Rakoczy, Hannes

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Cognition and Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","23"],["dc.contributor.author","Schünemann, Britta"],["dc.contributor.author","Proft, Marina"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-12-01T09:21:03Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-12-01T09:21:03Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1080/15248372.2021.2003366"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/94331"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-478"],["dc.relation.eissn","1532-7647"],["dc.relation.issn","1524-8372"],["dc.title","Children’s Developing Understanding of the Subjectivity of Intentions – A Case of “Advanced Theory of Mind”"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.artnumber","14967"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Scientific Reports"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","11"],["dc.contributor.author","Schünemann, Britta"],["dc.contributor.author","Keller, Judith"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Behne, Tanya"],["dc.contributor.author","Bräuer, Juliane"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-10-01T09:57:30Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-10-01T09:57:30Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.description.abstract","Abstract When dogs interact with humans, they often show appropriate reactions to human intentional action. But it is unclear from these everyday observations whether the dogs simply respond to the action outcomes or whether they are able to discriminate between different categories of actions. Are dogs able to distinguish intentional human actions from unintentional ones, even when the action outcomes are the same? We tested dogs’ ability to discriminate these action categories by adapting the so-called “Unwilling vs. Unable” paradigm. This paradigm compares subjects’ reactions to intentional and unintentional human behaviour. All dogs received three conditions: In the unwilling-condition, an experimenter intentionally withheld a reward from them. In the two unable-conditions, she unintentionally withheld the reward, either because she was clumsy or because she was physically prevented from giving the reward to the dog. Dogs clearly distinguished in their spontaneous behaviour between unwilling- and unable-conditions. This indicates that dogs indeed distinguish intentional actions from unintentional behaviour. We critically discuss our findings with regard to dogs’ understanding of human intentional action."],["dc.description.sponsorship","Open-Access-Publikationsfonds 2021"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1038/s41598-021-94374-3"],["dc.identifier.pii","94374"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/89852"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-469"],["dc.relation.eissn","2045-2322"],["dc.rights","CC BY 4.0"],["dc.title","Dogs distinguish human intentional and unintentional action"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1108"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Child Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","1122"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","85"],["dc.contributor.author","Köymen, Bahar"],["dc.contributor.author","Lieven, Elena"],["dc.contributor.author","Engemann, Denis A."],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Warneken, Felix"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomasello, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:52:50Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:52:50Z"],["dc.date.issued","2013"],["dc.description.abstract","This study investigates how children negotiate social norms with peers. In Study 1, 48 pairs of 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 96) and in Study 2, 48 pairs of 5- and 7-year-olds (N = 96) were presented with sorting tasks with conflicting instructions (one child by color, the other by shape) or identical instructions. Three-year-olds differed from older children: They were less selective for the contexts in which they enforced norms, and they (as well as the older children to a lesser extent) used grammatical constructions objectifying the norms (“It works like this” rather than “You must do it like this”). These results suggested that children's understanding of social norms becomes more flexible during the preschool years."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/cdev.12178"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151300"],["dc.identifier.pmid","24138135"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8089"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0009-3920"],["dc.title","Children's Norm Enforcement in Their Interactions With Peers"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","205"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","212"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","113"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomasello, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:52:51Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:52:51Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","Young children use and comprehend different kinds of speech acts from the beginning of their communicative development. But it is not clear how they understand the conventional and normative structure of such speech acts. In particular, imperative speech acts have a world-to-word direction of fit, such that their fulfillment means that the world must change to fit the word. In contrast, assertive speech acts have a word-to-world direction of fit, such that their fulfillment means that the word must fit the world truly. In the current study, 3-year-olds understood this difference explicitly, as they directed their criticisms selectively to actors when they did not follow the imperatives of the speaker, but to speakers when they did not describe an actor’s actions correctly. Two-year-olds criticized appropriately in the case of imperatives, but showed a more ambiguous pattern in the case of assertions. These findings identify another domain in which children’s normative understanding of human activity emerges around the third year of life."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.013"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151327"],["dc.identifier.pmid","19732871"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8117"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0010-0277"],["dc.title","Done wrong or said wrong? Young children understand the normative directions of fit of different speech acts"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","113"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2-3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognitive Systems Research"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","127"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","7"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:53:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:53:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2006"],["dc.description.abstract","Young children’s pretend play is considered in the context of the development of collective intentionality. It is argued that (i) early pretending is an essentially social and culturally acquired form of action, and (ii) early social pretend play can be considered as the first form of true collective intentionality in ontogeny – involving shared cooperative activities and even some rudimentary form of joint creation of status functions. Recent experimental studies are reported that provide evidence for the claims. Finally, philosophical implications of these claims and findings are discussed. The most important implication that emerges is that existing conceptual analyses of collective intentionality stand in need of being supplemented by more fain-grained taxonomies for the description of such early forms of collective intentionality."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.008"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151341"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8134"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","1389-0417"],["dc.title","Pretend play and the development of collective intentionality"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","121"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Mind and Language"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","147"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","18"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomasello, Michael"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:53:44Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:53:44Z"],["dc.date.issued","2003"],["dc.description.abstract","It is widely believed that what distinguishes the social cognition of humans from that of other animals is the belief–desire psychology of four–year–old children and adults (so–called theory of mind). We argue here that this is actually the second ontogenetic step in uniquely human social cognition. The first step is one year old children's understanding of persons as intentional agents, which enables skills of cultural learning and shared intentionality. This initial step is \\‘the real thing\\’ in the sense that it enables young children to participate in cultural activities using shared, perspectival symbols with a conventional/normative/reflective dimension—for example, linguistic communication and pretend play—thus inaugurating children's understanding of things mental. Understanding beliefs and participating in collective intentionality at four years of age—enabling the comprehension of such things as money and marriage—results from several years of engagement with other persons in perspective–shifting and reflective discourse containing propositional attitude constructions."