Keser, Claudia

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","93"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","107"],["dc.contributor.author","Jøsang, Audun"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Dimitrakos, Theo"],["dc.contributor.editor","Herrmann, Peter"],["dc.contributor.editor","Issarny, Válerie"],["dc.contributor.editor","Shiu, Simon"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-12-18T14:43:24Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-12-18T14:43:24Z"],["dc.date.issued","2005"],["dc.description.abstract","The term trust management suggests that trust can be managed, for example by creating trust, by assessing trustworthiness, or by determining optimal decisions based on specific levels of trust. The problem to date is that trust management in online environments is a diverse and ill defined discipline. In fact, the term trust management is being used with very different meanings in different contexts. This paper examines various approaches related to online activities where trust is relevant and where there is potential for trust management. In some cases, trust management has been defined with specific meanings. In other cases, there are well established disciplines with different names that could also be called trust management. Despite the confusion in terminology, trust management, as a general approach, represents a promising development for making online transactions more dependable, and in the long term for increasing the social capital of online communities."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/11429760_7"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57136"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.publisher","Springer"],["dc.publisher.place","Berlin"],["dc.relation.doi","10.1007/b136639"],["dc.relation.isbn","978-3-540-26042-4"],["dc.relation.ispartof","Trust Management Third International Conference, iTrust 2005, Paris, France, May 23-26, 2005. Proceedings"],["dc.title","Can we manage trust?"],["dc.type","book_chapter"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","177"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","2"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Games and Economic Behavior"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","205"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","39"],["dc.contributor.author","Berninghaus, Siegfried K."],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-02T17:41:42Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-02T17:41:42Z"],["dc.date.issued","2002"],["dc.description.abstract","We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine how much local interaction structures affect players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium than interaction in closed neighborhoods. Second, when players are allocated around a circle, the neighborhood size has, in the long run, no effect on the players' strategy choices. Third, with the same neighborhood size, players allocated on a lattice tend less than players allocated around a circle to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. This is true even though the players are given exactly the same instructions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1006/game.2001.0897"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57168"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Conventions and local interaction structures"],["dc.title.subtitle","experimental evidence"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Health Economics Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","10"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Montmarquette, Claude"],["dc.contributor.author","Schmidt, Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Schnitzler, Cornelius"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-04-14T08:32:04Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-04-14T08:32:04Z"],["dc.date.issued","2020"],["dc.description.sponsorship","Open-Access-Publikationsfonds 2021"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1186/s13561-020-00299-4"],["dc.identifier.purl","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gs-1/17795"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/83799"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-399"],["dc.notes.intern","Merged from goescholar"],["dc.relation.eissn","2191-1991"],["dc.rights","CC BY 4.0"],["dc.rights.uri","http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"],["dc.title","Custom-made health-care: an experimental investigation"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.version","published_version"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","473"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","4"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Theory and Decision"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","502"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","71"],["dc.contributor.author","Pogrebna, Ganna"],["dc.contributor.author","Krantz, David H."],["dc.contributor.author","Schade, Christian"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T14:47:27Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T14:47:27Z"],["dc.date.issued","2011"],["dc.description.abstract","We use a sequential voluntary contribution game to compare the relative impact of a first-mover’s non-binding announcement versus binding commitment on cooperation. We find that a non-binding announcement and a binding commitment increase individual contributions to a similar extent. Since announced contributions systematically exceed commitments, in sessions with a non-binding announcement, second-movers tend to contribute more to the group activity than in sessions with a binding commitment. Yet, second-movers appear to be more motivated towards achieving a social optimum when the first-mover uses commitment. We also find that a non-binding announcement has a higher impact on individual propensity to cooperate than the ex post contribution of the first-mover. However, the failure to make announced contributions decreases cooperation even though the first-mover is reassigned in every period."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1007/s11238-011-9248-5"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57175"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","23"],["dc.contributor.author","Weimann, Joachim"],["dc.contributor.author","Brosig-Koch, Jeannette"],["dc.contributor.author","Hennig-Schmidt, Heike"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Stahr, Christian"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-12-18T16:19:07Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-12-18T16:19:07Z"],["dc.date.issued","2012"],["dc.description.abstract","Many of real-world public-goods are characterized by a marginal per capita return (MPCR) close to zero and have to be provided by large groups. Up until now, there is almost no evidence on how large groups facing a low MPCR behave in controlled public-good laboratory experiments involving financial incentives. Connecting four experimental laboratories located in four di¤erent German universities via Internet, we are able to run such experiments. In ad-dition to the group size (60 and 100 subjects), we vary the MPCR which is as small as 0:02 or 0:04. Our data reveal a strong MPCR effect, but almost no group-size e¤ect. Our data demonstrates that, even in large groups and for low MPCRs, considerable contributions to public goods can be expected. Interestingly, the contribution patterns observed in large and very small groups are very similar. