Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp

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[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","207"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","216"],["dc.contributor.author","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.contributor.editor","Abraham, Markus"],["dc.contributor.editor","Zimmermann, Till"],["dc.contributor.editor","Zucca-Soest, Sabrina"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-09-18T13:30:41Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-09-18T13:30:41Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/67759"],["dc.publisher","Steiner Verlag"],["dc.publisher.place","Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie - Beihefte"],["dc.relation.eventlocation","Hamburg"],["dc.relation.eventstart","2015-04"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Vorbedingungen des Rechts"],["dc.title","Stabilität durch gerechte Institutionen"],["dc.title.subtitle","Eine rawlsianische Antwort auf das Böckenförde-Diktum"],["dc.type","conference_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","125"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","131"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","105"],["dc.contributor.author","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.creator.author","Philipp Gisbertz"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-09-18T13:30:12Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-09-18T13:30:12Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.25162/arsp-2019-0007"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/67756"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.publisher","Steiner Verlag"],["dc.publisher.place","Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie"],["dc.relation.doi","10.25162/ARSP-2019-0007"],["dc.relation.reviewedauthor","Frowe, Helen"],["dc.relation.reviewedauthor","Grayling, A.C."],["dc.relation.reviewedauthor","Haque, Adil Ahmad"],["dc.relation.reviewedauthor","Schneider, Sebastian"],["dc.relation.reviewedauthor","Jensen, Jessica"],["dc.relation.reviewededitor","Lazar, Seth"],["dc.relation.reviewededitor","Frowe, Helen"],["dc.title","Auch im Krieg ist nicht alles erlaubt"],["dc.type","review"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","196"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Ratio Juris"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","31"],["dc.contributor.author","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.contributor.orcid","0000-0003-3915-5803"],["dc.creator.author","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-09-18T13:28:59Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-09-18T13:28:59Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.description.abstract","The concept of human dignity is criticized due to its vagueness, but by discussing the most important schools of thought, we can identify a core meaning that is common to most understandings of human dignity: Whether we conceptualize human dignity in terms of autonomy, self-respect, social acts, or equal status, we always refer to some kind of personal identity. This personal identity consists in those aspects that we consider to be constitutive of our individual personality. Instead of remaining within doctrinal school thought, this core meaning can be taken as a common denominator for human dignity discourse."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/raju.12204"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/67753"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation.issn","0952-1917"],["dc.title","Overcoming Doctrinal School Thought: A Unifying Approach to Human Dignity"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","63"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","74"],["dc.contributor.author","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.contributor.editor","Neumann, Ulfrid"],["dc.contributor.editor","Tiedemann, Paul"],["dc.contributor.editor","Liu, Shing I"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-09-18T13:49:57Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-09-18T13:49:57Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.description.abstract","A common approach to human dignity is to define it by paradigmatic cases of its violations. These violations are often called humiliations; hence, theories of this sort can be called humiliationism. Humiliationists claim that their theory can avoid metaphysical justifications of human dignity. In this article, I show that humiliationism fails in this regard. Humiliationists must implicitly take recourse to those metaphysical preconditions that they tried to evade. If they do not, their theories must unconvincingly reduce human dignity to a contingent positive norm or social practice. But these findings must not lead to dignity scepticism. Instead we should distinguish justifiable from unjustifiable metaphysical arguments. The method of defining human dignity by its paradigmatic cases helps to identify and understand human dignity, but it cannot replace its philosophical (and sometimes cautiously metaphysical) justification."],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/67760"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.publisher","Steiner Verlag"],["dc.publisher.place","Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie - Beihefte"],["dc.relation.conference","29th IVR World Congress: Workshop \"Menschenwürde ohne Metaphysik\""],["dc.relation.eventlocation","Luzern"],["dc.relation.eventstart","2019-07"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Menschenwürde ohne Metaphysik"],["dc.title","Die Sackgassen des Humiliationismus in Metaphysik oder Positivismus"],["dc.type","conference_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.status","accepted"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.contributor.author","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.contributor.editor","v. d. Pfordten, Dietmar"],["dc.contributor.editor","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-09-18T14:30:30Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-09-18T14:30:30Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/67762"],["dc.publisher","Mohr Siebeck"],["dc.publisher.place","Menschenwürde"],["dc.relation.conference","Menschenwürde als unverfügbare Eigenschaft. Tagung anlässlich des 70. Jahrestags der