Mayrhofer, Ralf

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","789"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Psychonomic Bulletin & Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","796"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","23"],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:13:01Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:13:01Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","In the Michotte task, a ball (X) moves toward a resting ball (Y). In the moment of contact, X stops und Y starts moving. Previous studies have shown that subjects tend to view X as the causal agent (\"X launches Y\") rather than Y (\"Y stops X\"). Moreover, X tends to be attributed more force than Y (force asymmetry), which contradicts the laws of Newtonian mechanics. Recent theories of force asymmetry try to explain these findings as the result of an asymmetrical identification with either the (stronger) agent or the (weaker) patient of the causal interaction. We directly tested this assumption by manipulating attributions of causal agency while holding the properties of the causal interaction constant across conditions. In contrast to previous accounts, we found that force judgments stayed invariant across conditions in which assignments of causal agency shifted from X to Y and that even those subjects who chose Y as the causal agent gave invariantly higher force ratings to X. These results suggest that causal agency and the perception of force are conceptually independent of each other. Different possible explanations are discussed."],["dc.description.sponsorship","Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Wa 621/22-1, Ma 6545/1-2, SPP 1516]"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.3758/s13423-015-0960-y"],["dc.identifier.isi","000381177400011"],["dc.identifier.pmid","26452375"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/12591"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/40352"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.relation.issn","1531-5320"],["dc.relation.issn","1069-9384"],["dc.rights","CC BY 4.0"],["dc.rights.uri","https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0"],["dc.title","Causal agency and the perception of force"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1880"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","12"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1910"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","44"],["dc.contributor.author","Bramley, Neil R."],["dc.contributor.author","Gerstenberg, Tobias"],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.contributor.author","Lagnado, David A."],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T18:09:26Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T18:09:26Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1037/xlm0000548"],["dc.identifier.eissn","1939-1285"],["dc.identifier.issn","0278-7393"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/73655"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Time in causal structure learning."],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","54"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognitive Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","84"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","96"],["dc.contributor.author","Meder, Björn"],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T14:23:11Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T14:23:11Z"],["dc.date.issued","2017"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.05.002"],["dc.identifier.issn","0010-0285"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/71868"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Diagnostic causal reasoning with verbal information"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3-4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","International Journal of Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","43"],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, Michael R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T11:14:32Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T11:14:32Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.identifier.isi","000259264300366"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/54142"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Psychology Press"],["dc.publisher.place","Hove"],["dc.title","Mind reading aliens: Inferring causal structure from covariational data"],["dc.type","conference_abstract"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","266"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","297"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","179"],["dc.contributor.author","Rothe, Anselm"],["dc.contributor.author","Deverett, Ben"],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.contributor.author","Kemp, Charles"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T14:23:11Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T14:23:11Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.003"],["dc.identifier.issn","0010-0277"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/71865"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Successful structure learning from observational data"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","2137"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","8"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognitive Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","2150"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","40"],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:06:18Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:06:18Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","Research on human causal induction has shown that people have general prior assumptions about causal strength and about how causes interact with the background. We propose that these prior assumptions about the parameters of causal systems do not only manifest themselves in estimations of causal strength or the selection of causes but also when deciding between alternative causal structures. In three experiments, we requested subjects to choose which of two observable variables was the cause and which the effect. We found strong evidence that learners have interindividually variable but intraindividually stable priors about causal parameters that express a preference for causal determinism (sufficiency or necessity; Experiment 1). These priors predict which structure subjects preferentially select. The priors can be manipulated experimentally (Experiment 2) and appear to be domain-general (Experiment 3). Heuristic strategies of structure induction are suggested that can be viewed as simplified implementations of the priors."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/cogs.12318"],["dc.identifier.isi","000388565700014"],["dc.identifier.pmid","26522238"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/39062"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley-blackwell"],["dc.relation.issn","1551-6709"],["dc.relation.issn","0364-0213"],["dc.title","Sufficiency and Necessity Assumptions in Causal Structure Induction"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","277"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Psychological Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","301"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","121"],["dc.contributor.author","Meder, Bjoern"],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:37:59Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:37:59Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","Our research examines the normative and descriptive adequacy of alternative computational models of diagnostic reasoning from single effects to single causes. Many theories of diagnostic reasoning are based on the normative assumption that inferences from an effect to its cause should reflect solely the empirically observed conditional probability of cause given effect. We argue against this assumption, as it neglects alternative causal structures that may have generated the sample data. Our structure induction model of diagnostic reasoning takes into account the uncertainty regarding the underlying causal structure. A key prediction of the model is that diagnostic judgments should not only reflect the empirical probability of cause given effect but should also depend on the reasoner's beliefs about the existence and strength of the link between cause and effect. We confirmed this prediction in 2 studies and showed that our theory better accounts for human judgments than alternative theories of diagnostic reasoning. Overall, our findings support the view that in diagnostic reasoning people go \"beyond the information given\" and use the available data to make inferences on the (unobserved) causal rather than on the (observed) data level."