Misselhorn, Catrin

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","AI & Society"],["dc.contributor.author","Loh, Wulf"],["dc.contributor.author","Misselhorn, Catrin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-05-11T06:43:23Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-05-11T06:43:23Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019"],["dc.description.abstract","While recent studies suggest that augmented learning employing smart glasses (ALSG) increases overall learning performance, in this paper we are more interested in the question which repercussions ALSG will have on the type of knowledge that is acquired. Drawing from the theoretical discussion within epistemology about the differences between Knowledge-How and Knowledge-That, we will argue that ALSG furthers understanding as a series of epistemic and non-epistemic Knowing-Hows. Focusing on academic knowledge acquisition, especially with respect to early curriculum experiments in various STEM disciplines as investigated by the BmBF “Be-Greifen” project, we take the Be-Greifen holo.lab setup as an example for showing that ALSG shifts the learning focus from propositional knowledge to epistemic competencies, which can be differentiated as “grasping”, “wielding”, and “transferring”."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s00146-019-00881-3"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64977"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relation.issn","0951-5666"],["dc.relation.issn","1435-5655"],["dc.title","Augmented learning, smart glasses and knowing how"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.contributor.author","Behrendt, Hauke"],["dc.contributor.author","Loh, Wulf"],["dc.contributor.author","Matzner, Tobias"],["dc.contributor.author","Misselhorn, Catrin"],["dc.contributor.editor","Behrendt, Hauke"],["dc.contributor.editor","Loh, Wulf"],["dc.contributor.editor","Matzner, Tobias"],["dc.contributor.editor","Misselhorn, Catrin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-04-29T16:21:19Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-04-29T16:21:19Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019"],["dc.description.abstract","Wie lässt sich der Bereich des Privaten heute genau beschreiben? Welchen Wert besitzt Privatheit in digitalisierten Gesellschaften für den Einzelnen und die Gesellschaft als Ganzes? Welche Werte und Lebensformen werden durch Privatheit geschützt, welche eingeschränkt? Entstehen durch die Informationsasymmetrie zwischen Technologieunternehmen, staatlichen Verdatungsinstitutionen und Verbrauchern/Bürgern möglicherweise neue Machtstrukturen? Welche rechtlichen Implikationen ergeben sich hieraus? Dieser Band geht diesen und anderen Fragen, die sich im Hinblick auf die etablierte Gleichung von Freiheit und Privatheit stellen, nach und versucht Antworten zu finden."],["dc.format.extent","IX, 244"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/978-3-476-04860-8"],["dc.identifier.isbn","978-3-476-04860-8"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64518"],["dc.language.iso","de"],["dc.publisher","J.B. Metzler"],["dc.publisher.place","Stuttgart"],["dc.title","Privatsphäre 4.0"],["dc.title.subtitle","Eine Neuverortung des Privaten im Zeitalter der Digitalisierung"],["dc.type","book"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","575"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Philosophy & Technology"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","590"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","32"],["dc.contributor.author","Loh, Wulf"],["dc.contributor.author","Misselhorn, Catrin"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-05-07T06:19:15Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-05-07T06:19:15Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.description.abstract","This paper discusses the ethical implications of perverse incentives with regard to autonomous driving. We define perverse incentives as a feature of an action, technology, or social policy that invites behavior which negates the primary goal of the actors initiating the action, introducing a certain technology, or implementing a social policy. As a special form of means-end-irrationality, perverse incentives are to be avoided from a prudential standpoint, as they prove to be directly self-defeating: They are not just a form of unintended side effect that must be balanced against the main goal or value to be realized by an action, technology, or policy. Instead, they directly cause the primary goals of the actors—i.e., the goals that they ultimately pursue with the action, technology, or policy—to be “worse achieved” (Parfit). In this paper, we elaborate on this definition and distinguish three ideal-typical phases of adverse incentives, where only in the last one the threshold for a perverse incentive is crossed. In addition, we discuss different possible relevant actors and their goals in implementing autonomous vehicles. We conclude that even if some actors do not pursue traffic safety as their primary goal, as part of a responsibility network they incur the responsibility to act on the common primary goal of the network, which we argue to be traffic safety."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s13347-018-0322-6"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/64914"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.relatedmaterial.material","https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326417519_Autonomous_Driving_and_Perverse_Incentives"],["dc.relatedmaterial.material","https://philpapers.org/rec/LOHADA"],["dc.relatedmaterial.material","https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-018-0322-6"],["dc.relation.issn","2210-5433"],["dc.relation.issn","2210-5441"],["dc.title","Autonomous Driving and Perverse Incentives"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","no"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]