Keser, Claudia

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Health Economics Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","10"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Montmarquette, Claude"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmidt, Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Schnitzler, Cornelius"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-04-14T08:32:04Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-04-14T08:32:04Z"],["dc.date.issued","2020"],["dc.description.sponsorship","Open-Access-Publikationsfonds 2021"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1186/s13561-020-00299-4"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/17795"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/83799"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-399"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.relation.eissn","2191-1991"],["dc.rights","CC BY 4.0"],["dc.rights.uri","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"],["dc.title","Custom-made health-care: an experimental investigation"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","78"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","86"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","144"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Özgümüs, Asri"],["dc.contributor.author","Peterlé, Emmanuel"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmidt, Martin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T14:25:04Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T14:25:04Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.022"],["dc.identifier.issn","0167-2681"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/72427"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","An experimental investigation of rating-market regulation"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","291"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Games and Economic Behavior"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","310"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","101"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Markstädter, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmidt, Martin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-12-18T14:26:27Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-12-18T14:26:27Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.description.abstract","In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed “fair-share” rule of equal contributions relative to one's endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007, Keser et al., 2014) are influenced by minimum-contribution requirements. We consider three different schedules: FixMin, requiring the same absolute contributions, RelMin, requiring the same relative contributions, and ProgMin, requiring minimum contributions that progressively increase with the endowment. We find that minimum contributions exert norm-giving character and may lead to an increase in average group contributions. This is especially true for the progressive schedule. On the individual level, this schedule leads to higher relative contributions by the wealthier players and thus violates the “fair-share” norm. On the group level, it leads to the highest contribution level and the lowest inequality in total profits as measured by the Gini index."],["dc.description.sponsorship","Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) [GRK 1666 GlobalFood]"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.001"],["dc.identifier.isi","000398014300019"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57134"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","PUB_WoS_Import"],["dc.publisher","Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science"],["dc.relation.issn","1090-2473"],["dc.relation.issn","0899-8256"],["dc.title","Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public-good provision"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","28"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Markstädter, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmidt, Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Schnitzler, Cornelius"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-02T15:07:25Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-02T15:07:25Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","We compare voluntary contributions to the financing of a public good in a symmetric setting to those in asymmetric settings, in which four players have different, randomly allocated endowments. We observe that a weak asymmetry in the endowment distribution leads to the same contribution level as symmetry. Players tend to contribute the same proportion of their respective endowment. In a strongly asymmetric setting, where one player has a higher endowment than the three other players together, we observe significantly lower group contributions than in the other settings. The super-rich player does not contribute significantly more than what the others contribute on average and thus a much lower proportion of the endowment."],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57160"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.publisher","CeGE"],["dc.publisher.place","Göttingen; Göttingen"],["dc.relation.crisseries","Discussion Papers (Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research)"],["dc.relation.ispartofseries","Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research"],["dc.title","Social costs of inequality"],["dc.title.subtitle","Heterogeneous endowments in public-good experiments"],["dc.type","working_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","38"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.seriesnr","224"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Markstädter, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmidt, Martin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-02T16:18:04Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-02T16:18:04Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed \"fair-share\" rule of equal contributions relative to oneś endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014) may be influenced by minimum-contribution requirements. We consider three different schedules: FixMin, requiring the same absolute contributions, RelMin, requiring the same relative contributions, and ProgMin, requiring minimum contributions that progressively increase with the endowment. We find that minimum contributions exert norm-giving character and may lead to an increase in average group contributions. This is especially true for the progressive schedule. On the individual level, this schedule leads to higher relative contributions by the wealthier players and thus violates the \"fair-share\" norm. On the group level, it leads to highest contribution level and the lowest inequality in total profits as measured by the Gini index."],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57162"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.publisher","CeGE"],["dc.publisher.place","Göttingen"],["dc.relation.crisseries","Discussion Papers (Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research)"],["dc.relation.ispartofseries","Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research; 224"],["dc.title","Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogenous endowments and voluntary public-good provision"],["dc.type","working_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Markstädter, Andreas"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmidt, Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Schnitzler, Cornelius"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-02T15:46:37Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-02T15:46:37Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57161"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.publisher","CIRANO"],["dc.publisher.place","Montréal"],["dc.title","Rich man and Lazarus – Asymmetric endowments in public-goods experiments"],["dc.type","working_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","44"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.seriesnr","218"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Montmarquette, Claude"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmidt, Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Schnitzler, Cornelius"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T14:03:57Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T14:03:57Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","In this paper, we investigate in a controlled laboratory experiment physician behavior in the case of payment heterogeneity. In the experiment, each physician provides medical care to patients whose treatments are paid for either under fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation (CAP). We observe that physicians customize care in response to the payment system. A FFS patient receives considerably more medical care than the corresponding CAP patient with the same illness and treatment preference. Physicians over-serve FFS patients and under-serve CAP patients. After a CAP payment reduction in the experiment we observe neither a quantity reduction under CAP nor a spillover into the treatment of FFS patients."],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57170"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.publisher","CeGE"],["dc.publisher.place","Göttingen; Göttingen"],["dc.relation.crisseries","Discussion Papers (Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research)"],["dc.relation.ispartofseries","Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research; 218"],["dc.title","Custom-made healthcare"],["dc.title.subtitle","An experimental investigation"],["dc.type","working_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]