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Schulz-Hardt, Stefan
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Schulz-Hardt, Stefan
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Schulz-Hardt, Stefan
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Schulz-Hardt, S.
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2005Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","469"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Journal of Social Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","492"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","35"],["dc.contributor.author","Fischer, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Jonas, Eva"],["dc.contributor.author","Frey, Dieter"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:43:28Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:43:28Z"],["dc.date.issued","2005"],["dc.description.abstract","In research on selective exposure to information, people have been found to predominantly seek information supporting rather than conflicting with their opinion. In most of these studies, participants were allowed to search for as many pieces of information as they liked. However, in many situations, the amount of information that people can search for is restricted. We report four experiments addressing this issue. Experiment 1 suggests that objective limits regarding the maximum number of pieces of information the participants could search for increases the preference for selecting supporting over conflicting information. In Experiment 2, just giving participants a cue about information scarcity induces the same effect, even in the absence of any objective restrictions. Finally, Experiment 3 and 4 clarify the underlying psychological process by showing that information limits increase selective exposure to information because information search is guided by the expected information quality, which is basically biased towards supporting information, and information limits act to reinforce this tendency"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1002/ejsp.264"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151540"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8348"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0046-2772"],["dc.title","Selective exposure to information: the impact of information limits"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2005Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","977"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","7"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","990"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","31"],["dc.contributor.author","Jonas, Eva"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Frey, Dieter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:51Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:51Z"],["dc.date.issued","2005"],["dc.description.abstract","When making decisions, people have been found predominantly to seek information supporting their preferred choice and to neglect conflicting information. In this article, the authors investigate to what extent different types of advisors, who recommend a choice to someone or make a decision on behalf of someone, show the same confirmatory information search. In Experiment 1, the authors presented participants, in the role of advisors, with a client’s decision problem and found that when making a recommendation, advisors conducted a more balanced information search than participants who were making a decision for themselves. However, advisors who had to make a decision on behalf of their clients revealed an increased preference for information supporting their position. Experiment 2 suggested that this confirmatory information search was caused by impression motivation: The advisors bolstered their decision to justify it to the client. The results are discussed within the multiple motive framework of the heuristic systematic model."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1177/0146167204274095"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151531"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/13112"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8337"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0146-1672"],["dc.rights","Goescholar"],["dc.rights.uri","https://goescholar.uni-goettingen.de/licenses"],["dc.title","Giving Advice or Making Decisions in Someone Else’s Place"],["dc.title.subtitle","The Influence of Impression, Defense, and Accuracy Motivation on the Search for New Information"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2001Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","188"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Experimental Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","200"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","48"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Meinken, Imke"],["dc.contributor.author","Rott, Alexandra"],["dc.contributor.author","Frey, Dieter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:53Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:53Z"],["dc.date.issued","2001"],["dc.description.abstract","Die vorliegende Untersuchung knüpft an die Arbeiten von Karsten (1928) und Lewin (1928) zum Phänomen der psychischen Sättigung an. Psychische Sättigung bezeichnet einen Verlust intrinsischer Motivation bei der wiederholten Ausführung von Handlungen. Im Gegensatz zur weithin konstatierten hohen theoretischen und praktischen Relevanz des Phänomens sind die Bedingungen, die psychische Sättigung auslösen und/oder verstärken, kaum empirisch untersucht worden. Auf Grundlage des von Karsten und Lewin formulierten sowie von Schulz-Hardt, Rott, Meinken und Frey (in Druck) präzisierten Sättigungskonzepts wird postuliert, daß schwer peripherisierbare (d. h. als weitgehend unbewußte Nebenhandlung ausführbare) sowie persönlich relevante Tätigkeiten in höherem Ausmaß zu Sättigung führen sollten als leicht peripherisierbare sowie persönlich wenig relevante Tätigkeiten. Dies wurde in einem Experiment mit 66 Schülern überprüft, die verschiedene Variationen des Konzentrations-Leistungs-Tests (KLT) bearbeiteten. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen weitgehend unsere Vorhersage. Zudem finden sich Hinweise darauf, daß der Zusammenhang zwischen Sättigung und Leistung durch die Peripherisierbarkeit sowie die persönliche Relevanz der Aufgabe moderiert wird."],["dc.description.abstract","The present experiment on the phenomenon of psychic satiation expands on the work of Karsten (1928) and Lewin (1928). Psychic satiation denotes a loss of intrinsic motivation when the same action is performed repeatedly. Although many studies have shown the high theoretical and practical relevance of this phenomenon, the conditions which lead to or reinforce psychic satiation have rarely been investigated empirically. Based on the concept of psychic satiation as formulated by Karsten and Lewin and refined by Schulz-Hardt, Rott, Meinken, and Frey (in press), we predicted that psychic satiation will increase if the task does not lend itself to being carried out “peripherally¾ (i.e., as an almost unconscious incidental action) and if it has high personal relevance. These predictions were investigated in an experiment with 66 high-school students who performed different versions of the “Konzentrations-Leistungs-Test¾ (concentration-performance-test, KLT). The results are largely in line with our predictions. In addition, the results indicate that the relation between satiation and performance is moderated by personal relevance and the induced task characteristic."