UN-Menschenrechtserklärung"],["dc.relation.eventlocation","ZiF, Bielefeld"],["dc.relation.eventstart","2018-12"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Menschenwürde. Zur Frage ihrer Unverfügbarkeit"],["dc.title","Unverfügbarkeit oder Kontingenz? Gemeinsamkeiten und Trennlinien philosophischer Positionen"],["dc.type","conference_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.status","accepted"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","15"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","104"],["dc.contributor.author","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.contributor.orcid","0000-0003-3915-5803"],["dc.creator.author","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-09-18T13:29:12Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-09-18T13:29:12Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.description.abstract","Historically there are many conceptualizations of «war» and «peace». Taking a closer look, we can nevertheless specify these concepts rather clearly: war is defined as violent conflict resolution between states or as a condition of violence or continuing uncertainty. Peace requires at least the absence of war. As long as we do not consider it the contradictory antonym to war, it seems plausible to specify it by the feature of the absence of enmity or–even better–as an order of non-violent conflict resolution. To speak of a “war on terrorism“ negates the modern restriction of possible agents in war, i.e. that only states can be war parties, and it bears the risk of an erosion of humanity in war as well as of the distinction between martial and criminal law. It seems better justified to deal with transnational terrorism within terms of peace, in which violent acts are legally prosecuted in an order of alternative conflict resolution."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.25162/arsp-2018-0001"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/67754"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation.issn","0001-2343"],["dc.title","The Concepts of \"War\" and \"Peace\" in the Context of Transnational Terrorism"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","443"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Ethics & International Affairs"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","465"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","35"],["dc.contributor.author","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.date.accessioned","2022-01-11T14:05:38Z"],["dc.date.available","2022-01-11T14:05:38Z"],["dc.date.issued","2021"],["dc.description.abstract","Abstract The focus on the moral rights of combatants in the ethics of war ignores a very important point: although morally unjust combatants cannot be considered moral equals to just combatants, especially with regard to the right to kill, there are sound moral reasons why the laws of war should accept a kind of equality between them, a concept referred to as “reduced legal equality.” Reduced legal equality is not about equal moral rights but about granting legal immunity to combatants for their conduct in accordance with the laws of war. This article shows that reduced legal equality of combatants is not only the morally best legal regulation in our nonideal international world but also the correct interpretation of international law."],["dc.description.abstract","Abstract The focus on the moral rights of combatants in the ethics of war ignores a very important point: although morally unjust combatants cannot be considered moral equals to just combatants, especially with regard to the right to kill, there are sound moral reasons why the laws of war should accept a kind of equality between them, a concept referred to as “reduced legal equality.” Reduced legal equality is not about equal moral rights but about granting legal immunity to combatants for their conduct in accordance with the laws of war. This article shows that reduced legal equality of combatants is not only the morally best legal regulation in our nonideal international world but also the correct interpretation of international law."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1017/S0892679421000447"],["dc.identifier.pii","S0892679421000447"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/97712"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI-Import GROB-507"],["dc.relation.eissn","1747-7093"],["dc.relation.issn","0892-6794"],["dc.rights","CC BY 4.0"],["dc.rights.uri","https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms"],["dc.title","Reduced Legal Equality of Combatants in War"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","148"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Humboldt-Forum Recht"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","171"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","14"],["dc.contributor.author","Gisbertz-Astolfi, Philipp"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-09-18T13:30:33Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-09-18T13:30:33Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","Der Autor erörtert die Fragen der rechtsphilosophischen Argumentierbarkeit moralischer Differenzierung zwischen Mensch und Tier und ihrer Relation zum Begriff der Menschenwürde. Mittels einer Kritik der gängigsten anthropozentrischen und tierrechtlichen Theorien und einer Analyse konventioneller Argumentationstopoi der widerstreitenden Positionen deckt er die beiderseitige Überzeichnung argumentativer Konsequenz auf. In Anerkennung der evolutionären Kontinuität und einer moralischen Relevanz der Tiere wird dennoch ein entscheidender Unterschied zwischen menschlicher und tierischer Würde dargelegt: ein intersubjektives, soziales Moment der Zurechnung moralischer Reflexion. Als vermittelnde Position zwischen Anthropozentrismus und Spezies-Egalitarismus bietet der Autor einen moralischen Grundgedanken für tierrechtliche Fragestellungen und reflektiert in diesem Lichte kurz die juristische Situation."],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/67758"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.relation.issn","1862-7617"],["dc.title","Würde des Menschen – Würde des Tiers?"],["dc.title.subtitle","Zum Verhältnis von Mensch und Tier aus der Perspektive der Rechtsphilosophie"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dc.type.subtype","original_ja"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]