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1037/a0035944"],["dc.identifier.isi","000340470300001"],["dc.identifier.pmid","25090421"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/32963"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Amer Psychological Assoc"],["dc.relation.issn","1939-1471"],["dc.relation.issn","0033-295X"],["dc.title","Structure Induction in Diagnostic Causal Reasoning"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","485"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","490"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","132"],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T09:36:17Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T09:36:17Z"],["dc.date.issued","2014"],["dc.description.abstract","The question how agent and patient roles are assigned to causal participants has largely been neglected in the psychological literature on force dynamics. Inspired by the linguistic theory of Dowty (1991), we propose that agency attributions are based on a prototype concept of human intervention. We predicted that the number of criteria a participant in a causal interaction shares with this prototype determines the strength of agency intuitions. We showed in two experiments using versions of Michotte's (1963) launching scenarios that agency intuitions were moderated by manipulations of the context prior to the launching event. Altering features, such as relative movement, sequence of visibility, and self-propelled motion, tended to increase agency attributions to the participant that is normally viewed as patient in the standard scenario. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cognition.2014.05.013"],["dc.identifier.isi","000340013900020"],["dc.identifier.pmid","24955502"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/32581"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Elsevier Science Bv"],["dc.relation.issn","1873-7838"],["dc.relation.issn","0010-0277"],["dc.title","Indicators of causal agency in physical interactions: The role of the prior context"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","258"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Topics in Cognitive Science"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","281"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","14"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Mayrhofer, Ralf; 3\r\nDepartment of Psychology\r\nUniversity of Göttingen"],["dc.contributor.affiliation","Ruggeri, Azzurra; 2\r\nMPRG iSearch\r\nMax Planck Institute for Human Development"],["dc.contributor.author","Meder, Björn"],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.contributor.author","Ruggeri, Azzurra"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-08-12T07:45:26Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-08-12T07:45:26Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.date.updated","2022-06-14T21:11:25Z"],["dc.description.abstract","Abstract Dealing with uncertainty and different degrees of frequency and probability is critical in many everyday activities. However, relevant information does not always come in the form of numerical estimates or direct experiences, but is instead obtained through qualitative, rather vague verbal terms (e.g., “the virus often causes coughing” or “the train is likely to be delayed”). Investigating how people interpret and utilize different natural language expressions of frequency and probability is therefore crucial to understand reasoning and behavior in real‐world situations. While there is considerable work exploring how adults understand everyday uncertainty phrases, very little is known about how children interpret them and how their understanding develops with age. We take a developmental and computational perspective to address this issue and examine how 4‐ to 14‐year‐old children and adults interpret different terms. Each participant provided numerical estimates for 14 expressions, comprising both frequency and probability phrases. In total we obtained 2856 quantitative judgments, including 2240 judgments from children. Our findings demonstrate that adult‐like intuitions about the interpretation of everyday uncertainty terms emerge fairly early in development, with the quantitative estimates of children converging to those of adults from around 9 years on. We also demonstrate how the vagueness of verbal terms can be represented through probability distributions, which provides additional leverage for tracking developmental shifts through cognitive modeling techniques. Taken together, our findings provide key insights into the developmental trajectories underlying the understanding of everyday uncertainty terms, and open up novel methodological pathways to formally model the vagueness of probability and frequency phrases, which are abundant in our everyday life and activities."],["dc.description.abstract","Taking a computational and developmental perspective, the authors trace a developmental trajectory in the understanding of natural language expressions of frequency and probability in 4‐ to 14‐year‐old children and adults. They find that the quantitative estimates of children converge to those of adults from around 9 years on."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/tops.12564"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/88467"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-448"],["dc.relation.eissn","1756-8765"],["dc.relation.issn","1756-8757"],["dc.rights","This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes."],["dc.title","Developmental Trajectories in the Understanding of Everyday Uncertainty Terms"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","85"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","The Psychology of Learning and Motivation"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","127"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","65"],["dc.contributor.author","Waldmann, M. R."],["dc.contributor.author","Mayrhofer, Ralf"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:20:03Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:20:03Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","The main goal of this chapter is to defend a new view on causal reasoning, a hybrid representation account. In both psychology and philosophy, different frameworks of causal reasoning compete, each endowed with its distinctive strengths and weaknesses and its preferred domains of application. Three frameworks are presented that either focus on dependencies, dispositions, or processes. Our main claim is that despite the beauty of a parsimonious unitary account, there is little reason to assume that people are restricted to one type of representation of causal scenarios. In contrast to causal pluralism, which postulates the coexistence of different representations in causal reasoning, our aim is to show that competing representations do not only coexist, they can also actively influence each other. In three empirical case studies, we demonstrate how causal dependency, causal dispositional, and causal process representations mutually interact in generating complex representations driving causal inferences."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/bs.plm.2016.04.001"],["dc.identifier.isi","000383370100003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/41800"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-0-12-805182-5"],["dc.relation.issn","0079-7421"],["dc.title","Hybrid Causal Representations"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]