Philosophisches Seminar

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","AI & Society"],["dc.contributor.author","Loh, Wulf"],["dc.contributor.author","Misselhorn, Catrin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-05-11T06:43:23Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-05-11T06:43:23Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019"],["dc.description.abstract","While recent studies suggest that augmented learning employing smart glasses (ALSG) increases overall learning performance, in this paper we are more interested in the question which repercussions ALSG will have on the type of knowledge that is acquired. Drawing from the theoretical discussion within epistemology about the differences between Knowledge-How and Knowledge-That, we will argue that ALSG furthers understanding as a series of epistemic and non-epistemic Knowing-Hows. Focusing on academic knowledge acquisition, especially with respect to early curriculum experiments in various STEM disciplines as investigated by the BmBF “Be-Greifen” project, we take the Be-Greifen holo.lab setup as an example for showing that ALSG shifts the learning focus from propositional knowledge to epistemic competencies, which can be differentiated as “grasping”, “wielding”, and “transferring”."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s00146-019-00881-3"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64977"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation.issn","0951-5666"],["dc.relation.issn","1435-5655"],["dc.title","Augmented learning, smart glasses and knowing how"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","52"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","79"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","55"],["dc.contributor.author","Ludwig, Bernd"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-04-22T14:16:57Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-04-22T14:16:57Z"],["dc.date.issued","2001"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64244"],["dc.identifier.url","www.jstor.org/stable/20485000"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.relation.issn","0044-3301"],["dc.title","Zweifeln am Wunder. David Humes ‚ewige Schranke’ gegen den Wunderglauben."],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","24"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Jurisprudence : an international journal of legal an political thought"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","44"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","6"],["dc.contributor.author","Ludwig, Bernd"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:45:01Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:45:01Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.identifier.gro","3145464"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/3173"],["dc.notes.intern","aufklärung"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","oschaef1"],["dc.publisher","Hart"],["dc.relation.eissn","2040-3321"],["dc.relation.issn","2040-3313"],["dc.title","Sympathy for the Devil(s)? Personality and Legal Coercion in Kant's Doctrine of Law"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","417"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","443"],["dc.contributor.author","Misselhorn, Catrin"],["dc.contributor.editor","Grundmann, Thomas"],["dc.contributor.editor","Hofmann, Frank"],["dc.contributor.editor","Misselhorn, Catrin"],["dc.contributor.editor","Waibel, Violetta L."],["dc.contributor.editor","Zanetti, Véronique"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-05-06T10:47:58Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-05-06T10:47:58Z"],["dc.date.issued","2005"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64875"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.publisher","Suhrkamp"],["dc.publisher.place","Frankfurt am Main"],["dc.relatedmaterial.material","https://www.gbv.de/dms/hebis-darmstadt/toc/12728317X.pdf"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-3-518-29335-5"],["dc.relation.isbn","3-518-29335-4"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Anatomie der Subjektivität : Bewusstsein, Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstgefühl"],["dc.title","Ästhetische Erfahrung und die Perspektive der ersten Person"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","68"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Ethics in Progress Quarterly"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","81"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","10"],["dc.contributor.author","Misselhorn, Catrin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-05-11T06:41:21Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-05-11T06:41:21Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019"],["dc.description.abstract","The development of increasingly intelligent and autonomous technologies will eventually lead to these systems having to face morally problematic situations. This is particularly true of artificial systems that are used in geriatric care environments. The goal of this article is to describe how one can approach the design of an elder care robot which is capable of moral decision-making and moral learning. A conceptual design for the development of such a system is provided and the steps that are necessary to implement it are described."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.14746/eip.2019.2.7"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64976"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation.issn","2084-9257"],["dc.title","A Softwaremodule for an Ethical Elder Care Robot. Design and Implementation Abstract:"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","39"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","67"],["dc.contributor.author","Bratu, Christine"],["dc.contributor.editor","Mori, Massimo"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-06-05T06:04:28Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-06-05T06:04:28Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/978-3-658-15150-8_3"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/66165"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.publisher.place","Wiesbaden"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-3-658-15149-2"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-3-658-15150-8"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Vom Naturzustand zur kosmopolitischen Gesellschaft : Souveränität und Staat bei Kant"],["dc.title","Vom Naturzustand zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Das