Tams, Benjamin

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","170"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","IET Biometrics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","180"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","5"],["dc.contributor.author","Tams, Benjamin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:09:45Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:09:45Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","The fuzzy vault scheme' is a cryptographic primitive being considered for storing fingerprint minutiae protected. A well-known problem of the fuzzy vault scheme is its vulnerability against correlation attack-based cross-matching thereby conflicting with the unlinkability requirement' and irreversibility requirement' of effective biometric information protection. Yet, it has been demonstrated that in principle a minutiae-based fuzzy vault can be secured against the correlation attack by passing the to-be-protected minutiae through a quantisation scheme. Unfortunately, single fingerprints seem not to be capable of providing an acceptable security level against offline attacks. To overcome the aforementioned security issues, this study shows how an implementation for multiple fingerprints can be derived on basis of the implementation for single finger thereby making use of a Guruswami-Sudan algorithm-based decoder for verification. The implementation, for which public C++ source code can be downloaded, is evaluated for single and various multi-finger settings using the MCYT-Fingerprint-100 database and provides security-enhancing features such as the possibility of combination with password and a slow-down mechanism."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1049/iet-bmt.2014.0093"],["dc.identifier.isi","000382809100003"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/39712"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Inst Engineering Technology-iet"],["dc.relation.issn","2047-4946"],["dc.relation.issn","2047-4938"],["dc.title","Unlinkable minutiae-based fuzzy vault for multiple fingerprints"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","183"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","IET Biometrics"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","190"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","6"],["dc.contributor.author","Gottschlich, Carsten"],["dc.contributor.author","Tams, Benjamin"],["dc.contributor.author","Huckemann, Stephan"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:48:37Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:48:37Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","Fingerprint recognition is widely used for verification and identification in many commercial, governmental and forensic applications. The orientation field (OF) plays an important role at various processing stages in fingerprint recognition systems. OFs are used for image enhancement, fingerprint alignment, for fingerprint liveness detection, fingerprint alteration detection and fingerprint matching. In this study, a novel approach is presented to globally model an OF combined with locally adaptive methods. The authors show that this model adapts perfectly to the ‘true OF’ in the limit. This perfect OF is described by a small number of parameters with straightforward geometric interpretation. Applications are manifold: Quick expert marking of very poor quality (for instance latent) OFs, high-fidelity low parameter OF compression and a direct road to ground truth OFs markings for large databases, say. In this contribution, they describe an algorithm to perfectly estimate OF parameters automatically or semi-automatically, depending on image quality, and they establish the main underlying claim of high-fidelity low parameter OF compression."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1049/iet-bmt.2016.0087"],["dc.identifier.gro","3146922"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/4708"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","public"],["dc.notes.submitter","chake"],["dc.relation.issn","2047-4938"],["dc.title","Perfect fingerprint orientation fields by locally adaptive global models"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","985"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","5"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","998"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","10"],["dc.contributor.author","Tams, Benjamin"],["dc.contributor.author","Mihailescu, Preda"],["dc.contributor.author","Munk, Axel"],["dc.date.accessioned","2017-09-07T11:44:26Z"],["dc.date.available","2017-09-07T11:44:26Z"],["dc.date.issued","2015"],["dc.description.abstract","The fuzzy vault scheme is a cryptographic primitive that can be used to protect human fingerprint templates where stored. Analyses for most implementations account for brute-force security only. There are, however, other risks that have to be consider, such as false-accept attacks, record multiplicity attacks, and information leakage from auxiliary data, such as alignment parameters. In fact, the existing work lacks analyses of these weaknesses and are even susceptible to a variety of them. In view of these vulnerabilities, we redesign a minutiae-based fuzzy vault implementation preventing an adversary from running attacks via record multiplicity. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism for robust absolute fingerprint prealignment. In combination, we obtain a fingerprint-based fuzzy vault that resists known record multiplicity attacks and that does not leak information about the protected fingerprints from auxiliary alignment data. By experiments, we evaluate the performance of our security-improved implementation that, even though it has slight usability merits as compared with other minutiae-based implementations, provides improved security. However, despite heavy efforts spent in improving security, our implementation is, like all other implementations based on a single finger, subjected to a fundamental security limitation related to the false acceptance rate, i.e., false-accept attack. Consequently, this paper supports the notion that a single finger is not sufficient to provide acceptable security. Instead, implementations for multiple finger or even multiple modalities should be deployed the security of which may be improved by the technical contributions of this paper."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1109/TIFS.2015.2392559"],["dc.identifier.gro","3141918"],["dc.identifier.isi","000352534300008"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/2522"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","WoS Import 2017-03-10"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.notes.submitter","PUB_WoS_Import"],["dc.relation.eissn","1556-6021"],["dc.relation.issn","1556-6013"],["dc.title","Security Considerations in Minutiae-Based Fuzzy Vaults"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.subtype","original"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","43"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","54"],["dc.contributor.author","Mihăilescu, Preda"],["dc.contributor.author","Munk, Axel"],["dc.contributor.author","Tams, Benjamin"],["dc.contributor.editor","Brömme, Arslan"],["dc.contributor.editor","Busch, Christoph"],["dc.contributor.editor","Hühnlein, Detlef"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-02-05T10:16:35Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-02-05T10:16:35Z"],["dc.date.issued","2009"],["dc.description.abstract","The fuzzy vault approach is one of the best studied and well accepted ideas for binding cryptographic security into biometric authentication. We present in this paper a brute force attack which improves on the one described by T. Charles Clancy et. al. in 2003 in an implementation of the vault for fingerprints. Based on this attack, we show that three implementations of the fingerprint vault are vulnerable and show that the vulnerability cannot be avoided by mere parameter selection in the actual frame of the protocol. We will report about our experiences with an implementation of such an attack. We also give several suggestions which can improve the fingerprint vault to become a cryptographically secure algorithm. In particular, we introduce the idea of fuzzy vault with quiz which draws upon information resources unused by the current version of the vault. This may bring important security improvements and can be adapted to the other biometric applications of the vault."],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/11951"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","fcwi-famis"],["dc.publisher","Gesellschaft für Informatik"],["dc.publisher.place","Bonn"],["dc.relation.eventend","18"],["dc.relation.eventlocation","Darmstadt"],["dc.relation.eventstart","17"],["dc.relation.ispartof","BIOSIG 2009: biometrics and electronic signatures"],["dc.title","The fuzzy vault for fingerprints is vulnerable to brute force attack"],["dc.type","conference_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]