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one that includes large-group laboratory experiments with a small MPCR under conditions comparable to previous small-group standard public-good experiments."],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57140"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.title","Public-good experiments with large groups"],["dc.type","working_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","1"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","15"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.seriesnr","99s-24"],["dc.contributor.author","Ehrhart, Karl-Martin"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T14:43:44Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T14:43:44Z"],["dc.date.issued","1999"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57174"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.publisher","CIRANO"],["dc.publisher.place","Montréal"],["dc.relation.crisseries","Série Scientifique (CIRANO)"],["dc.relation.ispartofseries","Série scientifique. Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche et Analyse des Organisations; 99s-24"],["dc.title","Mobility and cooperation"],["dc.title.subtitle","On the run"],["dc.type","working_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","277"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.issue","3"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","German Economic Review"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","283"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","17"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Gaudeul, Alexia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2018-11-07T10:11:13Z"],["dc.date.available","2018-11-07T10:11:13Z"],["dc.date.issued","2016"],["dc.description.abstract","We summarize the career of Reinhard Selten, who received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994. We underline his contributions to several domains of the theory of games, to the study of bounded rationality and to the methodology of experimental economics. We finally present the papers in this special issue in honor of his 85th birthday."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1111/geer.12106"],["dc.identifier.isi","000380367000001"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/40003"],["dc.notes.status","zu prüfen"],["dc.notes.submitter","Najko"],["dc.publisher","Wiley-blackwell"],["dc.relation.issn","1468-0475"],["dc.relation.issn","1465-6485"],["dc.title","Foreword: Special Issue in Honor of Reinhard Selten's 85th Birthday"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dc.type.peerReviewed","yes"],["dc.type.status","published"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","149"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.journal","Economics Letters"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","151"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.volume","163"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Özgümüs, Asri"],["dc.date.accessioned","2020-12-10T14:23:35Z"],["dc.date.available","2020-12-10T14:23:35Z"],["dc.date.issued","2018"],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.012"],["dc.identifier.issn","0165-1765"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/71976"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.intern","DOI Import GROB-354"],["dc.title","Trust, vulnerability and trustworthiness"],["dc.type","journal_article"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.bibliographiccitation.firstpage","222"],["dc.bibliographiccitation.lastpage","230"],["dc.contributor.author","Cheng, Pau-Chen"],["dc.contributor.author","Rohatgi, Pankaj"],["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.contributor.author","Karger, Paul A."],["dc.contributor.author","Wagner, Grant M."],["dc.contributor.author","Reninger, Angela Schuett"],["dc.date.accessioned","2019-01-03T14:39:55Z"],["dc.date.available","2019-01-03T14:39:55Z"],["dc.date.issued","2007"],["dc.description.abstract","This paper presents a new model for, or rather a new way of thinking about adaptive, risk-based access control. Our basic premise is that there is always inherent uncertainty and risk in access control decisions that is best addressed in an explicit way. We illustrate this concept by showing how the rationale of the well-known, Bell-Lapadula model based, multi-level security (MLS) access control model could be used to develop a risk-adaptive access control model. This new model is more like a fuzzy logic control system than a traditional access control system and hence the name \"fuzzy MLS\". The long version of this paper is published as an IBM Research Report."],["dc.identifier.doi","10.1109/SP.2007.21"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/57173"],["dc.language.iso","en"],["dc.notes.status","final"],["dc.publisher","IEEE"],["dc.publisher.place","Piscataway, NJ"],["dc.relation.conference","2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy"],["dc.relation.eventend","2007-05-23"],["dc.relation.eventlocation","Oakland, California, USA"],["dc.relation.eventstart","2007-05-20"],["dc.relation.ispartof","2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07)"],["dc.title","Fuzzy Multi-Level Security"],["dc.title.subtitle","An Experiment on Quantified Risk-Adaptive Access Control"],["dc.type","conference_paper"],["dc.type.internalPublication","unknown"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]

[["dc.contributor.author","Keser, Claudia"],["dc.date.accessioned","2021-06-28T09:35:38Z"],["dc.date.available","2021-06-28T09:35:38Z"],["dc.date.issued","2019-06-04"],["dc.identifier.uri","https://resolver.sub.uni-goettingen.de/purl?gro-2/87342"],["dc.relation.conference","Das sogenannte Böse: Das Verbrechen aus interdisziplinärer Perspektive"],["dc.relation.date","2019-06-04"],["dc.relation.eventlocation","Göttingen"],["dc.relation.multimedia","https://goedoc.uni-goettingen.de/docs/audio/ring2019-06-04.mp3"],["dc.relation.multimedia","https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZdJ4zV0tps"],["dc.title","Homo oeconomicus – Ein Erklärungsmodell für (Wirtschafts-)Kriminalität?"],["dc.type","lecture"],["dc.type.internalPublication","yes"],["dspace.entity.type","Publication"]]