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1026//0949-3946.48.3.188"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151526"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8332"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","1618-3169"],["dc.title","Psychische Sättigung: Eine neue experimentelle Untersuchung zu einem alten Konstrukt"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2009Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","22"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Journal of Social Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","39"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","39"],["dc.contributor.author","Greitemeyer, Tobias"],["dc.contributor.author","Fischer, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Frey, Dieter"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T08:33:00Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T08:33:00Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","Biased assimilation is the tendency, to evaluate belief-consistent information more positively than belief-inconsistent information. Previous research has demonstrated that biased assimilation is due to an inconsistency between an argument and the recipient's position toward this argument. The present research revealed that an inconsistency between a source's position (independently of the argument) and the recipient's position is also responsible for biased assimilation. In two studies, participants evaluated arguments stated by a politician. Party affiliation of the politician was correctly labeled, incorrectly labeled, or not labeled. The politicians' arguments were evaluated more favorably by their respective voters when party affiliation was correctly labeled. This biased evaluation diminished when party affiliation was not labeled and even slightly reversed when party affiliation was incorrecctly labeled. Copyright (C) 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1002/ejsp.497"],["dc.identifier.isi","000263960700003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/17467"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","John Wiley & Sons Ltd"],["dc.relation.issn","0046-2772"],["dc.title","Biased assimilation: The role of source position"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI WOS2005Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","35"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Zeitschrift für Arbeits- und Organisationspsychologie A&O"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","43"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","49"],["dc.contributor.author","Greitemeyer, Tobias"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Popien, Grit"],["dc.contributor.author","Frey, Dieter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:47Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:47Z"],["dc.date.issued","2005"],["dc.description.abstract","Entscheidungen sollten gemäß des ökonomischen Postulats ausschließlich aufgrund der Abwägung von zukünftigen Kosten und Nutzen getroffen werden. Dagegen beschreibt der Sunk-Cost-Effekt das Phänomen, dass auch vergangene Investitionen Entscheidungen beeinflussen. In der vorliegenden Studie wurde der Sunk-Cost-Effekt bei vergangenen monetären Aufwendungen repliziert. Zudem konnte erstmals auch ein Sunk-Cost-Effekt bei zeitlichen Aufwendungen nachgewiesen werden. Bankangestellte hatten bei insgesamt vier Entscheidungsszenarien die Wahl zwischen zwei Alternativen. Eine der Alternativen wurde jeweils gegenüber der anderen als eindeutig ökonomisch vorteilhafter dargestellt. In die ungünstigere Alternative wurden entweder monetäre oder zeitliche Mittel investiert, wogegen für die objektiv bessere Alternative keine bisherigen Investitionen getätigt worden waren. Die Mehrzahl der Befragten entschied sich in mehreren Fällen für die objektiv schlechtere Alternative, ließ sich also von den bereits erfolgten Aufwendungen leiten. Normative principles imply that decisions should be based solely on incremental costs and benefits. Nevertheless, there is a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment has been made, a phenomenon which is labelled the sunk cost effect. In the present study, the sunk cost effect was replicated when money had already been invested. More importantly, a sunk cost effect was also found when time had already been invested. In four hypothetical scenarios, bank employees were faced with the choice between two alternatives. One alternative was presented as being clearly better than the other. For the less-preferred alternative, either money or time had been invested, whereas no prior investments had been made in the preferred alternative. In line with the sunk cost effect, most of the respondents chose the less-preferred alternative, indicating that prior investments affected their decisions."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1026/0932-4089.49.1.35"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151508"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8312"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0932-4089"],["dc.title","Der Einfluss versunkener monetärer und zeitlicher Kosten auf Ressourcenallokationen"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2008Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","175"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","186"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","108"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Thurow-Kröning, Birgit"],["dc.contributor.author","Frey, Dieter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:53Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:53Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.description.abstract","A prominent finding in escalating commitment and entrapment research is the “responsibility effect”: people invest more in a losing course of action or persist with it for longer if they themselves initiated this action (responsibility) as opposed to if it was assigned to them. We argue that this effect is driven by participants’ preferences. Responsible participants usually prefer the chosen alternative since they have chosen it themselves. Non-responsible participants, in contrast, represent a mix of persons who either favor or disfavor the chosen alternative. In two experiments, we demonstrate that responsible participants favor the chosen course of action more strongly than non-responsible participants do, that these preferences facilitate reinvestment in and persistence with the chosen course of action, and that responsibility has no effect over and above this effect of preferences. Non-responsible participants preferring the chosen course of action made similar reinvestments and exhibited similar persistence as responsible participants."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.11.001"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151528"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8334"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0749-5978"],["dc.title","Preference-based escalation: A new interpretation for the responsibility effect in escalating commitment and entrapment"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2002Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","563"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","586"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","88"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Jochims, Marc"],["dc.contributor.author","Frey, Dieter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:48Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:48Z"],["dc.date.issued","2002"],["dc.description.abstract","Decision-making groups in organizations are often expected to function as a “think tank” and to perform “reality testing” to detect the best alternative. A biased search for information supporting the group's favored alternative impairs a group's ability to fulfill these requirements. In a two-factorial experiment with 201 employees and managers from various economic and public organizations, genuine and contrived dissent were investigated as counterstrategies to biased information seeking. Genuine dissent was manipulated by forming three-person groups whose members either all favored the same alternative individually (homogeneous groups) or consisted of a minority and a majority faction with regard to their favored alternative (heterogeneous groups). Contrived dissent was varied by the use or nonuse of the “devil's advocacy” technique. The results demonstrate that heterogeneity was more effective in preventing a confirmatory information-seeking bias than devil's advocacy was. Confidence was identified as an important mediator. Implications for the design of interventions aimed at facilitating reality testing in group decision making are discussed."