Ambos, Kai

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","833"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","876"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Review of the Red Cross"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","858"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","91"],["dc.contributor.author","Ambos, Kai"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T11:21:30Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T11:21:30Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","Genocide is a crime with a double mental element, i.e. a general intent as to the underlying acts, and an ulterior intent with regard to the ultimate aim of the destruction of the group. The prevailing view in the case-law interprets the respective 'intent to destroy requirement as a special or specific intent (dolus specialis) stressing its volitional or purpose-based tendency. While this view has been followed for a long time in legal doctrine without further ado, it has recently been challenged by knowledge- and structure-based approaches, which have not received sufficient attention. A historical, literal, systematic and teleological interpretation of the 'intent to destroy' requirement, taking into account the particular structure of the genocide offence and the meaning of 'intent' in comparative law, reveals that the traditional view can no longer be maintained. It should be replaced by a combined structure- and knowledge-based approach that distinguishes according to the status and role of the (low-, mid- and top-level) perpetrators. Thus, the purpose-based intent should be upheld only with regard to the top- and mid-level perpetrators, whereas for the low-level perpetrators knowledge of the genocidal context should suffice. Lastly, this new approach requires a fresh look at the 'intent to destroy' requirement in cases of participation in genocide."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1017/S1816383110000056"],["dc.identifier.isi","000278419400009"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/55785"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Cambridge Univ Press"],["dc.relation.issn","1816-3831"],["dc.title","What does 'intent to destroy' in genocide mean?"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","552"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Zeitschrift für internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","564"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","11"],["dc.contributor.author","Ambos, Kai"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-10T08:13:20Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-10T08:13:20Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/5862"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/61208"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.notes.intern","Migrated from goescholar"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.access","openAccess"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.subject","Alberto Fujimori"],["dc.subject.ddc","340"],["dc.title","Politische und rechtliche Hintergründe des Urteils gegen den ehem. peruanischen Präsidenten Alberto Fujimori"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","689"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of International Criminal Justice"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","700"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","18"],["dc.contributor.author","Ambos, Kai"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-04-14T08:24:14Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-04-14T08:24:14Z"],["dc.date.issued","2020"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1093/jicj/mqaa019"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/81215"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-399"],["dc.relation.eissn","1478-1395"],["dc.relation.issn","1478-1387"],["dc.title","The ECCC’s Contribution to Substantive ICL"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","223"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1/3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Criminal Law Forum"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","228"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","23"],["dc.contributor.author","Ambos, Kai"],["dc.date.accessioned","2013-04-09T08:49:05Z"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-10-27T13:14:12Z"],["dc.date.available","2013-04-09T08:49:05Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-10-27T13:14:12Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.format.mimetype","application/pdf"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s10609-012-9167-3"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/8840"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/91843"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Migrated from goescholar"],["dc.publisher","Springer Netherlands"],["dc.publisher.place","Dordrecht"],["dc.relation.eissn","1572-9850"],["dc.relation.issn","1046-8374"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Juristische Fakultät"],["dc.relation.reviewof","Ruth Mackenzie, Kate Malleson, Penny Martin and Philippe Sands, Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process, and Politics (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 300 pp., ISBN: 978-0199580569"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.access","openAccess"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Book Review"],["dc.type","review"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","504"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft : ZStW"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","520"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","122"],["dc.contributor.author","Ambos, Kai"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-10T08:13:49Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-10T08:13:49Z"],["dc.date.issued","2010"],["dc.description.abstract","Cesare Beccarias Forderung nach Abschaffung der Folter kann nicht isoliert, sondern nur im Zusammenhang mit seinem legendären Werk „Von den Verbrechen und den Strafen“1 und der darin zum Ausdruck kommenden kontraktualistisch- utilitaristischen Strafrechtskonzeption gewürdigt werden. Bevor wir uns deshalb seiner eigentlichen Kritik der Folter zuwenden (III.) und ihre aktuelle Bedeutung beurteilen wollen (IV.), ist zunächst die Beccaria-Rezeption im Allgemeinen (I.) und die Entstehungsgeschichte des Werks im Besonderen (II.) zu untersuchen.Die kleineUntersuchung erbringt imWesentlichen drei Ergebnisse, die ihr zugleich als Thesen vorangestellt werden können: 1. Beccarias Werk hat eine bis heute anhaltende Bedeutung als kriminalpolitischesManifest zur utilitaristisch begründeten Ersetzung des grausamen, religiösen mittelalterlichen Strafrechts durch ein säkulares und (damit) im Ergebnis humaneres Strafrecht. 