How secure is the next generation of IP-based emergency services architecture?

For some location-based applications, such as emergency calling or roadside assistance, it appears that the identity of the requester is less important than accurate and trustworthy location information for accomplishing the main function. Accurate and genuine location is important for these applications to avoid misuse. In this paper we point to some ongoing efforts regarding transition emergency service architectures that could introduce security vulnerabilities unless countermeasures are developed. Furthermore, we summarize the ongoing work in providing cryptographic assertions for location. We argue that many of the currently proposed ideas are difficult to deploy and to operate. Additionally, when used without ensuring that the underlying assumptions are met these mechanisms do not provide any additional benefit, but costs. We conclude this article with a suggestion on what the research community and industry should be investigating to avoid potential problems with IP-based emergency services. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.