Keser, Claudia

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1514"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","6"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Economic Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1533"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","51"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Willinger, Marc"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-12-17T16:14:33Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-12-17T16:14:33Z"],["dc.date.issued","2007"],["dc.description.abstract","In a laboratory experiment, we investigate behavior in a principal–agent situation with moral hazard. We evaluate the predictive success of two theories. One is the standard agency theory, which assumes that the agent will accept any contract offer that satisfies his participation constraint, typically requiring zero expected utility. The other is the “fair-offer” theory suggested by Keser and Willinger [2000. Principals’ principles when agents’ actions are hidden. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18 (1), 163–185], which requires that the principal provide full insurance against losses to the agent and leave him a share of at most 50% of the generated surplus. The treatment variable of our experiment is the cost of effort. As effort costs increase, expected net surplus of a contract decreases. We observe that fair-offer theory generally predicts observed contract offers better than standard agency theory. However, the predictive success of the fair-offer theory decreases, while the one of standard agency theory increases with decreasing expected net surplus."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.euroecorev.2006.10.007"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57125"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Theories of behavior in principal–agent relationships with hidden action"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","237"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2/3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Revue d'Économie Industrielle"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","253"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","92"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Willinger, Marc"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-02T14:15:27Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-02T14:15:27Z"],["dc.date.issued","2000"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.3406/rei.2000.1049"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57153"],["dc.language.iso","fr"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","La théorie des contrats dans un contexte expérimental"],["dc.title.subtitle","Un survol des expériences sur les relations \"principal-agent\""],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","163"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Journal of Industrial Organization"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","185"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","18"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Willinger, Marc"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T15:08:06Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T15:08:06Z"],["dc.date.issued","2000"],["dc.description.abstract","We examine the behavior of subjects in a simple principal–agent game with hidden action. While subjects in the role of agents tend to choose the actions which maximize their expected profits, subjects in the role of principals offer contracts which differ from the theoretical predictions. We identify three principles of contract design: (1) the agent’s remuneration for the better outcome is at least as high as the remuneration for the worse outcome. (2) The agent must not risk making a loss. (3) The net profit of the agent should not be higher than the net profit of the principal."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00038-7"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57180"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Principals’ principles when agents’ actions are hidden"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","447"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Economic Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","466"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","24"],["dc.contributor.author","Willinger, Marc"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Lohmann, Christoph H."],["dc.contributor.author","Usunier, Jean-Claude"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T14:09:36Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T14:09:36Z"],["dc.date.issued","2003"],["dc.description.abstract","We compare the results of a one-shot investment game, studied earlier by Berg et al. [Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995) 122], for France and Germany. In this game, player A is the trustor and player B the trustee. The average level of investment is significantly larger in Germany, but the level of reciprocity is not significantly different between the two countries. This implies that German B-players earned significantly more than French B-players. Furthermore, in both countries B-players earned significantly more than A-players. Our results support Fukuyama’s conjecture that the level of trust is higher in Germany than in France, a situation which can explain a higher rate of investment and a higher level of performance. However, our results also show that the increased revenue which is attributable to the higher level of trust, is not shared in a more equitable way, but essentially increases B-players’ payoffs. Finally, based on an intercultural trust experiment, we show that French A subjects did not find German B subjects less trustworthy and German A subjects did not find French B subjects less trustworthy."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00165-4"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57171"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany"],["dc.title.subtitle","Experimental investigation based on the investment game"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","293"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","312"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Willinger, Marc"],["dc.contributor.editor","Brousseau, Eric"],["dc.contributor.editor","Glachant, Jean-Michel"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-12-17T16:18:41Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-12-17T16:18:41Z"],["dc.date.issued","2002"],["dc.description.abstract","In the standard principal–agent model with moral hazard (Holmström 1979; Grossman and Hart 1987) the principal, who cannot observe the agent's effort, generally has an interest in proposing a contract with a variable remuneration that is a function of the realized profit. The model is based on the assumption of a stochastic relationship between the realized profit and the agent's effort; this relationship is common knowledge. As the agent's effort is unobservable to the principal, the contract has to provide an incentive for the agent to choose the effort level that is desired by the principal. In other words, the contract has to satisfy an incentive constraint. It also has to provide the agent with an expected utility that is as least as high as his utility without the contract. This is called the participation constraint. If the principal offered a contract with a fixed remuneration that is independent of the realized profit, the agent would provide the effort level that is least costly to him, which is in general the lowest possible effort. If the principal wants to induce a higher and more costly effort level by the agent, the contract has to be designed such that the agent maximizes his expected utility by choosing this effort level. Contract theory predicts that the principal keeps the entire expected surplus of the contract for himself and makes the agent just indifferent between rejecting and accepting the contract with the provision of the induced effort level. This solution is based on the assumption that the stochastic relationship between the principal's profit and the agent's effort is common knowledge."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1017/CBO9780511613807.017"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57126"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.publisher","Cambridge University Press"],["dc.publisher.place","Cambridge"],["dc.relation.doi","10.1017/CBO9780511613807"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-0-511-61380-7"],["dc.relation.ispartof","The Economics of Contracts. Theories and Applications"],["dc.title","Experiments on moral hazard and incentives: reciprocity and surplus-sharing"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]