2. Beccarias reiht sich insoweit in die Reihe zahlreicher anderer aufklärerischer Denker ein, vermag aber seine – durchaus nicht neuartigen – Thesen so populär zuzuspitzen, dass sie sich rasanter Verbreitung in zahlreichen Sprachen erfreuen. Dies erklärt Beccarias bis heute anhaltende Popularität. Seine fehlende Anerkennung der geistigen Vorläufer seiner Thesen und insbesondere der erheblichen Mitwirkung der Gebrüder Verri an der Entstehung seines Werks, gerade auch des Kapitels zur Folter, lassen allerdings Zweifel an seiner Originalität und wissenschaftlichen Redlichkeit aufkommen. 3. Die heutige praktische Bedeutung des Werks ist aufgrund der umfassenden normativen (völker- und verfassungsrechtlichen) Absicherung eines humaneren Strafrechts und eines fairen Strafverfahrens als gering zu veranschlagen. Auch per se inhumane und voraufklärerische Strafrechtssysteme bedürfen angesichts der menschenrechtlichen lex lata keiner Beccaria-Lektüre, um von der Notwendigkeit humanisierender Reformen überzeugt zu werden; sie sind zu diesen verpflichtet. Führen sie diese trotzdem nicht durch, wird Beccaria daran auch nichts ändern. Was insbesondere die von Beccaria mit neun Argumenten bekämpfte Folter angeht, so stellt sich die Lage nicht anders dar, wobei freilich seine Konzentration auf die im inquisitorischen Strafverfahren angewendete (repressive) Überführungsfolter den Blick auf die heute diskutierten Probleme im Zusammenhang mit der (präventiven) Rettungsfolter vollkommen verstellt."],["dc.identifier.fs","575088"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/7498"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/61345"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Juristische Fakultät"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.subject.ddc","340"],["dc.title","Cesare Beccaria und die Folter – Kritische Anmerkungen aus heutiger Sicht"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","253"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","ICL Journal"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","287"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","14"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Ambos, Kai;"],["dc.contributor.author","Ambos, Kai"],["dc.date.accessioned","2022-11-28T10:33:02Z"],["dc.date.available","2022-11-28T10:33:02Z"],["dc.date.issued","2020-12-09"],["dc.date.updated","2022-11-27T10:14:00Z"],["dc.description.abstract","AbstractThe paper inquires, from a comparative (Canadian-German) and human rights perspective, whether the State’s right (or even obligation) to punish can be derived from the Constitution. It argues that Constitutions usually assume this right but do not explicitly provide, let alone explain it (infra 1). However, protective (affirmative) duties may be derived from the rights part of a constitution (2) and these protective duties may serve as a basis for criminalization (3). While this is the position of the case law (especially the German one) and finds support in human rights law (4), it is argued that the reasoning is not fully convincing (5.1) and therefore further reflections are needed (5). First, it is necessary to make explicit the basic assumptions on the role of constitutions and judges on which the acceptance of a (constitutional) ius puniendi is predicated (5.1). Then, in a second step, the combination of a victim-based and effective remedy reasoning which best supports an obligation or at least ius puniendi is, relying on the German discussion, to be elaborated further (5.2)."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1515/icl-2020-0008"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/117495"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.publisher","De Gruyter"],["dc.relation.eissn","1995-5855"],["dc.relation.issn","2306-3734"],["dc.title","Ius puniendi and Constitution: A Comparative (Canadian-German) Perspective"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","459"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Criminal Law Forum"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","460"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","22"],["dc.contributor.author","Ambos, Kai"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-09T11:53:21Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-09T11:53:21Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s10609-011-9152-2"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/7353"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/60406"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.publisher.place","Dordrecht"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Preface to the Special Symposium in Honour of Professor Otto Triffterer’s 80th Birthday"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","495"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Conflict & Security Law"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","504"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","21"],["dc.contributor.author","Ambos, Kai"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T18:19:19Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T18:19:19Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1093/jcsl/krw010"],["dc.identifier.eissn","1467-7962"],["dc.identifier.issn","1467-7954"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/75201"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Individual Criminal Responsibility for Cyber Aggression"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","389"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Criminal Law Forum"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","408"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","22"],["dc.contributor.author","Ambos, Kai"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-07-09T11:53:21Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-07-09T11:53:21Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s10609-011-9150-4"],["dc.identifier.fs","581240"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/7352"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/60405"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.publisher.place","Dordrecht"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted to the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on the Question of the Applicable Terrorism Offence with a Particular Focus on “Special” Special Intent and/or a Special Motive as Additional Subjective Requirements"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","ngw024"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Human Rights Law Review"],["dc.contributor.author","Ambos, Kai"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T18:19:15Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T18:19:15Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1093/hrlr/ngw024"],["dc.identifier.eissn","1744-1021"],["dc.identifier.issn","1461-7781"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/75181"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","The Crime of Genocide and the Principle of Legality under Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]