Erbe von Hobbes"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","294"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Philosophical Investigations"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","299"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","40"],["dc.contributor.author","Brandhorst, Mario"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T18:36:24Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T18:36:24Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/phin.12164"],["dc.identifier.issn","0190-0536"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/76611"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Sebastian Sunday Grève and Jakub Mácha (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). xxi + 314, £63."],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","129"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Literary Theory"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","144"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","3"],["dc.contributor.author","Misselhorn, Catrin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-05-05T14:24:13Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-05-05T14:24:13Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","For about fifteen years now there has been an increasingly vivid discussion of the so-called »puzzle of imaginative resistance«: we feel resistance to imagining worlds that are morally different from our world. In morally deviating worlds people do not just think differently about morality, but different things are morally good in these worlds. I will start with some introductory thoughts about the different dimensions of the problem. Then the general functioning of imagination has to be scrutinized. As I see it, imagining consists in the entertaining of a mental content without asserting it. However, this can be done in different ways: just by supposing the truth of a proposition, or in an experiential mode that involves also sensory and affective qualities. This brings us to a distinction made by Richard Moran (Philosophical Review 103: 75–106, 1994). He distinguishes two modes of imagining: a hypothetical and a dramatic one. Dramatic imagining is a form of imaginatively adopting a total perspective including thoughts, sensory qualities and emotions. From Moran's point of view, imaginative resistance depends mainly on the feelings involved in dramatic imagining. Therefore, I call it an affective account of imaginative resistance. Yet, it has been argued that imagined emotional responses are only »make-believe« or pretend. We, therefore, have to find out whether this objection is threatening the force of Moran's account. His answer to the challenge is based mostly on the affective aspect of dramatic imagining. Although he is right in emphasizing the role of feeling in emotional imagining, it does not suffice to explain the arousal of imaginative resistance. Therefore, we have to proceed from an affective to a full-fledged emotion-based account. Emotions in the full sense of the term cannot be reduced to mere feelings, they have a representational content. I suggest understanding the representational content of emotions following Kenny (Action, Emotion and Will, 1963) in terms of their formal objects which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. If an imagined content is not presented as a viable instance of the formal object of an emotion, the imagining will fail. As a consequence, I will develop a multi-layered model of failures to imagine something emotionally due to the specific ways in which the representational content and the affective dimension interact in emotional imagining. We also have to get a firmer grip on the nature of the feelings involved in emotions in order to understand their impact on imaginative resistance. From my point of view this has to do with their nature as bodily feelings, which makes emotional imagining in a way intrusive that distinguishes it from other kinds of imagining. We will then have to reconsider how the bodily feelings involved in emotional imagining relate to their representational content. Finally, I will discuss why it is specific to imaginative resistance that the imagining does not just fail, but a feeling of repulsion is evoked."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1515/JLT.2009.006"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64833"],["dc.identifier.url","https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249944808_Imaginative_Resistance_An_Emotion-Based_Account"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relatedmaterial.material","https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249944808_Imaginative_Resistance_An_Emotion-Based_Account"],["dc.relatedmaterial.material","https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/jlt/3/1/article-p129.xml"],["dc.relation.issn","1862-5290"],["dc.relation.issn","1862-8990"],["dc.title","Imaginative Resistance. An Emotion-Based Account"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.seriesnr","264"],["dc.contributor.author","Steinfath, Holmer"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-04-24T11:48:08Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-04-24T11:48:08Z"],["dc.date.issued","1991"],["dc.format.extent","353"],["dc.identifier.isbn","3-445-09245-1"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64340"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.publisher","Hain"],["dc.publisher.place","Frankfurt am Main"],["dc.relatedmaterial.material","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64340"],["dc.relation.crisseries","Athenäums Monografien. Philosophie"],["dc.relation.ispartofseries","Athenäums Monografien;264"],["dc.title","Selbständigkeit und Einfachheit"],["dc.title.subtitle","zur Substanztheorie des Aristoteles"],["dc.type","book"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","52"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Südwest-Presse. Schwäbische Donau-Zeitung. Ulm"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","8. Juni 2013"],["dc.contributor.author","Misselhorn, Catrin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-05-08T06:40:07Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-05-08T06:40:07Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64941"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.relatedmaterial.material","https://ezeitung.swp.de/suedwestpresse/ulm/archiv/ausgaben/"],["dc.title","Künstliche Intelligenz in der Philosophie"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]