Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-12-20T17:59:29Z"],["dc.date.issued","1999"],["dc.description.abstract","In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish between a situation in which the subjects are completely informed about the payoff function and a situation in which they are incompletely informed. We observe that subjects spend the greater part of the time at or near the efficient state. If the efficient state is an equilibrium, they spend more time there than otherwise. Furthermore, incomplete information increases the time spent at the efficient state."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1023/A:1009977715310"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57149"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Continuous-time strategy selection in linear population games"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","93"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Homo Oeconomicus"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","106"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","15"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-02T17:24:38Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-02T17:24:38Z"],["dc.date.issued","1998"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57166"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","New directions in experimental coordination games"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]