Dreher, Axel

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","516"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Conflict Resolution"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","546"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","56"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Gassebner, Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Siemers, Lars-H. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:09:52Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:09:52Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.description.abstract","Using the KOF Index of Globalization and two indices of economic freedom, the authors empirically analyze whether globalization and economic liberalization affect governments' respect for human rights in a panel of 106 countries over the 1981-2004 period. According to their results, physical integrity rights significantly and robustly increase with globalization and economic freedom, while empowerment rights are not robustly affected. Due to the lack of consensus about the appropriate level of empowerment rights as compared to the outright rejection of any violation of physical integrity rights, the global community is presumably less effective in promoting empowerment rights."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1177/0022002711420962"],["dc.identifier.isi","000304663000007"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/13070"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/26369"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Sage Publications Inc"],["dc.relation.issn","0022-0027"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Globalization, Economic Freedom, and Human Rights"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","183"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Journal of Political Economy"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","196"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","29"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Jensen, Nathan M."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:27:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:27:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.description.abstract","We investigate empirically changes in voting in the United Nations General Assembly consequent to leader turnovers over the 1985-2008 period and find evidence that governments with new rulers are more supportive of the United States on important votes. We consider the explanations that might underlie our empirical result, including material gain and ethical motivations. In contrast to our findings on key votes, our results show that voting on non-key votes in the General Assembly does not robustly shift towards the US. following leader change. We therefore conclude that material gain is the most likely reason for the observed pattern. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.10.002"],["dc.identifier.isi","000315425400012"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/30605"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Inc"],["dc.relation.issn","0176-2680"],["dc.title","Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","443"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3-4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Public Choice"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","467"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","146"],["dc.contributor.author","Boockmann, Bernhard"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:58:52Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:58:52Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","We investigate whether countries with poor human rights records oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly. An instrumental account of voting would suggest that these countries aim to weaken resolutions since they could be future targets of these policies. We estimate determinants of voting using 13,000 individual voting decisions from 1980 to 2002. Our results from ordered probit estimation show that a country's human rights situation is irrelevant to voting behavior if regional dependence of voting is controlled for. The results also show that simple rules for aggregating voting choices can lead to misleading results."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s11127-010-9598-5"],["dc.identifier.isi","000286328100009"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/7367"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/23750"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.relation.issn","0048-5829"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Do human rights offenders oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations?"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1950"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","11"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","World Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1968"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","39"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Nunnenkamp, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Thiele, Rainer"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:50:04Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:50:04Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","Major DAC donors are widely criticized for weak targeting of aid, selfish aid motives, and insufficient coordination. The emergence of an increasing number of new donors may further complicate the coordination of international aid efforts. At the same time, it is open to question whether new donors (many of which were aid recipients until recently) are more altruistic and provide better targeted aid according to need and merit. Project-level data on aid by new donors, as collected by the AidData initiative, allow for empirical analyses comparing the allocation behavior of new versus old donors. We employ Probit and Tobit models and test for significant differences in the distribution of aid by new and old donors across recipient countries. We find that, on average, new donors care less for recipient need than old donors. New and old donors behave similarly in several respects, however. They disregard merit by not taking the level of corruption in recipient countries into account. Concerns that commercial self-interest distorts the allocation of aid seem to be overblown for both groups. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.024"],["dc.identifier.isi","000297525700005"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/21606"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Pergamon-elsevier Science Ltd"],["dc.relation.issn","0305-750X"],["dc.title","Are 'New' Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between nonDAC and DAC Donor Countries"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","346"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","World Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","358"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","66"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Mikosch, Heiner"],["dc.contributor.author","Voigt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:01:51Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:01:51Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","We argue that membership in specific international organizations (IOs) is an important determinant of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. To the extent that membership restricts a country from pursuing policies that are harmful to investors, it can signal reduced political risk. Using data over the 1971-2012 period, we find that membership in IOs does indeed increase inflows of FDI. We find this effect to be substantively important and robust to controlling for alternative determinants of FDI, to using different model specifications and to using an indicator of membership in regional rather than global IOs. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.007"],["dc.identifier.isi","000346944100023"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/38114"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Pergamon-elsevier Science Ltd"],["dc.relation.issn","0305-750X"],["dc.title","Membership has its Privileges - The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","65"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","The Journal of Law and Economics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","93"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","53"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Gassebner, Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Siemers, Lars-H."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:46:21Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:46:21Z"],["dc.date.issued","2010"],["dc.description.abstract","Using panel data for 111 countries over the period 1982-2002, we employ two indexes that cover a wide range of human rights to empirically analyze whether and to what extent terrorism affects human rights. According to our results, terrorism significantly, but not dramatically, diminishes governments' respect for basic human rights such as the absence of extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture. The result is robust to how we measure terrorist attacks, to the method of estimation, and to the choice of countries in our sample. However, we find no effect of terrorism on empowerment rights."],["dc.identifier.isi","000279387000003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/20672"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Univ Chicago Press"],["dc.relation.issn","0022-2186"],["dc.title","Does Terrorism Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","337"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3-4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Public Choice"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","363"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","149"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Fuchs, Andreas"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:49:01Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:49:01Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","This article investigates empirically whether, and in what ways, donors in the Development Assistance Committee respond to transnational terrorist incidents and the onset of the War on Terror by changing aid effort and aid allocation. First, an analysis of 22 donor countries shows that aid effort increased during the War on Terror period, but did not respond to the actual number of terror events. Second, using aid allocation equations, we find that countries where terror originates are not more likely to receive aid as a consequence, but if they are selected, they receive larger amounts of aid. Our results imply that politicians may still have to learn from economic research. To the extent that development aid can effectively combat terror across the world, as recent research suggests it does, politicians would be well-advised to target aid to those countries where terrorist groups exist in abundance."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s11127-011-9878-8"],["dc.identifier.isi","000300790000007"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/7366"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/21352"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.relation.issn","0048-5829"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Does terror increase aid?"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","742"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","7"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Economic Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","757"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","53"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Sturm, Jan-Egbert"],["dc.contributor.author","Vreeland, James Raymond"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T11:23:32Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T11:23:32Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with voting members of the Security Council. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.03.002"],["dc.identifier.isi","000271364800002"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/56216"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","1873-572X"],["dc.relation.issn","0014-2921"],["dc.title","Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1294"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","8"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","World Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1307"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","39"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Poutvaara, Panu"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:53:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:53:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","Using panel data for 78 countries of origin we examine the impact of the inflow of foreign students in to the United States on migration patterns in the country over the 1971-2001 period. We find that the stock of foreign students is an important predictor of subsequent migration. The estimated relationship shows that an increase in the number of students by 10% increases immigration to the United States by a maximum of 0.94%. This suggests that student flows result in a significant brain gain for the United States. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.12.001"],["dc.identifier.isi","000293719800003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/22486"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Pergamon-elsevier Science Ltd"],["dc.relation.issn","0305-750X"],["dc.title","Foreign Students and Migration to the United States"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","413"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3-4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Public Choice"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","432"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","155"],["dc.contributor.author","Dreher, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Gassebner, Martin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:24:29Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:24:29Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.description.abstract","This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might 'grease the wheels' of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003-2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the 'greasing' effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the 'grease the wheels' hypothesis."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s11127-011-9871-2"],["dc.identifier.isi","000318515700012"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/10373"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/29832"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.relation.issn","1573-7101"],["dc.relation.issn","0048-5829"],["dc.relation.orgunit","Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]