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/s0749-5978(02)00001-8"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151513"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8317"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0749-5978"],["dc.title","Productive conflict in group decision making: genuine and contrived dissent as strategies to counteract biased information seeking"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2008Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","231"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Personality and Social Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","244"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","94"],["dc.contributor.author","Fischer, Peter"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Frey, Dieter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:49Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:49Z"],["dc.date.issued","2008"],["dc.description.abstract","Empirical evidence on selective exposure to information after decisions is contradictory: Whereas many studies have found a preference for information that is consistent with one's prior decision, some have found a preference for inconsistent information. The authors propose that different available information quantities moderate these contradictory findings. Four studies confirmed this expectation. When confronted with 10 pieces of information, decision makers systematically preferred decision-consistent information, whereas when confronted with only 2 pieces of information, they strongly preferred decision-inconsistent information (Study 1). This effect was not due to differences in processing complexity (Study 2) or dissonance processes (Study 3) but could be traced back to different salient selection criteria: When confronted with 2 pieces of information, the salient selection criterion was information direction (consistent vs. inconsistent), which caused a preference for inconsistent information. In contrast, when confronted with more than 2 pieces of information, the salient selection criterion was expected information quality, which caused a preference for consistent information (Study 4)."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1037/0022-3514.94.2.94.2.231"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151521"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8326"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","1939-1315"],["dc.title","Selective exposure and information quantity: How different information quantities moderate decision makers' preference for consistent and inconsistent information."],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2004Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","739"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","6"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","European Journal of Social Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","760"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","34"],["dc.contributor.author","Traut-Mattausch, Eva"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Greitemeyer, Tobias"],["dc.contributor.author","Frey, Dieter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:53Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:53Z"],["dc.date.issued","2004"],["dc.description.abstract","People in Germany overwhelmingly believe that the Euro introduction caused an overall price increase, however, no such increase actually took place. To investigate whether this disparity could be based on biased perceptions of the average price trend, four studies were conducted. Participants received two menus from a restaurant (one ‘old’ menu with German Mark (DM) prices and one ‘new’ menu with Euro prices) and were asked to estimate the price trend (in per cent). In all of these studies, price trend judgements were biased towards rising prices. If the prices had in fact been raised, the magnitude of this price increase was overestimated. If the prices had remained stable, significant price increases were perceived. And if the prices had fallen, they were perceived as having remained stable. The bias was systematically related to participants' expectations concerning price increases. A ‘selective outcome correction’ hypothesis proved to best fit the data: incorrect calculation outcomes that are in line with one's expectations are overlooked, whereas incorrect inconsistent outcomes are detected and corrected. The results imply that expectations can influence judgements even when clear disconfirming evidence is available that can be compared with an objective standard, thus leaving no room for interpretation."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1002/ejsp.228"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151525"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8331"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0046-2772"],["dc.title","Expectancy confirmation in spite of disconfirming evidence: The case of price increases due to the introduction of the Euro"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI2005Journal Article [["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","541"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Journal of Economic Psychology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","548"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","26"],["dc.contributor.author","Greitemeyer, Tobias"],["dc.contributor.author","Schulz-Hardt, Stefan"],["dc.contributor.author","Traut-Mattausch, Eva"],["dc.contributor.author","Frey, Dieter"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:54:47Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:54:47Z"],["dc.date.issued","2005"],["dc.description.abstract","The present study investigated whether initial expectations of rising prices causally influence price trend judgments even in the presence of unequivocal contrary evidence. To this end, a 2 (real price trend) × 3 (expected price trend) factorial experiment was conducted. Participants compared the prices of two menus, one priced in German Marks and the other priced in Euros. The average Euro price was either higher than or the same as the average German Mark price. Expectations of either higher prices or stable prices were induced. In a control condition, no expectation was induced. As expected, price trend perceptions were causally affected by price trend expectations. On the one hand, the manipulated expectation of rising prices yielded a perception of price increases even when the real prices remained stable. On the other hand, when the real prices increased but an expectation of stable prices had been induced the real price trend was underestimated."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.joep.2004.10.003"],["dc.identifier.gro","3151510"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/8314"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","0167-4870"],["dc.title","The influence of price trend expectations on price trend perceptions: Why the Euro seems to make life more expensive?"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]Details DOI