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/1468-0017.00217"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151347"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8140"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0268-1064"],["dc.title","What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","61"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognitive Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","69"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","24"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Warneken, Felix"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomasello, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:53:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:53:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.description.abstract","We investigated preschoolers’ selective learning from models that had previously appeared to be reliable or unreliable. Replicating previous research, children from 4 years selectively learned novel words from reliable over unreliable speakers. Extending previous research, children also selectively learned other kinds of acts – novel games – from reliable actors. More important, – and novel to this study, this selective learning was not just based on a preference for one model or one kind of act, but had a normative dimension to it. Children understood the way a reliable actor demonstrated an act not only as the better one, but as the normatively appropriate or correct one, as indicated in both their explicit verbal comments and their spontaneous normative interventions (e.g., protest, critique) in response to third-party acts deviating from the one demonstrated. These findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of children's social cognition and cultural learning."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.07.004"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151328"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8120"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0885-2014"],["dc.title","Young children's selective learning of rule games from reliable and unreliable models"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","730"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","749"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","106"],["dc.contributor.author","Mendes, Natacha"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Call, Josep"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:53:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:53:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2007"],["dc.description.abstract","Developmental research suggests that whereas very young infants individuate objects purely on spatiotemporal grounds, from (at latest) around 1 year of age children are capable of individuating objects according to the kind they belong to and the properties they instantiate. As the latter ability has been found to correlate with language, some have speculated whether it might be essentially language dependent and therefore uniquely human. Existing studies with non-human primates seem to speak against this hypothesis, but fail to present conclusive evidence due to methodological shortcomings. In the present experiments we set out to test non-linguistic object individuation in three great ape species with a refined manual search methodology. Experiment 1 tested for spatiotemporal object individuation: Subjects saw 1 or 2 objects simultaneously being placed inside a box in which they could reach, and then in both conditions only found 1 object. After retrieval of the 1 object, subjects reached again significantly more often when they had seen 2 than when they had seen 1 object. Experiment 2 tested for object individuation according to property/kind information only: Subjects saw 1 object being placed inside the box, and then either found that object (expected) or an object of a different kind (unexpected). Analogously to Experiment 1, after retrieval of the 1 object, subjects reached again significantly more often in the unexpected than in the expected condition. These results thus confirm previous findings suggesting that individuating objects according to their property/kind is neither uniquely human nor essentially language dependent. It remains to be seen, however, whether this kind of object individuation requires sortal concepts as human linguistic thinkers use them, or whether some simpler form of tracking properties is sufficient."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cognition.2007.04.007"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151332"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8124"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0010-0277"],["dc.title","Ape metaphysics: Object individuation without language"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","146"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognitive Development"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","155"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","24"],["dc.contributor.author","Wyman, Emily"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomasello, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:53:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:53:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","In two studies 3-year-olds’ understanding of the context-specificity of normative rules was investigated through games of pretend play. In the first study, children protested against a character who joined a pretend game but treated the target object according to its real function. However, they did not protest when she performed the same action without having first joined the game. In the second study, children protested when the character mixed up an object's pretend identities between two different pretend games. However, they did not protest when she performed the same pretend action in its correct game context. Thus, the studies show that young children see the pretence–reality distinction, and the distinction between different pretence identities, as normative. More generally, the results of these studies demonstrate young children's ability to enforce normative rules in their pretence and to do so context-specifically."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.01.003"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151329"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8121"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0885-2014"],["dc.title","Normativity and context in young children's pretend play"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","219"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Cognition"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","227"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","121"],["dc.contributor.author","Rossano, Federico"],["dc.contributor.author","Rakoczy, Hannes"],["dc.contributor.author","Tomasello, Michael"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:52:50Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:52:50Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","The present work investigated young children’s normative understanding of property rights using a novel methodology. Two- and 3-year-old children participated in situations in which an actor (1) took possession of an object for himself, and (2) attempted to throw it away. What varied was who owned the object: the actor himself, the child subject, or a third party. We found that while both 2- and 3-year-old children protested frequently when their own object was involved, only 3-year-old children protested more when a third party’s object was involved than when the actor was acting on his own object. This suggests that at the latest around 3 years of age young children begin to understand the normative dimensions of property rights."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.007"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151316"],["dc.identifier.pmid","21774921"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8105"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0010-0277"],["dc.title","Young children’s understanding of violations of property rights"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]